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Abstract
Combatting corruption in Cameroon has become a primary policy focus for the
government and the civil society; yet, the success on that front has been modest. The
literature on anticorruption efforts in the country is scant. Using Rothstein and Santiso’s
conceptualization of anticorruption strategies as the guide, the purpose of this case study
of government’s anticorruption policy and practice was to explore and contextualize the
anticorruption strategies in Cameroon to fill the gap in the literature and potentially
contribute to solving the problem. Data were collected through interviews with 20
government employees working with the government’s main anticorruption agency –the
National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC), and through documents obtained from
government published archives and expert publications. The data were inductively coded
and organized in themes, then an integrated content analysis was conducted on the
themes. The key finding of the study is that the government’s anticorruption strategies
faced major challenges due to their poor design, formulation, and implementation.
Potential approaches to addressing these challenges were also identified by participants to
include leadership/political solutions such as regime change, institutional reforms such as
granting NACC institutional autonomy, and conceptual solutions such as reforming
NACC into an organization with judicial status. This study will impact positive social
change through the recommendations it makes for good governance, which if
implemented by the Cameroon government, would improve systems, institutions, and
services to the citizens of the country. Another benefit is the improvement in government
revenue, better investment budgets, and greater economic activity to alleviate poverty.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Introduction
Corruption is one of the prevalent work-related and social behaviors that hamper
the efficient and effective functioning of governments, organizations, and societies.
Practices such as “bribery, fraud, embezzlement, kickbacks, cronyism, and extortion”
(Berlinski, 2009, p. 74) represent corruption, which has emerged in recent decades as a
critically important issue in developing countries and a major barrier to good governance,
especially in Africa. Most developing democracies have been plagued by this
phenomenon, while their governments are still aspiring to fully join the contemporary
global markets that set high ethical standards for corporate business operations as a
deterrent to both domestic and international corrupt practices in business (Kolk & van
Tulder, 2005).
The global consequences of corruption are dire because corruption basically
inflates the cost of goods and services without added value, thus undermining the
microeconomy of nations. It has been argued that corruption serves as a breeding ground
for social, economic, and political unrest, undermining democracy and the rule of law
while distorting national and international trade. Furthermore, as argued, corruption
jeopardizes sound governance and ethics in the private sector, threatens domestic and
international security and the sustainability of natural resources, reinforces gender
discrimination, and compounds political exclusion (Berlinski, 2009). Corruption also
promotes nepotism and misappropriation of funds in the public and private sectors,
creates a conflict of formal institutions and informal standards, sustains secrecy and
inequality which contradict the creation and existence of democratic institutions,
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decreases national productivity and increases inflation, worsens trade deficits, and
generally hinders investment, entrepreneurship, and innovation (Shahabuddin, 2002).
Transparency International (TI), a German based and renowned international
anticorruption nongovernment organization (NGO), has rated Cameroon more than once
as the most corrupt nation in the world (Berlinski, 2009; TI, 2016). The first time
Cameroon was rated as the most corrupt country of the world was in 1998 (TI, 1998).
Then, Cameroon appeared at the bottom of TI’s corruption perception index (CPI) chart,
which rates countries from highly clean to highly corrupt, with 10 representing the
cleanest nation and 0 representing the most corrupt nation. On this scale, Cameroon
scored 1.4 and ranked the worst of the 85 countries that participated in TI’s survey for
that year (TI, 1998). In the second year (i.e., 1999), Cameroon scored 1.5 on TI’s CPI and
ranked 99th out of the 99 countries surveyed (TI, 1999). Since then, the country has
developed several anticorruption programs and made strides towards combating
corruption; yet, much work is still to be done. Presently, Cameroon still ranks with some
of the most corrupt countries of the world even though it is no longer at the very bottom.
For instance, recently in 2017, TI’s CPI ranked Cameroon in 153rd place out of the 180
countries surveyed. And the country’s score remained low—at 25 on the scale of 100 (TI,
2017).
Corruption is a global problem. In 2010, TI noted that many governments were
committing huge budgets to tackle the world’s most pressing problems, ranging from the
instability of financial markets to climate change and poverty (TI, 2010). Regardless,
corruption remained an obstacle to achieving much needed progress in those areas. TI’s
CPI for the year 2010 showed that nearly three quarters of the 178 countries surveyed
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(mostly developing countries) scored below 5 on a scale of 10, thus indicating a serious
worldwide corruption problem, and specifically in developing societies (TI, 2010). To
address these challenges, TI (year) held that governments needed to integrate
anticorruption measures in all spheres, including the countries’ responses to the financial
crisis, climate change and commitments by the international community to eradicate
poverty. At that time, the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) was
considered the only global initiative that provides a framework for putting an end to
corruption (TI, 2010).
In the effort of combating corruption, Cameroon has developed different
anticorruption approaches, which are being implemented and managed by a government
agency, the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC), also known as the CONAC
(Commission Nationale Anti-Corruption) in French. Created in March 2006, NACC’s
activities against corruption in Cameroon are usually paired-up with different presidential
policies and mechanisms geared towards the same goal (NACC, 2008). The most recent
campaign launched against corruption in Cameroon by the head of state and managed by
NACC was named Operation Epervier (French appellation), which means Operation
Sparrow Hawk in English (NACC, 2006). This operation led to the incarceration of
several government officials in February 2008 (Cameroon Today, 2011; Freedom House,
2011; NACC, n.d; Ndoumbe, 2008).
The people of Cameroon wish that corruption be eradicated from their society, with the
government making significant strides toward the goal (Freedom House, 2011).
However, there is a concern as to how soon this goal can be achieved and what it would
take to attain such a goal considering the viability of mechanisms put in place to support
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government anticorruption policy. Concerns of this nature provide the impetus for this
study.
Background
Combating corruption in Cameroon has been among the fundamental governing
policies of the current president of the country since his ascension to power in 1982
(Ngomba, 2006). Accordingly, he announced in that year that his guiding philosophy as
Cameroon’s head of state will be rigor, integrity, and moralization (Ngomba, 2006). By
this pronouncement, the president meant that he would not tolerate corruption in the
country. But coming back after 3 decades to assess the situation on ground, it seemingly
could be said that the president fell short of this vision, as public corruption is still wide
spread in the civil service in Cameroon and the country still ranks amongst some of the
most corrupt countries of the world (TI, 2017). The outstanding question that continues to
linger is, what kind of anticorruption policies has the government agency responsible
been implementing and what are their weaknesses? This is one of the background pillars
upon which this study was constructed.
The need to combat corruption in Cameroon became more apparent between the
late 1990s and early 2000s, the period during which the toll of corruption on the society
appeared to have accelerated (Fombad, 2003). Author argued that corruption was
prevalent in Cameroon’s public services before the 1980s but that it was not widespread,
generalized, or as deep-rooted as it became evident in the 2000s (Fombad, 2003). In
another study, the author dubbed corruption in Cameroon endemic, explaining that
corruption has permeated almost every aspect of Cameroonian daily life, meanwhile,
public officials seem to have either severely underestimated, or completely ignored, the
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consequences of this epidemic (Fombad, 2000). According to Fombad (2000), high levels
and vast scales of corruption remain among the main causes of Cameroon’s economic
and political problems. In response, the government launched its first open national
initiative against corruption in the country in 2006 with the creation of a NACC (NACC,
2008). This agency would now champion government’s anticorruption policy across the
nation, leading the implementation of such policy, giving feedback to the president and
the legislature for the crafting of laws that will enhance the agency’s activities, and also
mandating and facilitating the prosecution of culprits of corruption in criminal courts
(NACC, 2008).
The Cameroon government’s anticorruption policy since the beginning of the
2000s was generally marked by complacency (Fombad, 2000). According to author,
corruption in Cameroon was officially dismissed as nothing more than occasional acts of
dishonesty and indiscretion by civil servants. However, the problem was much more
serious, with a gravity that could only be compared to the devastation caused by AIDS on
any fragile and depressed economy (Fombad, 2000). Developments in the fight against
corruption in Cameroon by January 2018 included the continuation of Operation Sparrow
hawk that was launched in the country about 11 years earlier by Biya—head of state
(Bechem, 2018).
Although several top-ranked government officials were arrested and incarcerated
through this operation, such as the arrest of the former prime minister on April 16, 2012
(Regional Anti-Corruption Initiative, 2012), the Cameroonian population still harbored
mixed feelings on how successful government anticorruption efforts had been in
Cameroon. The approach to prevent corruption in Cameroon was said to be limited to the
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application of Article 66 of the Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon, which
demanded that top-ranking government officials declare their assets before and after
serving in a public office (Houmfa, 2012). The strict reliance on the preceding article as
the sole major legal measure for curbing public corruption appeared to be insufficient to
treat the corruption disease that had been rooted into the culture of the entire society.
The Cameroon head of state created a special criminal court that would try
officials accused of embezzling public funds amounting to a minimum value of 50
million CFA francs (Houmfa, 2012). This action was being implemented alongside other
anticorruption laws, some of which were dubbed defective by public opinion, especially
parliament’s decision in December 2011, which stipulated that charges against
individuals found guilty of corruption would be dropped if they paid back missing funds
to the government (Houmfa, 2012). On the one hand, this measure sent a positive
message to the public in the fight against corruption, as it might had entailed that the
government wanted by all means to retrieve public funds from citizens who might have
embezzled them by reason of the devil’s temptation or without premeditation and as such
were willing to repent (Houmfa, 2012). On the other hand, this measure could result in
serious negative consequences for the anticorruption effort in general, as it incentivized
public officials to orchestrate embezzlements through money laundry and other
investment schemes granted that their liability was now limited by the legislature to the
starting capital misappropriated. The financial gain made from investing embezzled state
funds was not censored in a piece of legislation rendered hapless by the absence of a
preceding government white paper that would have enabled the public to identify
loopholes and closure mechanisms.
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Problem Statement
Combating corruption through different anticorruption approaches such as
government structural adjustment, systematic strategies, and specific mechanisms put in
place by governments and international organizations is an issue of global significance.
Cross-national cooperation in the fight against corruption has become a major means for
tackling the issue, especially in developing countries (Carr, 2007; Udombana, 2003).
Nevertheless, most developing countries, including Cameroon, have not been able to
substantially reduce their levels of corruption even after employing universal
anticorruption strategies such as structural adjustment programs (SAPs), which are now
considered as the way forward for most developing countries engaged in a serious
anticorruption fight (Nguemegne, 2011; Udombana, 2003). For example, after being
declared the most corrupt country in the world in 1998 and 1999 respectively (TI, 1998,
1999), Cameroon in the most recent CPI results of 2017 still performed poorly, scoring
25/100 and ranking 153 out of 180 participating countries (See Table 1, Appendix A).
Doig and Riley (1998) argued that universal anticorruption strategies still needed to be
set according to the political, economic, legal, and sociocultural contexts of the
developing countries to achieve real success. This is a perspective that is yet to have
substantial empirical support in the corruption/anticorruption literature.
The literature on corruption/anticorruption contains different theoretical opinions
on the nature of an effective governmental anticorruption strategies. Universalist and
particularistic theorists differ in their views on how to curb corruption, especially in
developing nations. Universalist and particularistic theorists differ in their views on how
to curb corruption, especially in developing nations. Universalists such as Santiso (2001),
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for example, see a transplantation of international measures, especially from the Western
world, through global cooperation and development programs and institutions, such as
the World Bank and IMF, into developing nations based on different economic and
sociopolitical objectives set for each country. Proponents of particularistic approaches, on
the other hand, hold the view that at the root of systemic corruption is a particularistic
political culture, which is defined as a system in which the treatment of citizens by
government depends on status or position in society, and people do not expect to be
treated fairly by the state. What people expect is similar treatment to everybody with the
same status. As such, anticorruption strategies must be adapted to address specific
contextual differences for real success to be attained (Rothstein, 2007, p. 13).
This study sought to locate a spot in the preceding argument for Cameroon’s
anticorruption policy in order to achieve a clear understanding of the country’s
anticorruption practices. The study aimed at gaining a better understanding of the context
and the nature of the anticorruption strategies adopted in Cameroon as practiced by
NACC. It also probed into the reasons for the weaknesses embedded in these strategies,
because this problem needs to be solved, as it is apparent that high levels and vast scales
of corruption remain among the main causes of Cameroon’s economic and political
problems (Fombad, 2000).
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to explore the Cameroon government’s policy
toward combating corruption in Cameroon by examining its anticorruption approaches
and their implementation. In this study, I examined the anticorruption strategies in place
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and endeavored to expose some of the particular reasons for the government’s negligible
achievement in its 3-decade combat against corruption in the Cameroonian context.
I examined the circumstances that led to the launch of the different anticorruption
campaigns by the current Cameroonian head of state since the mid-1990s until today and
explored the underlying context of corruption and the fight against it. I also sought to
identify and assess the government’s anticorruption policy and mechanisms, measure the
extent to which these policies satisfy good governance principles, and look for potential
reasons why the policies have not achieved much success over 3 decades.
In the absence of fundamental elements of anticorruption practice, those that
satisfy tested and proven good governance principles such as accountability,
transparency, rule of law, responsiveness, equitability and inclusiveness, effectiveness
and efficiency, and participative governance, a government is bound to face drawbacks in
its effort to combat corruption. Substantial effort and resources could be spent toward
anticorruption projects, but so long as the policies and processes are not properly
formulated, effectively debated in a democratic atmosphere, legislated into law, and
implemented in the light of the above-mentioned good governance principles, such
efforts could achieve less in terms of results. It is evident that little success has been
achieved in the country’s anticorruption struggle. As such, I first explored how
anticorruption strategies and approaches implemented by the government related to
universal working concepts of anticorruption which are also integral components of good
governance, and secondly how these strategies were adapted to the particular policy
context of the country. With this goal in mind, I was able to identify to some tangible
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propositions and developed answers connected to the lack of plausible success in
anticorruption practice by the NACC since inception.
Research Questions
This study was guided by one overarching question and four subquestions. The
main question was: What anticorruption strategies are perceived as effective in helping
the government of Cameroon curb systematic public corruption? The subquestions were:
1. What are the anticorruption strategies implemented by Cameroon’s NACC?
2. What can be learned from NACC’s experience of working with anticorruption
policies and programs?
3. What tools do NACC agents feel are needed from the government to implement
effective anticorruption policies?
4. How can the notion of adaptation of policies be used to potentially improve the
development and implementation of anticorruption strategies at NACC?
Conceptual and Theoretical Framework
The specific theories of universalism and particularism in anticorruption
approaches as constructed in Rothstein (2007) and in Santiso (2001) provided a
theoretical framework for this study. Universalists see a transplantation of international
measures, especially from the western world into developing nations (Santiso, 2001).
Particularistic opinions hold unto specificity and originality of approaches (Rothstein,
2007). I explored these views, while endeavoring to examine the concept of adaptability
(contextualization) of anticorruption approaches as a middle ground where these existing
theories could be retried and settled for improved performance. This conception was
based on the premise that imported anticorruption strategies from other examples around
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the world, especially from developed and industrialized nations, may not work effectively
in the setting of developing countries like Cameroon unless they are adapted to the policy
context of the country.
The universal or particularistic theories of anticorruption approaches must build
on the foundational theory of good governance, which measures the effectives of
anticorruption policy and practice. The good governance theory holds the premise that
there are certain government practices that if put into place, one would have a more
effective, efficient, and successful democratic government (Elahi, 2009). The theory, as
expounded in Elahi (2009), projects the control of corruption as one of the indicators of
good governance, including practices such as legitimacy and voice; direction;
performance; accountability and transparency; fairness (rule of law and equity) (Graham,
Amos, & Plumptre, 2003, p. 3). This theory, in explaining the dynamics of the
relationship between corruption/anticorruption and the realization of effective
governance, receives support from related theories such as that of global governance, and
development (Elahi, 2009; Nanda, 2006). If the control of corruption is an indicator of
good governance, then good governance principles could be employed to ensure effective
anticorruption policy making and practice. Theoretically and conceptually, the study built
on universalistic and particularistic competing theories of anticorruption, the foundation
of which is the theory of good governance, while endeavoring to explore a possible
balance through the concept of adaptability of anticorruption strategies.
Nature of the Study
This section of the study states the design of the study in terms of design
paradigm, inquiry approach, and the rationale for the choice of design. Secondly, it states
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the methodology in terms of participants, site, role of the researcher in data collection
procedures, and sampling. Thirdly, it states potential weaknesses associated with the
methods and how they are addressed. And finally, it outlines some of the ethical concerns
that may surround the study.
The study sought to gain an in-depth understanding of Cameroon’s government
anticorruption strategies as implemented by its NACC. This study was conceived and
conducted as a qualitative study, making use of the case study approach to scientific
inquiry. A research design can either be qualitative or quantitative in nature, or a
combination of both (mixed methods). The choice of design usually depends on the
nature of the inquiries the researcher intends carrying out. Research design itself is a plan
or proposal to conduct research, involving the intersection of philosophy, strategies of
inquiry, and specific methods (Creswell, 2009, p. 5). The researcher’s philosophical
worldview plays a considerable role in determining the suitability of each of the
approaches. Positivism, constructivism, advocacy/participatory, and pragmatism are
some of the major worldviews espoused in Creswell (2009). Each of these worldviews
influences the thinking pattern and design approach adopted in the research. The nature
of the research problem, the researcher’s personal experiences, and the audience are also
determining factors in choosing a specific design (Creswell, 2009).
The primary worldview held in this study is constructivism, which entails
interaction between researcher and participants in the study (Guba & Lincoln, 1989). This
is one of the main reasons why the study is best suited to a qualitative design. The study
was designed to investigate anticorruption which is a behavior that cannot be counted or
quantified, but can only be assessed, evaluated, and to some extent valorized depending
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on the specificity of analysis conducted. According to Creswell (2007), the qualitative
researcher is identified with activities that locate him/her in real world problems that
require extensive and thorough exploration, interaction with participants, developing
assumptions, collecting pertinent data and inductively analyzing and interpreting them.
With regards to the particular approach to qualitative inquiry that was adopted in
the study, the case study method was the research design of choice. Case study is defined
as “the study of an issue explored through one or more cases within a bounded system”
(Creswell, 2007, p. 73). Yin (2014) characterized it as an empirical inquiry that
investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the case) in depth and within its real-world
context. The encompassing nature of case study expounded by Yin makes the approach
more fitting to study complex phenomena, as it tends to provide the researcher with a
more simplistic platform and tools to carry out inquiries. It is on this definition that this
study situates its inquiry into Cameroon’s anticorruption strategies as implemented by
NACC.
Another reason that accounted for the selection of the case study method was the
argument that case study is familiar to social scientists because of its popularity in
psychology, law, and political science (Creswell, 2007). Therefore, approaching this
study as a public policy analyst was more disciplinary relevant. Perception of sampling
unit drew on the conclusions made by Tellis (1997) on unit of analysis for case study
research. The unit of analysis is said to be a critical factor in case study, and it is typically
a system of action rather than an individual or group of individuals (Tellis, 1997). And
case studies tend to be selective, focusing on one or two issues that are fundamental in
understanding the system being examined. The population sample for the study primarily
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consisted of a group of civil servants (public agents) working within the government
agency – NACC. The site was the capital city of Cameroon, Yaoundé, which is the
headquarters of all governmental agencies, including the NACC.
I employed purposeful random and critical case sampling strategies as the main
sampling method for the study, in line with the established approaches to sampling in
qualitative studies (see Patton, 2002). The focus on critical case strategy permits logical
generalization and maximum application of information to other cases (Creswell, 2007).
In terms of sample size and data collection procedure, 20 participants
(knowledgeable public servants in the area of corruption/anticorruption) working at
NACC were interviewed. Additionally, documents from NACC and other applicable
sources were consulted.
Interviewing constituted the principal procedure for data collection in this study.
However, I also consulted available government documents on the subject so as to enable
triangulation of the data collected. The main advantage of interviewing in comparison to
other data collection methods is the ability it offers the researcher to enter into other
persons’ perspectives of what is going on. Qualitative interviewing varies in strategies.
Patton (2002) put forth three basic approaches to collecting qualitative data through openended interviews: the informal conversational interview, the general interview guide
approach, and the standardized open-ended interview. A combination of approaches may
be employed to maximize potential feedback (Patton, 2002). However, I focused on the
general interview guide approach for logistic reasons. Virtual interviewing by telephone
or online chats were the only means of interviewing available at the time due to ongoing
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political crisis in Cameroon, which drastically narrowed the window for a field visit due
to safety concerns.
In terms of data analysis procedures and strategies, I developed a data collection
protocol that established the basis for a comprehensive analysis. Content analysis was
operated manually with the help of coding and organization of the patterns of information
derived from the data.
For the role of the researcher, potential weaknesses of the methods, and ethical
concerns, each preceding the outlined method indicated points of weaknesses but with
more focus on the strengths that mitigated and enabled each approach to remain viable
for the study. Personal experience played an important role in facilitating data collection
and increasing trustworthiness in the judgments and analysis made on data collected. I
also avoided biases by balancing data collection techniques and analyses with
objectivism and triangulation between applied methods.
Operational Definitions
Anticorruption: This constitutes comprehensive, systematic, and knowledgebased strategies to curb corruption (Czepil, 2016).
Anticorruption Approaches or Strategies: These are measures employed by
governments and organizations to discourage, curb, and sanction corruption (Czepil,
2016). These include anticorruption campaigns, administrative or public ethics, legal
sanctions, and moral or ethical political rhetoric (Desta, 2004).
BRICS: Acronym for an association of five major emerging economies, which are
Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (brics.org).
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Contextualization: Haleblian (1983) defined the concept of contextualization as
the interrelated conditions (environment) in which something exists or occurs. Thus, to
contextualize as deemed in this study, is to put an element or an action in a particular
environment, taking into consideration the different factors existing in the said
environment, that impact the element or action. Contextualizing anticorruption therefore,
would refer to putting the elements of anticorruption being studied into a country-specific
context.
Corruption: Corruption is defined as any behavior that violates nondiscrimination norms governing the access to the political process and the allocation of
rights and resources (Kurer, 2005), and as well as behavior that can impair fair treatment
in transactions between individuals.
Particularism: Particularism refers to public servants making decisions based on
the interests of particular individuals or groups (Melchior and Melchior, 2001).
Political, economic, legal, and sociocultural realities of Cameroon (Policy
Context): These are facts concerning the organization and the functioning of the
Cameroonian state within its societal contexts (Shahabuddin, 2002).
Public, Systematic, or Political Corruption: This is the misuse of public office for
private gain (Sandholtz & Koetzle, 2000).
Universalism: Universalism is defined as the practice of government remaining
open to lessons from elsewhere (Gaylord, 2002). Relying on this background, this study
perceives universalism as a range of knowledge, interests, or practices applicable across
the globe. As such, universal anticorruption approaches should apply to any country or
society and produce similar results irrespective of the settings of these societies.

17
Assumptions
Assumptions in a study are things that are somewhat out of control, but necessary
to be in the study because if they disappear the study would become irrelevant (Simon,
2011). As such, the first assumption held for this study was that anticorruption
approaches differ in type, application, and relevance or effectiveness. Therefore, the
Cameroon government practiced particular sets of anticorruption strategies that could be
identified with its governance policies. Also, it was assumed on the preceding basis that
every society fighting corruption could achieve greater outcomes by formulating and
applying strategies that specifically address their own socioeconomic and political
realities irrespective of all other influences. This is due to the prevailing cultural
differences between societies, thus affecting individual and group behavioral patterns and
how fundamental institutions are established and how they operate. Secondly, I assumed
that low levels of corruption, be it systematic, public, sporadic, petty, or grand is a strong
indicator of good governance. Therefore, effective anticorruption strategies should
directly signify the presence of good governance principles as identified in the
subsequent literature review. Consequently, the absence of anticorruption strategies that
tie with good governance principles would mean fundamental weakness of such
strategies for the purpose of combating corruption. In addition, I assumed that
participants would be helpful in explaining the anticorruption strategies implemented in
the society being studied, from which subsequent analyses were made as appertaining to
their effectiveness in combating corruption. Lastly, I assumed that the government of
Cameroon exercised the full responsibility in matters of combating corruption in the
country and that private agencies would follow government policy in this matter.
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Scope and Delimitations
Delimitations are characteristics that limit the scope and define the boundaries of
the study (Simon, 2011). Considering the role given to NACC as the government agency
charged with the task of administering the anticorruption policy in Cameroon, I focused
on gaining an understanding of how this agency functions. I therefore looked at
perceptions of effective policy implementation in this organizational context. To this end,
different notions and theories such as particularistic and universalistic views, the
adaptability notion of public policy implementation, and the good governance theory
were used as a framework for assessment of specific anticorruption strategies adopted.
Data for the study was gathered from two main sources: publicly available
documentation and open-ended interviews with selected participants from NACC.
Limitations
Limitations in a scientific study are potential weaknesses found in the study itself
(Simon 2011). These weaknesses should be identified and examined in the light of the
conceptual and theoretical foundations of the study so as to strengthen the reliability of
the study. The main limitations of this study were those inherent to case studies,
especially generalizability. Not all government agencies in Cameroon were studied;
instead, inquiries were obtained from one major agency, Cameroon’s NACC, from which
generalizations were made. Private agencies were not studied. I assumed that the
government was fully in charge of anticorruption operations in the country. Therefore,
generalizability might be limited.
A scientific assessment of a behavior such as corruption/anticorruption is a task
that is liable to scientific errors, since the causes of the act of corruption itself might be
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misjudged; discrepancies might exist between the legal connotations of the act and what
policy analysts judge to be an act of corruption. The sensitivity (political nature) of the
object of this research was considered an element that could also impact the collection of
trustworthy information from participants.
Time was also a limiting factor that was addressed before engagement into field
work. Collecting data from government participants in this context and making quality
analyses demanded a considerable amount of time. The Cameroonian civil service has a
problem of accessibility, in terms of collecting information, especially due to the fact that
the system is not yet computerized and standardized. It took a considerable length of time
to find individuals willing to participate in a sensitive inquiry like this.
Finally, the purposeful sampling method employed in selecting participants for
this study could also be seen as a limiting factor to the openness and generality of the
study. Following this method, only specific candidates who possessed the knowledge
requisite to understand the subject matter of the study were selected. They had to meet
specific criteria in order to pass recruitment. This process itself could be perceive as a
weakness to the study in terms of the ability to gather the thoughts of the studied
population or information that was fully representative of the said population. However,
this approach remains a strong qualitative case study tradition (Creswell, 2007), and the
deep interviews conducted on the few selected participants revealed a wealth of
information that was representative of the population due to the quality of the
participants.
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Significance
Firstly, this study will add to the information and knowledge resources that could
conceivably contribute to the effectiveness of implementing the government’s
anticorruption policy in Cameroon and potentially in other nations plagued by the same
phenomenon. The study will also add to an existing body of literature that describes how
different governments tackle corruption, using different or similar tools and strategies,
and obtaining results that reflect their applications.
Secondly, effective anticorruption mechanisms entail a reduction in corruption
and social challenges to good governance. Such outcome would favor political stability
and foster socioeconomic prosperity for the targeted society and those that would draw
lessons from this study. According to Elahi (2009), the control of corruption is one of the
strong indicators of good governance. If this study succeeds in proposing
recommendations that will help in finding a solution to the problem of corruption in
Cameroon, the impact will be felt in the society in terms of changed attitudes to
governance by public officials and improved political climate.
Thirdly, the study was unique in its timing, as it was conducted at the very time
that the government renewed its commitment to pursue greater success in the fight
against corruption in Cameroon. The purpose of fighting corruption is to lead the nation
on the path of economic prosperity and good governance, hoping that it becomes an
emerging democratic and united country in diversity by 2035 (Ministry of the Economy,
Planning, and Regional Development, 2009). The study coincided with renewed interest
in the battle against corruption in Cameroon. Another significance of the study could be
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seen in the different government anticorruption strategies it identified, that might be
perceived as effective, and thus would better address the needs of the people.
Additionally, this study explored the basis for understanding anticorruption
approaches in Cameroon in terms of their effectiveness in solving the problem of
corruption in the country. As such, future research can build on the study, particularly
focusing on the progress in achieving anticorruption policy goals and implementing
specific policy mechanisms.
Finally, the study will serve as a potential resource for the United Nations, TI, and
other international organizations that are involved in corruption mitigation programs
around the world. It will become a resource to future studies in this discipline (public
policy and administration). It should delineate the strengths and weaknesses in the
development, legislation and enforcement of policy by the government to counter corrupt
practices, based on different instruments and strategies that can be contextualized. These
lessons may be transferable to the situation in other countries, especially those that are
willing to consider the experience of Cameroon.
Summary
For the past decade, the government of Cameroon has turned the need to reduce
corruption in the country into one of its major policy priorities (NACC, 2008). In this
effort, different anticorruption approaches have been developed and have been
implemented by NACC. Significant research is yet to be conducted on the successes
achieved through this effort. However, this study is one of the steps taken toward
addressing the significance and impact of government activity in Cameroon as an effort
towards reducing or possibly eradicating the corruption cankerworm from the society.
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This chapter laid the foundation for the study by exposing the problem, research
questions, purpose, conceptualization, the nature of the study, scope and delimitations,
limitations, and significance of the study. Chapter 2 will examine pertinent literature that
provides the basis of the theoretical framework of the study and examines what previous
researchers have discovered thus far on the specific case of anticorruption policies in
Cameroon.
Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
This chapter consists of pertinent literature on corruption and anticorruption,
focusing on the instruments and strategies with which the problem of corruption can be
tackled and curbed, especially for developing democracies. It also underscores some of
the current corruption and anticorruption issues faced by researchers and practitioners in
the field. Finally, I present identified gaps in the literature for future research. The
chapter is organized into four general subject areas: definitions and conceptualizations of
corruption and anticorruption, theoretical foundations of anticorruption approaches,
instruments for anticorruption practice, and contexts, which include the adaptation of
strategies for effective anticorruption practice.
Literature Search Strategy
The main databases I consulted included ProQuest Central, Academic Search
Complete/Premier, Political Science Complete, CQ Researcher, ScienceDirect,
EBSCOhost, ProQuest Dissertation and Theses, Expanded Academic ASAP, Business
Source Compete/Premier, and Sage Premier. The Google Scholar search engine was also
a key to access some scholarly information reviewed in this chapter. My search included
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the following keywords: corruption, history of corruption, corruption in Cameroon,
corruption in developing countries, corruption in Africa, anticorruption strategies,
anticorruption strategies for developing countries, anticorruption in Cameroon, and
history of anticorruption campaigns. Other keywords included combat against
corruption, effective anticorruption measures, global anticorruption, contextualizing
anticorruption, leadership and anticorruption, ethics in government, good governance
and anticorruption, corruption and the law, corruption and morality, corruption and
democratic institutions, transparency, accountability, and corruption, integrity in
government, public performance and anticorruption, and public responsibility.
Theoretical Foundation
Universalist and particularistic theories of anticorruption expressed through
operational theories such as good governance, global governance, big-bang, and program
theories as expounded in the works of Rothstein (2007), Santiso (2001), Elahi (2009),
Graham, Amos, and Plumptre (2003), Nanda (2006) formed the theoretical foundation of
this study. These theories shall be discussed subsequently. However, before then, it
would be good to explore the definition of corruption and anticorruption, so as to create a
comprehensive nexus between the different theories, concepts, and findings of the study.
The common definition of corruption held by researchers across the field of social
sciences is the one that perceives corruption as the misuse of public power for private
gain (Goldsmith, 1999; Johnston, 1996; Kurer, 2005; Philp, 1997; Sandholtz & Koetzle,
2000; Xin & Rudel, 2004). Social science researchers will always face the challenge of
establishing a universal consensus on the definition of corruption, as it has been the case
in the history of corruption studies. According to Sandholtz (2000), such difficulty is due
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to the fact that practices considered by one society as corrupt, are considered harmless or
even appropriate in another society or cultural context. However, the difficulty in
establishing general concepts and definitions of corruption should not erode the keenness
to fight corruption worldwide. Regardless of all definitions and societal contexts, corrupt
acts are wrong, improper, and illegitimate (Berlinski, 2009). Settling corrupt acts on this
broad base offers three dimensions through which policy studies can identify corrupt
behaviors in society: public interest, public opinion, and legal norms (Sandholtz, 2000).
Generally, research on corruption can be conducted at two levels—at the
individual level and the national level (Connelly & Ones, 2008). According to Connelly
and Ones (2008), research at the individual level should ask the main question, “What
characteristics of individuals and situations cause some individuals to behave in corrupt
ways?” (p. 354), while research at the national level would ask the question, “What
characteristics of nations cause greater rates of corruption at the national aggregate?” (p.
354). For studies focused on the causes of corruption, the variables examined covered a
wide spectrum of economic, political, social, cultural, and politico-historical (such as
colonialism) causes. Some of the prominent studies published on corruption in Africa,
consulted for this study, included the works of Temple (2012), Solima and Cable (2011),
Bah (2011), Kiser and Sacks (2011), Pillay and Dorasany (2010), Kusiak (2010), FraserMoleketi (2009), and Levi, Sacks, and Tyler (2009). Those specifically addressing the
case of Cameroon included the works of Nguemenge (2011), Phe and Drori (2010), and
Tanga and Dzemua (2009).
Focusing on the concept of anticorruption, this study analyzed mostly the
literature that dealt predominantly with anticorruption measures and their surrounding
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dynamics, rather than seeking to discover what the causes of corruption were, as it was
the case with most of the published research on corruption issues. Drawing on the
definition of corruption, anticorruption was defined in this study as the action and effort
by government or any other organization endowed with the required authority to
discourage and sanction the misuse of public power for private gain (Nguemenge, 2011).
In addition, since corruption is not limited to public corruption, the definition of
anticorruption could equally be expanded to include any effort taken by government,
groups, and individuals to discourage corruption in all forms (Czepil, 2016).
Research on anticorruption strategies includes the works that discuss
anticorruption measures having global application and measures that can only be
applicable to specific cultural contexts. However, this position is yet to be widely
considered by researchers in this field, most studies settle on the interplay between
international and domestic anticorruption efforts (Beblavý, 2009; Moroff & SchmidtPfister, 2010; Smilov, 2010). In this regard, the literature on anticorruption efforts
generally identifies three levels of anticorruption measures: international level
(international legal mechanisms), national level (governmental political machines), and
the civil society or community level (domestic social movements) (Moroff & SchmidtPfister). Policy makers could develop more contextual strategies by considering the
preceding distinction.
Conceptual Foundation
The concept of adaptability of anticorruption strategies derived from the work of
Santiso (2001) is the guiding idea that founded the platform upon which the other
anticorruption notions were explored. This concept shall be discussed in detail in an
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integrated analysis of the major ideas of the study. An account of a general scientific
conception of anticorruption helped established the base for scholarly review of the topic.
Anticorruption is generally conceived in the field of social sciences as an effort
toward achieving morality, ethical behavior, public performance, and simply being able
to carry on life and engaging in human affairs, respecting legal and moralistic
consideration in day to day transactions (Schmidt, 2007). Based on this conception,
different labels have been attributed to the anticorruption concept for the purpose of
research and practice. Labels such as accountability, transparency, good governance,
public service ethics, business ethics, global governance, and ethical globalization are
used as the operational terms for anticorruption studies and practice (Carr, 2007). The
works of Schmidt (2007), Carr (2007), Benito and Bastida (2009), and Moynihan (2009)
were some of the pertinent writings I selected to explain the preceding concepts. Most
recently, research in this area have expanded and other authors have explored these
topics, explaining government experience with anticorruption policies in developing
countries and the challenges that still exist despite considerable efforts that have been
made for more than 2 decades now both at domestic and international levels to bring
lasting solutions to the problem of corruption in these countries, including Cameroon.
Some of these works included those of Majila et al. (2014); Neupane et al. (2014);
Ramanujam and Caivano (2016); Spector (2016); Walton (2016); Ocheje (2017); and
Fedran et al. (2018).
According to Schmidt (2007), anticorruption debates witnessed an increase, with
a historical evolution that can be traced back to pre-1990s. In a study conducted on
selected Central Eastern European (CEE) countries, Schmidt distinguished four different
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chronological phases in the modern history of the anticorruption debates. The first phase,
witnessed during the pre-1990 era, considered a period of “earlier scholarly debates on
corruption;” the second phase was the early 1990s which marked the period of “initial
anti-corruption debates;” the third occurred in the early-2000s, which is considered the
period of “reorientation;” and finally, the mid-2000s marks a period of the “latest anticorruption debates” (Schmidt, 2007, p. 202). Two major anticorruption conceptions
include the transnational anticorruption strategy and the domestic anticorruption strategy
(Schmidt, 2007).
Examining the case of the postcommunist world, which refers to the era after
1990 when communism collapsed in Eastern Europe, Schmidt (2007) analyzed the
development of the anticorruption practices in the countries of CEE. Revealing that the
anticorruption literature in the West has had a more stable development than that in the
East, Schmidt examined a situation where the proliferation of the Western ideas of the
free market greatly influenced the landscape of anticorruption studies in the communist
world. The literature has had that same kind of influence on the developing nations,
including Cameroon. According to Schmidt, in the early 1990s corruption emerged as a
major problem in the new independent states of the global south. It is this awareness that
would give a new impetus to governments, organization, and groups fighting corruption
both domestically and internationally.
In another study, Carr (2007) discussed the legal framework of anticorruption
efforts at regional and international levels. This framework is defined by legislations and
conventions drafted by member-governments and organizations. While Schmidt’s (2007)
writings examined the politico-economic and global nature of anticorruption practices
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and studies, Carr’s study revealed the legal aspect of the concept. Anticorruption cannot
be studied or practiced without the understanding that it has legal foundations, support,
and instruments. Discussing legislations and conventions as the major legal frameworks
for anticorruption practices at regional and international levels, Carr explained how these
approaches would likely produce fewer effective results if they lack uniformity in their
conception and application, and are not enforced robustly through solid mechanisms set
in place (p. 122).
Carr (2007) discussed the use of varied regulations within the legal framework
against corruption, including fines, loss of freedom, and incentives. Conventions usually
include sanctions, preventive measures, mutual assistance, and cooperation (Carr, 2007).
Carr outlined several conventions that have been established worldwide to foster
anticorruption, some of which included the Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption (1996), the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions (by Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, 1997), and the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption
(1999). Other conventions include the Southern African Development Protocol Against
Corruption (2001), African Union Convention of Preventing and Combating Corruption
(2003), and the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (2003) (Carr, 2007).
These are some of the legal instruments that are used to encourage anticorruption
practices in signatory countries.
The social factor was the third major aspect considered in the literature when
conceiving an approach for studying or practicing anticorruption. Anticorruption is
perceived as a cure to corruption which is a social problem, needing curative and
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preventive measures that are deeply rooted in sociology, anthropology and morality of
every society (Carr, 2007). Carr used the term resocialization to explain the need to
create considerable social awareness about the dangers of corruption as a measure of
fighting this endemic disease.
The last theoretical basis for anticorruption studies and practice was revealed in
systematic administrative studies of corruption in governments, corporations, and other
forms of public organizations. From this theoretical basis came the concepts of good
governance, public service ethics, business ethics, accountability, transparency and all the
operational concepts that ensure proper and productive system functioning (Benito &
Bastida, 2009). The works of Benito and Bastida and Moynihan (2009) discussed some
of the recent ideas developed in this area. The work of Benito and Bastida covered a wide
array on concepts in systemic public administration, including fiscal procedures, budget
performance, budget transparency, and accountability in general within the public sector.
The findings of Benito and Bastida related to some of the policy issues resulting from the
relationship between budget transparency, fiscal situation, and political turnout, using a
comparative international approach, all in the effort to create and run systems that lessen
the loopholes for corrupt practices within the public sector.
According to results derived from a comparative budget transparency index
developed by Benito and Bastida (2009), encompassing 40 budget features based on
international standards for a sample of 41 countries, a positive relationship was found
between national government fiscal balance and budget transparency. This implied,
according to authors, that the more information the budget disclosed, the less fiscal
deficits can be used by politicians to achieve opportunistic goals (Benito & Bastida,
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2009). Obscure budgets often set the stage for embezzlement and corruption (Benito &
Bastida, 2009). As budget transparency appears to hold politicians and public officials
accountable, Benito and Bastida’s article can serve as a model for examining the
relationship between budget transparency and the fight against fiscal corruption, which is
one of the significant areas of corruption witnessed in developing countries, including
Cameroon.
Moynihan (2009) discussed performance issues in government as another basis
for establishing the practice of anticorruption in the public service system. Moynihan
sought to settle the debate on the source of legitimacy for public administration between
two schools of thoughts—those who hold that the rule of law should be considered the
dominant framework of the field, and those who have said that the study of performance
should be considered the dominant source. By referring this argument to the study at
hand, one would extract those elements related to government performance—the purpose
of public policy administration. In public administration, the citizenry is the bedrock of
all policies and what it awaits from the government is service delivery, which has to do
with performance (management) (Moynihan, 2009). Improved government performance
means the implementation of efficient and effective systems, and thus more
accountability and less corruption. Moynihan provided another scholarly resource for
studying government performance and how it is linked to the construction of transparent,
accountable, responsible, and effective systems. These are the concepts that form the
basis and the support system for all studies and practices of anticorruption by
governments and other domestic and international anticorruption proponents.
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Instruments for Anticorruption Practice
There is no one uniform approach to anticorruption. Several tools and strategies
are used to combat corruption, either curatively or preventively. These tools and
strategies include the following:
•

The policy instrument made applicable through strategies such as
anticorruption programs and campaigns and structural and functional
administrative adjustments that seek to ensure certain standards for public
performance and integrity.

•

The legal instrument that utilizes punitive and institutional strategies to
curb corruption.

•

The role of leadership and society, which calls for transformational
leadership and organizational change..

•

Citizen participation.
The Policy Instrument

Strategies such as anticorruption programs and campaigns, structural and
functional administrative reforms that define standards for public performance and
integrity constitute some of the instruments used by government as policy strategy to
combat corruption.
Anticorruption Programs and Campaigns
In a recent study conducted on Eastern European Countries (EEC) by Moroff and
Schmidt-Pfister (2010), the researchers documented findings on how anticorruption
programs, projects, and campaigns became an essential aspect of furthering good
governance over the past two decades prior to their study. These campaigns and
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programs, Moroff and Schmidt-Pfister explained, are manifested at both domestic and
international levels. Thus, the authors differentiate between domestic social movements,
governmental political machines, and international legal machines. This separation
creates a three-level platform for analyzing anticorruption efforts—the international
society, the national government, and the domestic civil society. In the study, the
researchers found out and concluded that the interface of the preceding three levels
produced coincidental and spontaneous breakthroughs that largely outweighed systematic
implementation of appropriate anticorruption strategies.
Moreover, Moroff and Schmidt-Pfister (2010) stressed that broad social support
for anticorruption strategies remains essential for the success of any international and
governmental initiatives. This analysis might be true in the context of the current study,
but the situation might be different in other cases since systematic anticorruption
strategies might produce more effective results in these cases than focusing on broad
anticorruption programs and campaigns. Programs and campaigns identified by the
researchers were classified according to the three groups of analyses listed above, with
actors and activities identified at each level. At the international level, Moroff and
Schmidt-Pfister found an international society that is made up of actors such as
“international organizations, international NGOs, transnational actors such as private
foundations, think tanks, multinational business and some very active western
governments” (p. 93).
In another study conducted by Beblavý (2009) in Slovakia, the dynamics of
anticorruption programs and campaigns are once again witnessed, especially as they
interacted with other strategies to bring about an effective effort against corruption and its
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consequences. Beblavý’s study revealed that government strategies against corruption are
usually interwoven, as one form of approach could be used to implement the other. For
example, certain structural reforms would require sensitization campaigns and educative
programs for effective implementation. Beblavý found that amongst the things policy
makers can do to decrease corruption in developing and transition countries, changing
norms of behavior through education and public information campaigns is essential.
Beblavý discovered that Slovakia’s success in combating corruption started in
June 2000 when the first Dzurinda government approved a national program for the fight
against corruption, developed by the office of the deputy prime minister of economic
policy, Miklos on the basis of a proposal prepared by TI, Slovakia (Beblavý, 2009, p.
181). The principles and reforms held under this program targeted a “multifaceted
strategy favoring changes both in formal and informal rule” (Beblavý, 2009, p. 182). The
goal was to endorse reduction in administrative budgetary discretion and increase
transparency, improve the functioning of the judiciary and prosecution, combat conflict
of interest at all levels of government, and above all change norms of behavior through
education and public information campaigns (Beblavý, 2009). Although the program and
campaigns strategy did not stand alone in the Beblavý’s study, its significance is seen in
the interface it creates between other strategies and their application in the field.
Slovakia’s case is one from which other developing countries such as Cameroon can
learn.
In concert with Beblavý (2009), David (2010) conducted another study on Hong
Kong, explaining how the country transitioned from a corrupt to a clean government,
using the strategy of amnesty as one of the major weapons for combating corruption.
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Most researchers in social sciences have agreed on the definition of amnesty, as
forgiveness or pardon from a crime or other social liability, thus giving the concept
different sociological, political, and criminological implications (Klug, 1998; Parker,
2001; Shichor & Ranish, 1980). Some authors have refused to accept a standard
definition of amnesty to mean a complete forgetfulness (oblivion) of the past, even
though forgiveness might have taken place (Klug, 1998). Other researchers, such as
Bennett, Harris, Laskey, Levitch, and Monrad (1976), see the argument as being deeply
rooted in symbolic compositions in a political construction of what amnesty means.
However, the argument can be settled by an agreement on what the legislation, the courts,
and the constitution would stipulate for each society as seen in the following statement in
the case of the United States:
The American Constitution makes no mention of amnesties, however,
Article II, section 2 grants the president the power to grant Reprieves and
Pardons for offenses against the United States except in cases of
Impeachment. The Supreme Court has declared that there is no legal
distinction between amnesties and pardons, and therefore amnesties are a
part of the constitutional fabric of the United States and have also been
part of the historical reality as well. (Shichor & Ranish, 1980, p. 443)
Other countries might adopt similar positions to that of the United States concerning the
question of amnesty, and some might have the provisions clearly outlined in their
constitutions. Using amnesty as an anticorruption tool would depend on the interpretation
given to it by the country making the usage.
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As significant as the concept of amnesty might be due to its drastic character in
changing political culture, certain governments might neglect its usefulness, or may
simply lack the right political judgments as to when to employ it and under what
circumstances. This paradigm guided David’s (2010) study on Hong Kong. In that study,
the author argued that mainstream researchers have seldom considered non-conventional
triggers of anticorruption efforts such as amnesty (David, 2010).
David argued further that the measures that lead to clean government in Hong
Kong are different from those that contribute to its maintenance. In this effort, David
challenged an over concentration of policy on formal structures of clean governance,
while the actual process of changing the culture of corruption, which is changing the
political culture is being overlooked. In the case of Hong Kong, David discovered that the
country had failed to combat corruption before the mid-1970s through functional
measures that were designed by legislature. However, the irresolvable situation started to
change in the mid-1970s when the government started seeing the importance of initiating
the programs and campaigns strategy, which took off with the creation of the Independent
Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) as of February 1974 (David, 2010).
Although ICAC was seen as the main structure behind the eradication of
corruption in Hong Kong, David (2010) argued that the “granting of amnesty on a
collective basis to members of the Royal Police force in 1977 is what actually paved the
way to the ICAC’s success” (p. 396). This program parallels the position taken by the
Cameroonian legislature in December 2011, holding that charges against individuals
found guilty of corruption would be dropped if these individuals would return the funds
to the government (Houmfa, 2012). This approach appears tactful in policymaking.
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However, it creates negative results, where public officials proactively embezzle more
government funds with the hope of investing ill-gotten capital, paying back the principal
if incidentally caught but keeping proceeds for their private enrichment.
To strengthen anticorruption programs, Spector (2016) in a study conducted with
implications for Vietnam, put forth the role of a cost-benefit approach in encouraging a
government to set out for effective anticorruption policy planning and action. In this
approach that tend to perceive anticorruption strategy and practice different from the
traditional perception, author argued that stronger anticorruption initiatives are more
beneficial than institutional structures aimed at fighting corruption. Accordingly, Spector
held that instead of focusing on negative consequences of corruption, countries should
focus on the potential benefits of anticorruption. That the discussion needs to change
from the notion that if you act (anticorruption wise) your government will avert that or
this particular amount or level of harm, to the perception that if you act (anticorruption
wise) your government will benefit in the following ways. This shifting of anticorruption
practice from how to fight corruption to how anticorruption can benefit the government
and the society at large, could give actors a different kind of motivation to commit to
anticorruption practices in societies where corruption is almost normalized, like in
Cameroon.
The emphasis on anticorruption programs and campaigns are seen in the
preceding studies, especially for the fact that the information pressure exerted by this
strategy on the masses and the corporate society in general is the first step that
governments should consider in order to change a corrupt political culture and set the
pace for maintenance through structural reforms. The effectiveness of campaigns and
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programs also depend on the strength of supporting institutions and structures. Thus, one
would reiterate, as it is the argument in this study that anticorruption strategies are
interwoven. Seemingly, placing emphasis on some strategies at the expense of others can
create imbalance and dysfunction. Therefore, starting with public sensitization campaigns
and educative programs within the public system, the governments of corrupt societies
must also preview long lasting structural reforms designed to curb and discourage
corruption at all levels of the society.
Standards for Public Performance and Integrity
This anticorruption strategy directly implicates the public administration in place,
touching the core systematic values that define the structural and functional outlook of
the government. Corporations usually adopt standards for integrity in business
reminiscent of what the government does. A corrupt government therefore corrupts the
entire economy. The study conducted by Desta (2006) examined certain strategies that
concisely define structural and functional anticorruption reforms. These strategies were
grouped into four broad categories, including, “economic/market reforms,
administrative/bureaucratic reforms, accountability/transparency enhancing reforms, and
political accountability enhancing reforms” (Desta 2006). This categorization enables the
government to focus its anticorruption strategies based on needs within particular sectors
of the government. And this is what makes policy implementation effective.
In the case of Croatia, anticorruption efforts were guided by the “formulation of a
comprehensive anticorruption code that would eliminate the dispersion of anticorruption
legislation in numerous acts and redundancy that obfuscated the action of political actors
in combating corruption” (Grubiša, 2011, p. 69). In the case of Cameroon, Nguemegne
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(2011) evoked structural and functional anticorruption reforms that focused on
administrative organization, constitutional provisions, intervention of international
conventions, and the creation of specialized institutions, even though they did not create
any considerable success in the fight against corruption in the country. It has not been too
long a time since Nguemegne conducted the study in Cameroon. Thus, the situation
might likely be the same presently, or even if changes have occurred, they may be of
minute significance.
Research shows that although diverse approaches reflect a government’s strategy
in combating corruption, the uniqueness of system reforms in different countries fighting
corruption are usually defined within the scope of standards for performance and integrity
Grubiša (2011). In addition, institutions participate in a partial manner in the formulation
process of the anticorruption policy in most developing countries. Grubiša reiterated that
the core policy making usually depends mostly on the decision of the head of state, thus,
real transition into democracy has to be achieved for countries such as Cameroon to
exhibit this pattern of formulating anticorruption policies. Lack of administrative
participation in anticorruption policymaking is the reason why the implementation and
monitoring process of such policy usually becomes ineffective in these countries.
Grubiša pointed out that corruption is one of the pathologies in democratic
politics, meanwhile totalitarian political systems are corruptive by definition because the
misuse of power is built in the very foundations of arbitrary power. Six categories of
pathologies of democracy listed by the author included, “political demagogy, political
hypocrisy, political manipulation, political corruption, political paranoia, and political
violence” (pp. 70-71). The author pointed out that this situation was prevalent in Central
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Eastern Europe after 1989 following the collapse of the soviet communist system and its
Easter European variants. According to the author, the above-mentioned forms of
pathologies attracted much attention in Croatia at that time, because they became a
measure of democracy in a country that is new to democratic policies or a country
transitioning into democracy (Grubiša, 2011). The country was transitioning from a
communist auto-centric system unto a democratic and more liberal system. Croatia had to
take into consideration these dynamics, in order to set an anticorruption machine that
could work.
Grubiša also identified six main causes of corruption in Croatia, which included
the existence of the old communist mentality system and traditional corruption culture;
the influence of the 1990s Balkan Wars; non-transparent privatization process of stateowned enterprises; nationalist revolution; massive bureaucracy founded on spoil system;
and hyper-normativism or super-centralization and concentration of government, (pp. 7678).
In the case of Cameroon, Tiky VI (2010) discussed the three main causes for the
high level of corruption in the country. First, the author identified infancy of institutions
that reflect the slow modernization, and in turn, the colonial past of the country. Second,
Tiky VI discussed the willingness of local elites to loot the country’s resources after
independence, and third, the extractive economic policies and the collusion between the
country’s elites and their foreign patrons (p. 58). To these three causes, one can also add
four other causes said to be the main causes responsible for corruption in developing
countries, especially African countries. These include, “ethnic fragmentations,
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persistence of traditional values, weak institutions, and low social capital” (Tiky VI,
2010, p. 55).
To exemplify some of the preceding ideas, Tiky VI documented a case whereby
the civil servant in traditional African setting is compelled to share his or her fortune with
relatives. In case the former’s salary is not enough to meet these obligations, thoughts of
corruption to get sufficient means will begin to spring up (Harsch, 1993, Cited in Tiky
VI, 2010, p. 55). This describes how traditional value can create grounds for behavioral
traits that end up in corrupt practices when exercised in a modern market-oriented
societal setting. African countries need to start facing these realities in order to
successfully curb the corruption cankerworm that is eating them up daily.
In an extension of the discussion on the causes of corruption, the demands to
mention the existence of different theoretical dimensions on this subject seemed eminent,
considering the fact that the solution to the problem (which is the focus of this study)
cannot be understood without a full capture of the nature of the problem. Corruption
fighters should have knowledge of the broad base of theories that describe why people
and nations get involved in corruption in the first place. The main theories discussed in
corruption literature include: historical and cultural theories (colonialism and inherited
traditional values); economic theories (for example, rent-seeking and natural resources
transactions, and cost-benefit analyses); institutional theories (the nature of governing
institutions); agency theories (individual-bureaucrat client-principal relationships); and
development theories (human development dynamics) (Pellegrini & Gerlagh, 2008, pp.
249-250; Sims, Gong, & Ruppel, 2012). To these five approaches, it is good to add a
moralistic or spiritual tendency that is based on the assumption that naturally, people are
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corrupt due to the sinful nature inherent in humankind, and this is where moral
philosophers and religious authors make their entry into the discussion on corruption
(Gouinlock, 1994).
Human development is the rational perspective held to be at the center of the
discussion on the causes of corruption (Sims, Gong, & Ruppel, 2012). Thus, this study
suggests that human development should be the most objective factor examined by those
who make efforts to combat corruption in the countries infected by this peril. In a
contingency theory of corruption conducted in 2012, Sims et al. collected data from 68
countries, accounting for 80% of the world’s population. Through this study, the
researchers discovered that there was a major effect of human development on
corruption. In the study, one of the fundamental postulations of the contingency theory is
described, whereby the theory argues, “the effectiveness of a solution depends on the
conditions under which the solution is implemented” (Galbraith as cited in Sims, Gong,
& Ruppel, 2012, p. 90).
Treating corruption in Cameroon and in other developing countries with the same
predicaments as a matter of contingency, as discussed by the preceding authors, would
lead to the concept of contextualization, which is the theoretical nexus of this study.
Contingency analyses would allow for a holistic assessment of the battle against
corruption in Cameroon, and it is these types of approaches that can lead to the discovery
of specifics that can in turn engender greater impact overall on reducing corruption. Sims,
Gong, and Ruppel, (2012) discussed that linking contingency to human development is
an emergent widespread corruption situation. In such a situation, people tend to involve
themselves in bribery and all other crooked behaviors because they focus on the social
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benefits that they could have had access to by nature and by right. However, because of
underdevelopment of different dimensions and magnitudes, they are unable to access
these benefits freely and fairly. This is the nature of the predicaments of most African
countries, especially the countries of the CEMAC zone (“Communauté Économique et
Monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale” in French) or (“the Economic and Monetary
Community of Central Africa” in English).
CEMAC is a regional development bloc of Central African states, created on
March 16, 1994 in N’djamena, Chad and consisting of five other countries—Cameroon,
Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and the Central African Republic. CEMAC’s mission
is to promote the harmonious development of member states within the framework of
establishing a common market (CEMAC, n.d). Transparency International Corruption
Perceptions Index (CPI) scores and rankings for these countries indicate close similar
trends in the perception of corruption in these societies. CPI for Cameroon from 1995
which is when the program was first launched to the most recent publication in 2017 is
shown on a list of tables under appendix A below. Looking at table 1 on that list, one can
notice corruption perception trends for the country for the past 22 years. This is a picture
of what is happening in the region. Cameroon as a leading member of this confederation
can steer the dynamics of the combat against corruption in the entire region.
Comparatively, looking at the causes of corruption in the case of Croatia
discussed above and in the case of Cameroon, one would notice that some causes should
be generalized, while some are specific. Massive bureaucracy founded on a centralized
and spoiled system was a problem in Croatia’s case (Grubiša, 2011), and it is the same
for Cameroon—weak institutions that permit autocratic forms of leadership (Tiky VI,
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2010). However, there’s a specific situation of the effects of the Balkan Wars on
corruption in Croatia (Grubiša, 2011), and in Cameroon, the extraction of natural
resources stands out as a specific cause of corruption for the country in contrast to the
preceding case (Tiky VI, 2010). This analogy is aimed at distinguishing causes of
corruption and thereby suggesting that approaches for combat should also be made
specific (or contextualized) when facing specific factors. If the causes of corruption can
be understood at a general level, as well as at a specific level, the solutions should also
follow such trail, while doors are kept open for possibilities of “adaptation” of solutions,
a notion that is also paramount in the conceptualization of this study. The solutions to
Croatia’s corruption problem started with the passage of the “National Program for the
Fight against Corruption” in Croatia in 2002, and fully adopted in 2006 by the Croatian
parliament, an action that is marked as the beginning point of the combat against
corruption in Croatia Grubiša (2011). Grubiša also saw the intervention of the European
Commission’s report and recommendations beginning 2001 concerning corruption in
Croatia as another major turning point in the fight against corruption in the country.
Strategies undertaken by Croatia since then culminated in a “revised action plan”
approved on March 18, 2010, by which an announcement was made by the Prime
Minister, Kosor, for a “general zero-rate tolerance of corruption” in Croatia (Grubiša,
2011, p. 80).
The five thematic areas identified by Grubiša as Croatia’s strategic vision for
fighting corruption included the following: a) government focus on legal and institutional
framework of the country, b) prevention of corruption, c) legal prosecution and
sanctioning corruption, d) international cooperation, and e) dissemination of public
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awareness on the damaging effects and harmfulness of corruption (p. 80). Amongst these
strategies, structural and functional administrative reforms that could be identified
included the monitoring measure, and the conditionality rule that the European Union
(EU) made requisite for Croatia and other countries of the Balkans, for their accession
into the EU. Monitoring is effectuated with cooperation and verification. Government
agencies can implement these strategies amongst themselves.
In another study, Lessmann and Markwardt (2010) examined the impact and
usefulness of monitoring in government as a tool to combat corruption. The authors
found out that monitoring is made more enforceable when there is free press, and that this
is necessary for the success of a decentralized system of government, which is held as a
proper governing mechanism that discourages corruption (Lessmann & Markwardt,
2010).
The dynamics of structural and functional reforms in fighting corruption were
also examined in the work of Nguemegne (2011) on Cameroon. In that study,
Nguemegne documented anticorruption efforts in Cameroon, stating how the country’s
anticorruption system has failed due to “the numerous structural and functional
weaknesses” associated with the system (Nguemegne, 2011, p. 83). Some of the major
structural and functional reforms identified by the author included: “administrative
regulations, ad hoc committees, and specialized bureaucracy” (Nguemegne, 2011, p. 84).
Nguemegne discovered that corruption remained pervasive in the country, despite the
existence of a “formidable anticorruption machine” in the country for more than a decade
(p. 84).
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Nguemegne also documented the abovementioned reforms, and for administrative
regulations, author mentioned “bureaucratic hierarchy and administrative oversight”
(Nguemegne, 2011, p. 86). This strategy encourages a “rigidly centralized and
cumbersome administrative hierarchy that is supposed to shield the Cameroonian
government from corruption” (Nguemegne, 2011, p. 86). Nguemegne also stated that the
bureaucratic hierarchy and administrative oversight strategy attribute an organizational
status to the state, fostering “public-private dichotomy rule, which implies that the public
administrator’s bureau is separate from his/her private domicile (Nguemegne, 2011, p.
86).
Government regulations enforcing the public-private dichotomy rule were traced
by Nguemegne beginning from a 1974 decree, amended by Decree No. 94/199 of
October 7, 1994, right up to the Decree of October 12, 2000, amending the 1994 decree
(pp. 86-87). According to Nguemegne, Article 37 of the 2000 Regulation “clearly
prohibits ‘functionaries’ (civil servants) from getting involved in any lucrative private
activity or business” (Nguemegne, 2011, p. 87). This is also considered a regulatory
effort aimed at balancing “bureaucratic paradigm with democratic accountability”
(Nguemegne, 2011, p. 87). The 1996 amendment of the Constitution of the Republic of
Cameroon also constituted one of the regulations identified by author for the same
purpose (Nguemegne, 2011, p. 87). According to Nguemegne, the preamble of the
constitution states that public interest should not be violated by the exercise of the right
of private ownership by all citizens (Nguemegne, 2011, p. 87). The same constitution
also states the incompatibility of certain top-ranking public offices with other positions
(Nguemegne, 2011, p. 88).
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The notion of integrity can sometimes be theoretically distinguished from strict
ethical standards and enforced by regulation as pointed out by Miller (2010). However,
the notions of ethics and integrity are held from a holistic perspective in this study, and
the emphasis on integrity is an attempt to get government officials to practice more ethics
without having to comply with several complex codes of conduct. Rather, integrity
systems introduce the informal dimension of ethical practice, which actually produces
greater results when successfully implemented, according to Miller. To understand this
dimension, Miller defines an integrity system as “an assemblage of institutional entities,
mechanisms, and procedures whose purpose is to ensure compliance with minimum
ethical standards and to promote the pursuit of ethical ideals” (Miller, 2010, p. 241).
Organizational integrity is paramount to the organization’s success, and this is a strong
tool that governments fighting corruption must build for their system if they desire
positive and long-lasting results.
Specialized bureaucracies in Cameroon constituted the third strategy discussed by
Nguemegne (2011) that falls within the scope of reforms that strictly have to do with
changing the administrative practices of the country. Nguemegne reported the creation of
three agency approaches: the “National Anticorruption Observatory” (NACO) in 1995,
Anticorruption Units (ACUs) within different ministries in 1997, and the Superior State
Audit (SSA) – an administrative audit institution that performs a function of oversight
and investigation in Cameroon’s administration (Nguemegne, 2011, p. 96). The “National
Agency for the Investigation of Financial Crimes (NAIFC) (ANIF in French) was created
for the same goal in 2005, and NACC was created the following year (2006) to replace
NACO (Nguemegne, 2011, p. 101). The preceding two organs are currently the main
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institutions in charge of the day-to-day implementation of the government’s
anticorruption policy in Cameroon.
Nguemegne explained that the presence of these offices did not grant the
government noticeable success in the fight against corruption. Rather, the institutions are
said to have failed to meet up to the task due to reasons the author identified as lack of
political will; poor administrative coordination and supervision of anticorruption
mechanisms; failed legislative oversight; underpowered and dysfunctional judiciary;
autocracy, non-merit system; state of impunity; media intimidation and crackdown;
weakness of anticorruption bureaus; and the culture of corruption (Nguemegne, 2011, pp.
102-114).
Countries fighting corruption can design licit plans and strategies to ensure
success of their efforts, however, lack of adaptation of strategies to the realities of the
sociopolitical, economic, legal, and cultural dynamics of the said country hinder this
fight. This dimension raises the notion of “contextualization” of anticorruption strategies,
as the core argument of this study. Nguemegne (2011) did not examine detailed aspects
of the contextualization perspective in the study conducted on Cameroon. In this study, I
sought to look into such weaknesses with hopes of reducing the gap as much as possible,
especially in the theoretical construct of anticorruption practice in Cameroon.
Open Government Strategy
McDermott (2010) studied the elements of structural and functional
administrative reform in the “open government” strategy by studying President Obama’s
memorandum on transparency and open government, issued on his very first complete
day in office (McDermott, 2010, p. 401). McDermott documented an open government
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reform as a system made up of “transparency, public participation, and collaboration”
(p.401). According to McDermott, such reform emphasizes a transparent government, a
participatory government, and a collaborative government. The open government plan
was designed to impact all government agencies of the United States, while the task of
guiding the policy was made a responsibility of the “Office of Management and Budget”
(OMB) (McDermott, 2010, p. 402). McDermott also reported that the open government
policy was executed with the help of two instruments—the initialization of an “open
government directive and plans” (McDermott, 2010, p. 402), and the ratification of
certain “laws and regulations underpinning open government” (McDermott, 2010, p.
404).
The open government directives and plans stipulated the following:
1. Outlining agency responsibilities,
2. Creation and institutionalization of a culture of open government,
3. Requiring components of the open government plans developed by
agencies,
4. Fostering transparency through a strategic and detail plan that invigorates
and guides the agencies into using technology to make agencies’
information available to the public,
5. Increasing public participation in government, increasing collaboration in
government by revising practices within each agency to “further
cooperation with other federal and non-federal agencies, the public, and
nonprofit and private entities”,
6. Strengthening a “flagship initiative for transparency”, and
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7. Instituting an outside evaluation that required “OpenTheGovernment.org”
to evaluate open government plans of these agencies. (McDermott, 2010,
p. 403-404)
According to McDermott, the laws and regulations underpinning open
government, include the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) of 1980, the 1995 PRA
reauthorization, the 1985 Circular A-130 implementing the Paperwork Reduction Act,
and the 1994 Circular A-130 that significantly changed information policy and practices
across the executive branch. Others include the E-government Acts of 2001 and 2002, the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and its amendments–original in 1966, and
amendments in (1974, 1976, 1978, 1978, 1984, 1986, and 1996), the Open Government
Act of 2007 and reiteration in 2009 by President Obama (McDermott, 2010, pp. 404412). Open government can significantly be explained within the scope of the
understanding of the concept of “E-government,” which is currently a strong reformative
tool in the hands of administrations fighting corruption. Most developing countries are
still lacking the kind of technological manpower and institutionalization that can render
e-government effective in their administrations (Dada, 2006; Heeks, 2002; and Ndou,
2004).
Continuing the discussion on the e-government concept as a significant
administrative reform for anticorruption practice, Singh, Pathak, Naz, and Belwal’s
(2010) study on India, Ethiopia, and Fiji discussed the concept comprehensively,
including how it relates to anticorruption. The study was conceived with the aim of
examining and analyzing e-government applications in developing countries, and how
they can contribute to the improvement of governance and combating corruption.
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Employing a mixed method research approach, Singh et al. conducted a survey targeting
“over 918 citizens in India, Ethiopia, and Fiji, using convenience random sampling with a
structured questionnaire” (Singh, Pathak, Naz, & Belwal’s, 2010, p. 254). In the study,
Singh et al. demonstrated that many potential benefits of e-governance remained
unexploited by developing countries, due to non-exploitation of what? They concluded
that benefits of e-government were the same for both developed and developing
countries, even though the latter was said to still have the need of increasing its usage of
this method of governance.
Singh et al. (2010) recommended that communication technology should be
integrated in development agendas of the countries studied. They discovered that egovernment significantly contributed to the reduction of corruption in the countries
studied, even though e-governance systems remained underused. Other studies held that
the reasons for this limited usage included lack of financial means, technology
underdevelopment, managerial shortcomings, and constitutional hindrances (Basu, 2004;
Wagner, Cheung, Lee & Ip, 2003; Yildiz, 2007).
The last administrative reform strategy for anticorruption practice reviewed in this
study is the setting of ‘ethical codes’ that would guide civic, moral, and corporate
behavior and responsibility, and ensure overall transparency, accountability, and integrity
in the functioning of the government system of the country combating corruption. The
works of Veil (2008), Corvellec and Macheridis (2010), de Arruda (2009), Karren and
Zacharias (2007), and Mutula and Wamukoya (2009) were reviewed for detail
examination and further illustration of the preceding strategy.
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Veil (2008) analyzed public service practice in the United States, especially
during emergency management situations, with the focus to demonstrate “how
community partnerships and civic responsibility can improve community resilience”
(Veil, 2008, p. 387). The enforcement of civic responsibility would improve government,
even in the case of fighting corruption. Veil explained that civic responsibility is
paramount to the success of democracy. Responsibility is often shown through voting,
paying taxes, serving jury duty, and volunteering (Veil, 2008). Adopting an
anticorruption culture is both a public and a civic responsibility. Even though Veil
discovered that the “community partnerships” discussed in the study demonstrated that
engagement and civic responsibility can improve community resilience and government,
the society sometimes tends to show complacency in this area.
Civic responsibility has generally been defined across social sciences as a
behavior guided by social awareness, and thus it would incorporate all moral, ethical, and
other sociopolitical values held and practiced by a given society (Ecklund, 2005; da
Silva, Sanson, Smart, & Toumbourou, 2004). But bringing the community of people to
act civilly is a difficult task, because laws that guide human behavior in society have their
own shortcomings as well as the humans themselves. It is therefore no surprise to notice
that societies that exercise greater civic responsibility tend to be less corrupt than those
with less or no attention paid to civility.
Close to the concept of civic responsibility is that of morality or moral
responsibility. To combat corruption in a society, that society must exercise a certain
level of moral awareness that rebuffs acts of corruption. While Corvellec and Macheridis
(2010) examined the moral responsibility of “project selectors” in Swedish society, they
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discussed the need for managers to be morally responsible for their choices during the
process of project selection. The authors defined responsibility as a combination of
“attributability—what choices the project manager can ultimately be praised or blamed
for, and of accountability—what choices the project manager has to be prepared to
answer for” (Corvellec & Macheridis, 2010, p. 212).
Therefore, the morality of project selection goes beyond identifying the best
possible project (s) for the parent organization. Selectors have a moral responsibility to
design and manage a selection process that combines, in its various stages, openness with
correctness and integrity (Corvellec & Macheridis, 2010, p. 218). Corvellec and
Macheridis also reported that managers found it problematic to meet the demands of a
“formalized view of responsibility” (p. 217), and they concluded that, public and private
organizations alike subject managers to structural constraints and reduce managers’
responsibilities to make decisions and act in ways that systematically comply with their
individual, moral judgments.
A full template of managerial responsibility should therefore pay a more
perceptive consideration, for example, to goal ambiguities, power games, hidden
agendas, absurd routines, and other culturally determined behaviors, together with legal
requirements, performance imperatives, the incentive system, moral support structures,
the organizational ethical history, and the nature of the competition. (Corvellec &
Macheridis, 2010, p. 217). These administrative practices should be integrated in
governments having the desire of improving performance and eradicating corruption.
Great philosophers such as Kant, Dewey, and Dostoevsky in their writings, have
supported morality in government and within the general population as part of the solid

53
basis for building successful societies having to struggle less with ills such as corruption.
Although social science research sometimes tends to deemphasize morality as a
fundamental aspect of governance, classical philosophers did not ignore the significance
of this concept in the relationship between the governors and the governed.
Kant established morality on “the good will” (Kant, 1785/1964, p. 17). According
to Kant, “the only thing that is good without qualification or restriction is goodwill. That
is to say, a good will alone is good in all circumstances and in that sense, it is an absolute
or unconditioned good” (Kant, 1785/1964, p. 17). The extension of this foundation of
governance is seen in “the good will and duty, the motive of duty, the formal principle of
duty, reverence for the law, the categorical imperative, ordinary practical reason, and the
need for philosophy” (Kant, 1785/1964, pp. 19-23).
Dostoevsky founded morality on God and the different existential stances of
human nature, thus criticizing the Russian reformers for “renouncing Christ, and putting
themselves in the place of God, and in doing so, they succeeded in undermining the
people’s faith and capacity for love” (Guignon, 1993, p. xvi). Dewey’s own opinion of
morality was based on the “instrumentalities of thought and conduct which have the most
significant bearing on the quality of human life” (Gouinlock, 1994, p. xxi). Dewey’s
process of inquiry was fundamentally “naturalistic,” seeing man as he is and as he
interacts with the cosmos. Ethical behavior, be it at the individual or corporate level finds
its roots in the writings of these philosophers, and such precedents apply to contemporary
societal behavior.
Moving to the discussion on structural and functional administrative reform
strategies, explained within the framework of standards for public integrity, the works of
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Mutula and Wamukoya (2009) and Karren and Zacharias (2007) provided the basis for
examining this concept of integrity, as practiced by government and the corporate world.
Mutula and Wamukoya examined the role played by information management in
enhancing democracy, transparency, accountability, and integrity in government for
governments in East and Southern Africa.
It is also important that information custody of government is not only available,
but also availed to the public. Therefore, the onus is on governments to put in place
effective national and institutional frameworks including adequate capacity to harness,
facilitate, and enhance information capture, organizational maintenance, and usage. With
this, Mutula and Wamukoya (2009) argued that citizens and civil society organizations
would be able to access and use such framework to monitor the public in the areas of
administrative efficiency and effectiveness in achieving stated public service objective
and target.
In another study, Karren and Zacharias (2007) examined the critical application of
integrity requirements in the business world. The researchers discovered that many
employers in the United States made use of “paper- and- pencil integrity and personality
tests to weed out dishonest, or otherwise suspicious protective employees from their labor
pools” (p. 221). However, such approach has never been very effective, as advocates of
integrity tests may significantly underestimate the number of false positives, which is the
number of honest applicants being labeled as dishonest (Mutula & Wamukoya, 2009, p.
222). This reveals some of the shortcomings of integrity testing.
In the same light, governments usually use integrity-screening techniques to
purify their employee pools. However, Karren and Zacharias (2007) argued that testing
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for integrity is accompanied by weaknesses including “validity issues such as
construction, confusion, false positive problem, faking issues centered around coaching
and retaking tests, and privacy and fairness concerns” (Karren & Zacharias, 2007, pp.
222-231). They also indicated that the dramatic increase in the use of paper-and-pencil
tests was due to the passage of the Employee Polygraph Protection Act (EPPA) of 1988,
which “barred the use of polygraph or lie detector as pre-employment screening device”
(Karren & Zacharias, 2007, p. 221).
Testing for integrity is not common in developing countries as it is for developed
countries. Although Karren and Zacharias critically examined the weaknesses associated
with this activity, they do not rule out its importance in the improvement of the jobsite
and consequently reducing the grounds for corruption and other work-related
malpractices. They provide certain recommendations as to how the testing could be
improved. These include, reducing the failures of the test, creating tests using the
construct-oriented approach, balancing expectations of privacy against employers’ needs
to know further research on intercultural and international differences in attitudes toward
privacy and fairness of integrity testing, and researching other selection methods and
management practices to screen theft (Karren & Zacharias, 2007, pp. 231-232).
Barry and Stephens (1998) conceptualized the definition of integrity in an
organization in terms of correspondence between values and behavior, giving the subject
a morally neutral approach. Accordingly, they challenge the position held by
fundamentalists such as Ayn Rand, according to whom integrity is a morally justifiable
system of values and related to what constitutes “an appropriate set or system of ethical
principles” (as cited in Barry & Stephens, 1998, p. 163). Alexander (2010) framed
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integrity within the context of oligarchic fluxing shadows, which explains visibility in
public affairs as an illusionary flux for the invisible (p. 503). Thus, system integrity
depends on the ethical values set in place by the organization practicing such values.
Integrity is perceived morally and ethically, justified more appropriately when
distinguished to address different situations, circumstances, and organizational settings.
Barry and Stephens (1998) reported that the development of integrity systems
within governments is one of the most effective efforts for combating corruption in
corrupt governments and societies. In addition, Alexander (2010) showed that developing
countries have yet to adopt and make advancements in fighting corruption and using all
pilot weapons for combating corruption for all societies. Alexander added that
governments should ensure the formulation and coordination of all the strategies in legal
terms and provide a framework for materializing every vision that leadership and society
might conceive as to how corruption should be combated in the given country or society.
Most researchers that have explored the nature of the policy instrument
constituting literature that explains the two strategic dimensions of the anti-corruption
policy instruments, which are anticorruption programs and campaigns (transformative
information), and standards for public performance and integrity (structural and
functional reforms) within the administration (Southeast European Legal Development
Initiative, & Center for the Study of Democracy, 2002) have tend to propose more of
curative measures to the problem of corruption. A more recent study conducted by
Fedran, Dobovšek, Ažman, and Bren, (2018) on Slovenia, tends to explore a new
dimension by which anticorruption measures should be given a preventive focus instead
of a curative perception and concentration.
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In discussing ‘integrity plan’ as a preventive measure or tool against corruption,
Fedran et al. argued that effective anticorruption approaches should not focus only on
making government work better but should also endeavor to make the people more
honest. They proposed that each government sector should have an integrity plan and
custodians of such plans. According to authors, prevention is not very popular in curbing
corruption by government because it is longtime previewed (Fedran, Dobovšek, Ažman,
& Bren, 2018), however, this is another innovative perspective by which anticorruption
policies could be pursued.
In the effort to reduce, prevent, and if possible eradicate corruption in
governments, and consequently society using public policy and administration as a
weapon, governments usually pay attention to topics such as sensitization and awareness
campaigns, national anticorruption programs, accountability, transparency, public
responsibility and performance, ethical and moral codes, collaboration, cooperation,
public participation, and system integrity (Southeast European Legal Development
Initiative, & Center for the Study of Democracy, 2002). This list might not be exhaustive
as to what governments would put into place in terms of policy to curb corruption in a
given society, but it covers the fundamental policy strategies exposed in contemporary
anticorruption literature.
The Legal Instrument
The legal instrument is comprised of all strategies implemented by the
government within the framework of the law to combat corruption. These strategies span
from punitive measures taken by the courts and the administration to sanction acts of
corruption, to institutionalized anticorruption norms safeguarded and enforced by the law.
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Punitive Measures
The anticorruption punitive strategy incorporates the law enforcing sanctions by
courts and the administrations. This involves, in one way or the other, all the three
branches of government (executive, judiciary, and legislative). Administrative sanctions
need legal backing from the legislator and interpretation and custody from the judiciary.
The legislator needs administrative public policy proposals to make effective laws and
needs feedback from the judiciary to correct nuances in the laws found difficult to
interpret. The judiciary needs administrative institutions and oversight for the
enforcement, management, and coordination of the sanctions pronounced by the courts,
and needs legal backing from the legislature. Punitive sanctions against corrupt acts
usually include dismissals from office, imprisonment, suspensions, fines, and other forms
of penalties. The application of this measure was examined through the works of Eliason
(2009), White (2010), Kubiciel (2009), Peci and Sikkema (2010), Nasrawin (2010), and
Majila, Taylor, and Raga (2014).
Eliason (2009) discussed the federal criminal law prohibiting bribery and
gratuities, as part of an intricate web of laws and regulations governing the behavior of
federal officials. Eliason reveals that the law sanctioning corruption in the United States
witnessed complex interpretations and applications at the time the study was conducted
(p. 929). Eliason explained this intricacy of the law stating that, court decisions over the
past decade have narrowly construed the bribery and gratuities law, making prosecution
under that statute more difficult and giving prosecutors of federal corruption an incentive
to look for alternative legal theories. Honest service fraud, traditionally used to fight state
and local corruption, has stepped into the breach and increasingly appears in federal
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corruption cases. But this trend threatens to upset the balance struck in the law between
corruption criminal behavior by federal officials and behavior that may be unseemly or
unethical but falls short of being criminal. (Eliason, 2009, p. 929)
According to the author, honest service standards did not provide government
officials or the public with adequate notice about the requirements of criminal law
(Eliason, 2009). On the other hand, the author documented that “potential penalties vastly
exceeded the penalties for gratuities or other lesser misconduct that may be repackaged as
honest service fraud” (p. 929). As a remedy to this problem, Eliason proposed an
amendment of the federal gratuities statute, and that a statutory definition of honest
service fraud should be enacted.
Interpreting acts of corruption and attributing them the appropriate sanctions can
sometimes raise issues of clarity of the law, especially when administrative errors occur.
However, criminal laws on corruption and their acute interpretation occupy an important
place in government’s effort toward the combat against corruption. This is the first step in
the application of punitive measures against corruption. The centerpiece of the law
punishing corruption in the United States is 18 U.S.C § 201, Bribery of Public Officials
and Witnesses.
Courts usually also develop and use other prosecution theories, like the honest
service fraud that was developed out of the federal mail and wire fraud statutes and
became the leading prosecution instrument for corruption in the United States, touching
even state and local officials that were not mentioned in the provisions of 18 U.S.C § 201
(Eliason, 2009, p. 952). The first law punishes bribery and gratuities involving federal
officials, while the second (honest service fraud) “charge state and local corruption, as a
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scheme to defraud citizens and taxpayers of their intangible right to the fair and honest
services of the government official, using the federal mail and wire fraud statutes”
(Eliason, 2009, p. 952).
The complexities raised in the preceding study, indicating the intricate nature of
laws on corruption in a developed world country like the United States, reveal how, even
advanced democracies can still find it difficult to pinpoint what behavior of the public
servant should be labeled corrupt and criminal. It is also difficult determining the gravity
and appropriate penalties to be attributed to such acts.
Most developing countries that do not have sufficient structures and competent
juridical frameworks would usually avoid taking the pain to detail the definition of acts of
public corruption. Until a government official is embezzling huge sums of funds, a case
of corruption would not be heard in these countries, even though daily kickbacks, petty
bribes, and under-the-table gifts are ravaging the fabrics of meritocracy, justice,
democracy, and overall economic prosperity of these countries. As Nguemegne (2011)
wrote, “this is typical in the Cameroonian case, corruption has become over the years so
rampant in Cameroon that one is afraid that a real culture of corruption entrenched in the
fabric of the society exists in the country” (p. 114). Yet, most corruption suspects are
seldom arrested and prosecuted, and in general, corrupt officials are more likely to be
exempted from a court’s trial, all due to an underpowered and dysfunctional judiciary
(Nguemegne, 2011, p. 105).
In Kubiciel (2009), the researcher revealed criminal sanctions embedded in the
United Nations’ Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) in 2003, which is the principal
international law and organization that fights corruption universally. Just as in Eliason
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(2009), Kubiciel classified the infraction of corruption into two categories including
bribing public officials and actively bribing foreign public officials (Kubiciel, 2009, p.
139). Kubiciel also defined bribery as the act of lending a benefit in order to affect a
decision unduly. According to author, the definition for the term bribery is drawn from
Article 15 of the UNCAC. The article also criminalizes individuals who promise or give
an inducement directly or indirectly to a public official, in order for the public official to
restrain from exercising his or her duties (Kubiciel, 2009, p. 142).
Article 15 (b) also criminalizes passive bribery, which refer to public officials
who solicits or accept a gift and in return, acts or refrain from acting in accordance with
his/her official duties (Kubiciel, 2009, p. 142). Other international legal instruments with
similar provisions include the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) convention on Bribery of Foreign Public Officials, the Council of Europe (COE)
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, and the European Union Convention on the
Fight against Corruption (Kubiciel, 2009, p. 142).
In the African context, more legal instruments include the African Union
Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (2003), and the South African
Development Protocol Against Corruption (2001). Furthermore, Kubiciel’s study argued
that the development of the UNCAC in 2003 took international legal development fight
against corruption to its highest peak. Kubiciel added that a ‘legal transplant’ of these
instruments alone cannot sufficiently cure the social disease of corruption at national
levels because, in order to record a considerable amount of success, expertise of lawmakers, law enforcement agents, and courts has to be employed (Kubiciel, 2009, pp.154155). Even in the case of Cameroon, the difficulty to establish an independent judicial
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body with the aptitude of interpreting and punishing corruption infractions is inherent,
causing a major handicap to government’s efforts of fighting corruption in the country.
Besides conventions, constitutional and legislative stipulations, and general
administrative law, the general rule of law theory is in itself a major legal weapon that
requires close attention in a study of this nature. The basic and shortest definition of the
rule of law would be: respect for the law—a concept that different authors in the social
science field have broadly defined (Bufford, 2007). However, this study holds the
definition of Bufford, which adopts Justice Anthony Kennedy’s position in a 2006
address at the annual meeting of the American Bar Association (ABA)” (Bufford, 2007,
p. 2). According to this position, the rule of law states that:
i.

The law is superior to, and thus is binding to all government officials;

ii.

The law must respect and preserve the dignity, equality, and human rights of all
persons. The law must establish and safeguard the constitutional structures
necessary to build a free society in which all citizens have a meaningful voice in
shaping and enacting rules that govern them.

iii.

The law must devise and maintain systems to advise all rights of persons, and it
must empower them to fulfill expectations and seek redress of grievances without
fear of penalty or retaliation (Bufford, 2007, p. 3).
From the preceding principles, Bufford stated that the ABA drew a working

definition for the rule of law, summarized as “a government where the law is superior to,
and thus binds, the government and all its officials and citizens” (Bufford, 2007, p. 3).
Bufford also argued that the importance of an independent judiciary in the administration
of the rule of law contemplates such form of government in which the law will be
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superior to all (Bufford, 2007, p. 3). White (2010) examined the dynamics surrounding
the rule of law in the legal effort against corruption in some Central Asian and Eastern
European countries. According to the author, international donor agencies and
development banks invested millions in the various countries, beginning from the mid1990s, to reform their post-communist judiciaries. With the belief that democracy and
economic growth are dependent on the rule of law, these agencies carried out
enforcement of institutional reforms concomitant to the approach of institutional building
of the judiciary, which was implemented in the West (White, 2010, pp. 307-308).
White further argued that even though such approach concentrated on improving
the resources of the judiciary, education and training, and promoting judicial
independence will have the corollary effect of eradicating corruption and implanting the
rule of law. It is however regrettable that such was not the case in Central Asia and not in
Eastern Europe as well (White, 2010, p. 308). Suggestions consisted therefore of the use
of the jury method in fostering the rule of law, because such method took into
consideration the sociopolitical realities of each country (White, 2010, p. 309). Acts of
corruption in each country, based on this proposal, would be examined and condemned in
accordance with different intrinsic cultural and political values that are held in each
country. Even so, this study argues that such position does not efface a universal
similitude for the works of corruption and it has consequences on the prosperity of human
societies.
Bufford’s (2007) conclusion on the rule of law supports White’s (2010) argument,
when he stated that the importance of the rule of law lies in the manner in which it is
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viewed and practiced by each society, such that the concept appears indispensable for all
societies, and inexcusably compelling for all democratic societies:
The rule of law is the bedrock for building a structure of ordered liberty and
progress in civil society. It provides the foundation for economic development,
the protection of human rights, the provision of self-government, the prevention
of crime and corruption, the promotion of basic identity, and the achievement of
economic and social rights. At the same time, it is important to recognize that the
rule of law is not an international or apolitical matrix that can be imposed on a
particular culture in a particular country. Instead, the rule of law must be realized
through each country’s distinctive political, cultural and historical institutions and
traditions. In consequence, the particular realization of the rule of law varies from
country to country, both in the developed world and in developing countries.
(Bufford, 2007, p. 1)
The preceding conclusions are some of the pertinent perspectives that corruption
fighters in Cameroon and in other developing countries need to uphold in their efforts of
reforming and making use of the judiciary as a successful weapon against corruption. The
observations made by White (2010) on the case of Central Asian and Eastern European
countries are similar to those prevailing in other developing countries. The importation of
democratic practices has always faced the problem of either ‘adaption’ or ‘understanding’
in the recipient countries. That is why time, education, contextualization, and sometimes
rigor are necessary for successful spread and establishment of democratic values and
institutions in these societies.
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The evidence and impact of the punitive legal instrument usually includes, fines,
imprisonment, reprimand, suspension, dismissals, and in extreme cases, execution and
forcing into exile. These occur when the said acts of corruption are associated with
genocidal killings and political treason of high degree, particularly in emerging
democracies. The recent sweeping crackdowns on dictatorial regimes in North Africa
(including Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia) by the masses in 2011-2012 can be seen as an
example of the extreme measures that can be taken to punish those involved in corruption
and abuse of political power.
In another study by Peci and Sikkema (2010), the cost of punitive anticorruption
measures on culprits of corruption was examined in Netherlands (a consolidated
democracy) and in Albania (a transitional democracy). The research focus was to find out
how the rule of law worked in combating corruption in the different democratic
experiences. In the study, both countries had a common source of international law—the
European Union Criminal Law Convention on Corruption that influenced their criminal
laws against corruption. As Peci and Sikkema explained, this commonality stemmed
from the recommendation that was made by the Minister of Justice of the Council of
Europe in 1994. The Minister said that corruption ought to be addressed at a European
level, for nations in the economic block of the EU, due to globalization effects (Peci &
Sikkema 2010, p. 101).
Following the recommendation, the Group of States Against Corruption
(GRECO) was set up in 1999, to improve the capacity of its members to fight corruption
and ensure compliance with the anticorruption standards of European Council (Peci &
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Sikkema, 2010, p. 101). This study suggests that such global approach can benefit
regional economic blocks such as the CEMAC zone, with Cameroon as member country.
In the case of Albania, Peci and Sikkema (2010) explained the incorporation of
the provisions of the Criminal Law Convention for the European Union in the Albania
Criminal Code (ACC) as of July 2002. The authors stated clearly the definitions and
offences of corruption, and attributed clear, concise, and appropriate penalties for them
(Peci & Sikkema, 2010, p. 107). Penalties prescribed by some of the articles in the ACC
include imprisonment and fines—some of the common criminal penalties that are
applicable worldwide, although the severity may vary from country to country. The
definition of passive corruption offense by public officials and the punishment attributed
to it is stipulated in Articles 259, 260, and 319a of the ACC (Peci and Sikkema, 2010, p.
108). Article 259, regarded as the general provision on corruption by public officials,
stipulates the following definitions and sanctions:
Soliciting or taking, directly or indirectly, by a person who exercises public
functions, of any undue advantage or of any such promise for himself or for a
third person, or accepting an offer or promise deriving from an undue advantage,
in order to act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his duty or function, is
punished with a prison term of two to eight years and with a fine of 500,000 to 1
million Lekë. (Peci and Sikkema, 2010, p. 108)
In furthering the discussion on the offenses and punishment of corruption, these
researchers distinguished between type of perpetrator and the corresponding severity of
penalty. Thus, senior public officials would suffer more severe punishments compared to
regular civil servants. The case of the Dutch revealed the same use of the dynamics of
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imprisonment and fines to punish the corrupt (Peci & Sikkema, 2010, p. 114). Their study
indicates that countries and societies that are serious to curb and eradicate corruption in
their governments and amongst their people, have made their anticorruption efforts part
of the law, and have out rightly and concretely condemned acts of corruption in their
criminal law provisions.
Due to lack of such rigorousness in developing countries, even if the law
provisions are made available, the implementation always remains a nightmare.
Corruption is punished in Article 134 of the Criminal Code of Cameroon (Nguemegne,
2011, p. 96). Its provisions in Section 1, stipulate five to ten years imprisonment and a
fine of 200,000 FCFA to 2 million FCFA for a public official or any functionary who, for
himself or for a third party, solicits, accepts, or receives donations, gifts, promises,
presents, for doing, not doing or adjourning an act of his duty (Nguemegne, 2011, p. 96).
This punitive weapon to combat corruption is recognized by most societies, be it in the
developed or developing world. This study suggests that the weakness of this tool might
stem from its implementation and therefore countries such as Cameroon that are
dedicated to the fight against corruption can focus on enhancing the institutions that will
ensure the enforcement of the law against corruption.
International laws dealing with corruption seem to have recorded greater success
in Europe, especially because the transplantation of these laws in various EU member
countries is being done in the framework of mature institutions and advanced
collaborative politics. Participative countries in the EU block are ready to make
meaningful reforms in order to meet the requirements stipulated by international
conventions on corruption.
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An example of such adjustments was examined in Nasrawin (2011) for the case of
the United Kingdom (UK), where author explained that the UK needed to introduce a
new statutory law to bring members of parliament within the scope of the criminal
offense of corruption. Nasrawin also argued that this would also be necessary in order to
meet Britain’s international obligations to combat corruption in the public sector
(Nasrawin, 2011, p. 204). The adjustments affected the British law to as far back as the
“Bill of Rights” of 1689 (Article 9 on parliamentary privileges), and the “Prevention of
Corruption Acts of 1889-1916” (Nasrawin, 2011, p. 204).
The rigorousness of the law and legal endeavors to combat corruption in the UK
and the other countries in the EU block lacks in most developing countries which are
struggling in this race. This is so, especially with the current financial missteps resulting
from bad and corrupt decisions by public officials. Its achievements in combating
widespread corruption in public service and society in general are far more substantial
and effective compared to the latter, where setting the platform for real democracy to take
off is still a major challenge to most of the countries. Nguemegne (2011) mentioned that
a state of impunity existed and persisted in Cameroon as one of the main reasons why the
country’s anticorruption machinery is not productive (p. 106). As such, the punitive
anticorruption weapon remains strategic and significant in the combat against corruption
ostensibly on paper.
Lastly in another study by Majila, Taylor, and Raga (2014), authors identified
legislation as a punitive tool for anticorruption practice with focus on legislative
capability of anticorruption agencies. Authors asked the question whether these
anticorruption agencies have enough political muscle or recognition to identify and
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punish acts of corruption, or do they only concern themselves with responding to
demands by international agreements such as those coming from UNCAC, the SADC
protocol against corruption, and the African Union Convention on Preventing and
Combating Corruption. The study which was conducted on anticorruption legislation in
South Africa with focus on Cape Town, revealed that most often, as it is in other
developing countries like Cameroon, anticorruption legislation is politicized, and
anticorruption agencies are not given significant political leverage that can enable them to
execute their functions as they should. Authors therefore argued that for anticorruption
legislation to work as a legal instrument to combat corruption, it must be depoliticized,
and the agencies granted independence to function.
This section, containing the review of recent works written on the punitive legal
instrument for anticorruption, has revealed that punitive measures against corruption vary
from country to country in terms of the definition of the corruption infraction and the
severity of the penalty attributed to the infraction. The two common criminal penalties
seen include imprisonment and fines. Other administrative sanctions might include
suspensions, dismissals, layoffs, reduction of pay, and other forms of reprimands. The
punitive measure is an effective anticorruption weapon, especially with contemporary
contributions from international law and collaborative legal frameworks. The literature
also revealed that the main concern surrounding this weapon is the challenges it faces at
the level of implementation, especially for developing countries that lack the necessary
democratic platforms, sophisticated institutions, and effective procedures to implement
this measure productively. This raises the issue of institutionalization, which is the
subject of the next section.
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Institutionalization of Anticorruption
The main issue here is that of deciding which and how many authorities should
take charge of the government’s anticorruption machinery, and which institutions should
sanction corrupt acts and govern the anticorruption system, and how? For any
anticorruption effort and strategy to become effective and produce long-lasting effects,
the government must at a certain point make permanent law so as to turn the volume of
their message high, to the hearing of all citizens that corruption is a crime that is
punishable by the law as all other crimes. The literature in this section contains
investigations and analyses recently conducted on the developments that have taken place
and are still going on in the anticorruption discourse.
Yusuf (2011) discussed institutionalizing anticorruption against the
institutionalization of corruption. To institutionalize an anticorruption effort is to grant it
the legal, administrative, and sociopolitical backing that it needs in order to successfully
and legitimately install itself in the practices of the system of the country or society
taking the initiative (Yusuf, 2011). As such, at the center of institutionalization is the rule
of law. In connection with the rule of law, Yusuf investigated and analyzed the role of the
judiciary as the overarching factor for institutionalizing anticorruption (Yusuf, 2011).
Yusuf conducted the study on Nigeria, making provisions for the lessons to reflect
the experiences of other developing countries, especially those of Sub-Saharan Africa.
According to Yusuf, the volatility of anticorruption policy when it interacts with politics
is a common phenomenon. This statement stemmed from the findings in the Nigerian
case that revealed that political malpractices had meddled with the judiciary system of the
country, rendering the judiciary corrupt itself and as such, could not meet its
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responsibility toward enforcing anticorruption practices in the country, especially when
public officials are involved (Yusuf, 2011). Yusuf documented such deplorable
institutional state in the following statement, describing the corruption case of one
Governor Ibori, and how the judiciary failed to provide the legal oversight that was
needed to sanction the case and make it an example to the other top government officials.
Furthermore, Yusuf concluded that pursuing social reforms through the agency of
an unreformed institution, in this case, the judiciary, gives rise to trouble in many post
authoritarian contexts. Moreover, that such tendencies result from “common mistrust of
courts in post authoritarian transitions, mistrust arising from social misgivings regarding
the complicity of these courts in past illiberal governance” (Yusuf, 2011, p. 82).
Therefore, it can be argued as suggested in this study, that if the judiciary performs its
role in the fight against corruption in such context (involving developing countries), it
must be reformed alongside the reforms that these governments are making to ensure that
corruption is checked.
Apart from installing the appropriate judicial system that is apt, grants the
necessary independence, and is ready to foster the government’s success in fighting
against corruption, the institutionalization of anticorruption is also examined in terms of
systemization of anticorruption strategies. Ionescu (2011) pinpointed this factor by
stating that “anticorruption initiatives must be viewed in a systemic manner” (p. 118). In
discussing the economic dynamics of anticorruption, Ionescu presented the importance of
elements such as “networks, the culture of corruption, the economic cost of corruption
and cost-benefit analyses of corruption/anticorruption, and the understanding of new
models of corruption in developing strategies against corruption” (Ionesu, 2011, p. 116).
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Systemic corruption refers to political or bureaucratic corruption, but within the
government, it can be described as organized corruption (Alam, 1989; Delacote, 2008;
and Philp, 1997). The chronic nature of systemic corruption makes it a pathology that
necessitates intensive and quality treatment in order to increase the chances and the hope
for the occurrence of healing. Such is the case of most transitional democracies of the
developing world. It is as such, suggested in this study that in order to counteract
systematic corruption, governments engaged in the fight against corruption must do so in
a systematic manner. This is where the notion of ‘political will’ comes into play, and
shall be discussed in the subsequent section.
Another aspect of institutionalized anticorruption is culture. Culture is spoken of
mostly in terms of the practice of corruption, but the anticorruption culture is a notion
that should be instilled into the systems that are stricken with massive tolls of corruption
cases and are making serious strides toward changing the status-quo. Barr and Serra
(2010) conducted a study on corruption and culture with participants spanning across
several countries. The study revealed that “corruption as being examined contemporarily
is, in part a cultural phenomenon” (p. 21). The authors arrived at this conclusion by
asking certain pertinent questions suggested in this study to represent some of the
fundamental questions that should be asked when making findings into the nature,
sources, and causes of corruption. In the same way, the anticorruption discourse must
visit these roots in order to develop and prescribe appropriate curative and preventive
measures, and if possible, develop or manufacture a vaccine for the corruption pathology.
The questions Barr and Serra asked were summed up in the following sentences:
why do some people choose corruption over honesty, while others do not? Is it only the
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economic cost and benefit associated with a corrupt act that are important or do intrinsic
motivations also play a determining role? (Barr & Serra, 2010, p. 3).
They also found out in their study that culture, i.e., the “values and beliefs”
transmitted from generation to generation in a given society through socialization,
justified and guided the ways that social institutions function, their goals and modes of
operation, with social actors drawing on them to select actions, evaluate people and
events, and explain or justify their actions and evaluations (Barr & Serra, 2010).
Therefore, this is one of the reasons why corruption is more persistent in certain countries
than others. (Barr & Serra, 2010). If corruption is a cultural phenomenon as Barr and
Serra concluded, this study suggests that anticorruption efforts should be fostered such
that they become a cultural behavior so as to see corruption terminated or reduced in a
permanent manner in the given society.
Finally, setting aside independent anticorruption bodies to function as the
principal government structure responsible for implementing public policy on the combat
against corruption is a recent approach that most governments have put into place in their
efforts to win the battle against corruption in their various countries and communities. In
Cameroon, these bodies include the NACC, the “Ministry under the Presidency of the
Republic in charge of Supreme State Audit,” and the “National Agency for the
Investigation of Financial Crimes (NAIFC)” (Nguemegne 2011, p. 96, 101).
NAIFC and NACC are currently the specialized bureaus assigned with the
daunting task of stopping the pervasiveness of bureaucratic corruption in Cameroon
(Nguemegne, 2011). Other government departments, programs, and movements of NGOs
function as auxiliaries to the special bureaus. In Nigeria, the Independent Corrupt
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Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and
financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) are the special bureaus principally responsible for
issues of corruption and combating it in the country (Yusuf, 2011, p. 58). The trend is the
same for all countries adopting this approach of special agencies. Their appellations and
constructions may likely differ from one country to another, but their principal mission
remains the same—fight corruption with all might, power, and strength.
Literature shows that the strategy of using special anticorruption bureaus has
succeeded to some extent in combating corruption in several countries (David, 2010;
Grubiša, 2011; Smilov, 2010). This has however worked only in those countries where
the bureaus have appropriate expertise and sufficient recourses to carry on with the
enormous task of combating corruption. Some examples of these include the “office of
combating corruption and organize crime (USKOK)” in Croatia (Grubiša, 2011, p. 78),
the “Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC)” in Hong Kong (David, 2010,
p. 396), the “State Agency for National Security (SANS)” in Bulgaria (Smilov, 2010, p.
69), and the “Anticorruption Monotony Group (ACMG)” in Albania (Smilov, 2010, p.
73). The preceding countries have witnessed large-scale reduction in the trend of
corruption in their governments and societies in general thanks to the unrelenting efforts
and hard work put forth by their respective special and independent agencies.
Furthermore, some countries like Cameroon and other developing democracies of
the Sub-Saharan Africa regions have adopted the strategy of maintaining independent and
or special bureaus to combat corruption. However, according to the recent corruption
perception indexes (CPI) from TI, these institutions have not recorded much success (TI,
2017).
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To ensure the effectiveness of the special bureau approach, Smilov (2010)
suggested that political players must enforce these bodies (p. 72). This again raises the
issue of ‘political will’, which will be examined in the next section. In a study on
anticorruption agencies and their uses and applications in more than three Eastern
European Countries (EECs), Smilov made the following assertions about
instrumentalizations of these agencies by political players:
It is impossible for key government officials to speak regularly about wide spread
corruption, to measure it, and to organize public awareness campaigns, as this will
associate the politicians with corruption in the eyes of the public. Therefore, there
is a political need for a semiautonomous, semi-independent public body to take
upon itself the anticorruption discourse on behalf of the ruling parties. (Smilov,
2010, p. 72)
Smilov also proposed four major structural and functional elements that these
bodies need to consider at their creation in order to be successful. First is that their
composition should build bridges with civil society and the opposition and second, the
powers of these bodies need to be concentrated mainly in the area of institutional reform,
legislative drafting, and coordination among other government agencies; investigative
powers are not needed. Third, in relation to the media, the commission should be able to
supply with media-friendly material and the fourth thing is in relation to business, one
could expect that the commission remains discrete and appreciative of two major factors
of business support: downsizing of the state and lowering of taxes (Smilov, 2010, p. 72).
Issues of the distribution and separation of powers and effective coordination
between the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches of the government, are usually
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hindrances to the effective operation of special government agencies like the
anticorruption bureau (Yusuf, 2011). Yusuf pointed in support of this assertion citing the
case of Nigeria, that the Due Process Office (DPO), ICPC, and EFCC make the judiciary
an unquestionably reputable institution (Yusuf, 2011, p. 58).
Issues of power distribution are due to lack of strategy, vision, and, coordination
in the way power is partitioned and managed among the various arms of the government
(Smilov 2010). Smilov also rejected the attribution of investigative powers to specialized
anticorruption agencies, arguing that they could counteract important groups such as the
police and the prosecutor (p. 72). Smilov further added that special anticorruption
agencies can in certain cases initiate proceedings that are then transferred to the
prosecutor and the police for continuance (Smilov, 2010, p. 72). However, a slightly
different situation prevails in the case of Cameroon, where the NACC is invested with
greater investigatory powers in cases of corruption. As stated in the agency’s
organization papers, the action of NACC is based on three fundamental pillars:
investigation, prevention, and communication; studies; and cooperation (NACC, 2008).
This, in comparison to the recommendations made by Smilov (2010) discussed below,
indicates that special anticorruption bureaus function differently in different countries,
the reason why some are successful in their missions and some are not.
Smilov’s study suggested that fewer specialized bureaus should be created, or
even that a single special bureau should be in charge, and the amount of legislation
sanctioning corruption should not be overwhelming and ambiguous, rather it should be
clear, fair, and concise. Yusuf argued that numerous legislative provisions and
institutions can create conflicts between jurisdictions and possibly exacerbate rather than
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reduce corruption incidences in a nation (Yusuf, 2011, p. 63). In addition, special
agencies can initiate more effective anticorruption policies if they concentrate on the
policy part of it and stay away from ground investigations, which belong to the judiciary
and the police.
Finally, the review on the institutionalization of anticorruption methods engages
policy makers, practitioners, and researchers in a discussion on four major pillars of the
institution of anticorruption (Scherer & Palazzo, 2008). These pillars are judicialization,
systemization, culturalization, and independence (TI, 2007). These elements have been
reviewed in the preceding section, and the different works reviewed indicate that
substantial research has been conducted on the different aspects concerning the
institutionalization of anticorruption norms, values, and practices in the given society.
This might provide comparative lessons for countries still struggling to register a largescale win against corruption and its consequences. The next section provides a review of
literature on leadership and the role played by society in the anticorruption discourse
through topics such as political will, leadership style, culture, and other dynamics of the
civil society.
The Role of Leadership and Society
The role of leadership and the dynamics of society in the combat against
corruption are significant at several levels and worth examining. This study supports the
leadership school of thought that upholds the notion that “everything rises and falls on
leadership,” as stated by Maxwell (1999, p. xi). On the other hand, people and culture
share a strong bond that makes it difficult to separate the two when conducting behavioral
studies, as it is in the case at hand. This section therefore examines leadership dynamics

78
in the fight against corruption in form of the political will for change, usually initiated
and guided by the leadership of the particular country or community. Secondly, the
normative/cultural applications of societal behavior vis-à-vis corruption and the combat
against it is examined to complete the circle of change, which requires both the will for
change and the change in behavior itself.
The Political Will for Change
In the context of combating corruption, the concept of political will is defined in
Kpundeh (1998), as the “demonstrated credible intent of political actors (elected or
appointed leaders, civil society watch dogs, stakeholder groups, etc.) to attack perceived
causes or effects of corruption at a systemic level” (p. 92). Kpundeh also posited, “this
will of political actors is a critical starting point for sustainable and effective
anticorruption strategies and programs” (Kpundeh, 1998, p. 92). In the absence of a
strong, determined, and committed political will, Kpundeh emphasized that the statement
of government in reforming civil service, strengthening transparency and accountability
and reinventing the association between government and private industry would remain
mere rhetoric (Kpundeh, 1998, p. 92). Political will is thus seen as the fuel for change in
the engine of government. Such change takes root first at the level of organizations and
groups (government, private, civil society), and then spreads across the nation or the
community. Thus, the use of leadership and organizational change becomes important for
the understanding of the application of political will.
Organizational change can occur with respect to two trends – evolutionary or
revolutionary change (Burke, 2008). Evolutionary change is a gradual and steady change
process that occurs within a long period, while revolutionary change engenders a major
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transformation of significant parts or all of the organization within a short period.
Changing the corruption culture in government and society is a project that can benefit
from both types of change. Changing the corruption culture requires revolutionary change
in terms of administrative reforms, and evolutionary change in terms of behavioral
reforms. It might also implicate multi-level change, which is change at the individual,
group, and organizational levels. Change can also be structural, functional, and statutory.
Perspectives on organizational change must also take into consideration culture,
organizational learning, and possible resistance—factors that will be analyzed further in
the next subsection.
The initiation of the kind of leadership that will stimulate the right political will
and spark change within a political system is summed up in the good governance
concept. This concept is fundamental in the discourse on corruption and the combat
against it. To achieve good governance within a system, the right leadership and
management should be present. The subsequent discussion in this subsection shall review
some of the recent studies conducted on good governance and the combat against
corruption and will end with a review of the concept of leadership, including how it
influences political will and good governance, and how effective and important public
management is in the consolidation of this anticorruption network.
Good governance has been defined in Elahi (2009) as the process and structure
that guides political and socio-economic relationships (p. 1170). This concept can
sometimes be embedded or misunderstood with that of just ‘governance’ which is the
exercise of economic, political and administrative authorities in managing affairs of a
country (Elahi, 2009, p. 1170). Thus, the main idea that distinguishes between
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governance and good governance decision is the process or structure of implementation
of decision. Drawing from the good governance principles enumerated in the United
Nations Development Program’s “Governance and sustainable Human Development”
policy of 1997, Graham, Amos, and Plumptre (2003, p. 3) listed five good governance
principles. These principles do not detail exhaustively what can contain good governance
in a political system but are largely satisfactory to explain the expectations of good
governance for all governments practicing democratic governance.
The first principle concerns legitimacy and voice, which refers to the notions of
participation and ‘consensus orientation’ enforce this principle, which upholds the
viewpoint that all men and women should have a voice in decision–making either directly
or through legitimate intermediate institutions that represent their intentions. The
principle also adds that “differing interests can be medicated to reach a broad consensus
on what is in the best interest of the group and, where possible, on policies and
procedures” (Graham, Amos, & Plumptre, 2003, p. 3). The second concerns direction.
The direction principle is expounded by the ideas of ‘strategic vision’, which requires that
“leaders and the public have a broad and long-term perspective on good governance and
human development, along with a sense of what is needed for such development”
(Graham, Amos, & Plumptre, 2003, p. 3).
Another one is the performance principle, which is realized through the
implementation of the notions of responsiveness, effectiveness, and efficiency. These
three sets of administrative strategies ensure that institutions and processes serve all
stakeholders and produce results that meet needs while making the best use of resources
(Graham, Amos & Plumptre, 2003). There is also accountability: The twin public policy
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strategies of accountability and transparency explain what the accountability principle
generally means to government. Accountability requires that decision-makers in
government, the private sector and civil society organizations be accountable to the
public, as well as to institutional stakeholders. At the same time, transparency is built on
the free flow of information, where process, institution, and information are directly
accessible to those concerned with them, and enough information is provided to
understand and monitor them (Graham, Amos & Plumptre, 2003, p. 3).
Fairness: The rule of equity and the rule of law guarantee fairness for all in
society. These rules hold that all men and women have opportunities to improve or
maintain their wellbeing, and as such, legal frameworks should be fair and enforced
impartially, particularly the laws on human rights (Graham, Amos & Plumptre, 2003).
These principles also reflect the stipulations of the United Nations Convention in the
universal declaration of human rights.
Elahi (2009) elaborated the preceding principles in a study on the character of
UNDP and its take on the notion and policy of good governance. Being at the center of
development of the good governance policy and its principles, the UNDP was said to
have taken this policy to heart, with the major goal of materializing sustainable human
development in the developing world (Elahi 2009). Not forgetting, other pioneers of good
governance, including the World Bank, enforced this policy. As stated by the Elahi in the
study, the term ‘good governance’ was first mentioned causally in the World Bank’s
1989 report (Elahi, 2009, p. 1167). Just as in Graham et al. (2003), Elahi pointed out
participants or players of governance to include the state, private sector, and the civil
society. The force that unites these three parties is the concept of “social contract,” which
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John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau are said to be the originators (Elahi, 2009, p.
1173).
Elahi explained the concept of social contract in the following words:
Social contract is a conceptual watershed that acts as a facilitator in the
humankind’s transition from the state of nature to civilized life. In order to trace
the natural growth of human society, Locke and Rousseau, following Hobbes,
postulated that people lived in the state of nature before submitting themselves
under the authority of civil government. (Elahi, 2009, p. 1172)
The social contract concept therefore helps to resolve most governance
complexities including political powers, individual rights, and general respect for the
state. Lessons of this analysis directly apply to those of developing countries that are still
learning government and democracy. Combating corruption in these countries will take
understanding and commitment to govern, and the principles of good governance for
success to be achieved.
When Slovakia saw corruption greatly reduced in the country between the 2000
and 2008, it was because the principles of good governance were put into action by the
leadership of the country. As said in Beblavý (2009, p. 180), between 2000 and 2008
Slovakia experienced a major reduction in corruption, particularly in certain sectors.
During this period, successive Slovak governments also passed major reforms in almost
all areas of policy. Multilateral institutions (EU, World Bank) as well as bilateral donors
played a significant role in this endeavor. It is therefore interesting to look at Slovakia’s
experience in the light of how good governance agenda can be made realistic, as well as
improving the aid process in corruption control.
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Other countries that have successfully combated corruption using good
governance initiatives during the past decade include, Croatia, Hong Kong, Bulgaria, and
most of the CEE Countries that came out of communism and embraced democratic
governance principles, institutions, and structures beginning from early 1990s (Grubiša,
2011; David, 2010; Smilov, 2010; and Beblavý, 2009). International efforts aid in
enforcing and establishing good governance principles in developing countries for
reasons such as declaration of poverty, promotion of human rights, and combat against
corruption. The end goal of these efforts is to speed up the development process of these
countries. However, these efforts have proven to work only for some countries, where
others like those of the sub-Saharan African region seem not to be responding very well
to this treatment as current and past CPIs by TI would indicate.
The reasons for this slow response are diverse, but literature has pointed strongly
to the lack of or absence of leadership, which incorporates the political will necessary to
implement good governance and provide quality, sufficient, and stable oversight to the
newly created democracies. In Agbiboa (2010), the researcher examined the case of
Nigeria, looking for connections between corruption and underdevelopment. This
eventually stirred up issues like poverty, lawlessness, economic dependence, and high
mortality rates due to low standard of living. Agbiboa found out that corruption had
“penetrated all aspect of Nigerian society and public affairs” (Agbiboa, 2010, p. 482).
Nigeria, just as other Sub-Saharan countries, is said to be less than successful in
combating the corruption ailment due to several reasons, with ‘laissez faire’ leadership
and share incompetence being the prime factor (Agbiboa, 2010). Another serious reason
pointed by Agbiboa is the historical and cultural interruption caused by western
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colonization in Nigeria (Agbiboa, 2010). This goes the same for most over 90 percent
African countries. Other reasons pointed by author included “low public-sector salary,
lack of transparent political processes, lack of effective incentives to public officials,
ineffectiveness of the judiciary, societal pressures and culture, poor economic policies,
and lack of effective media” (Agbiboa, 2010, p. 498).
Concerning the incidence of corruption, in the case of Nigeria, Agbiboa (2010)
quoted Maduagwu (1982), who blamed the rising incidence of corruption in the public
service on the prevailing culture that condones and even encourages corruption. Agbiboa
held the following observations for this pervasiveness of corruption in Nigeria:
Corruption thrives in Nigeria because society sanctions it. No Nigerian official
would be ashamed, let alone condemned by his people because he or she is
accused of being corrupt. The same applies to outright stealing of government or
public money or property. On the contrary, the official will be hailed as being
smart. He will be adored as having ‘made it’; ‘he is a successful man’…and any
government official or politician who is in a position to enrich himself corruptly
but failed to do so will, in fact, be ostracized by his people upon leaving office.
He would be regarded as a fool, or selfish, or both. (Maduagwu as cited in
Agbiboa, 2010, p. 483-484)
The Nigerian case reflects what nearby countries like Cameroon also experience.
Referring to Ngomba (2006), Nguemegne (2011) posited that in Cameroon, corruption is
so pervasive that one would think nobody does the right thing. The few honest people are
lost in an ocean of corruption. There seems to be a socially established tolerance for
corruption. Nguemegne also made the assertion that “corruption has become, over the
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years, so rampant in Cameroon that one is afraid that a real culture of corruption
entrenched in the fabric of the society exists in the country (Nguemegne, 2011, p. 114).
Just to mention some of the dreadful examples of corruption in Africa, in Nigeria, public
officials are said to have stolen more than $440 billion of public money between 1960
and 1999 (Agbiboa, 2010, p. 491).
Agbiboa explained that this is six times the Marshal Plan, the sum total required
to reconstruct devastated Europe in the aftershock of the Second World War (Agbiboa,
2010, p. 491). In Cameroon, one of the outstanding cases of corruption is that of Mr.
Ondo Ndong, the ex-general manager of Fonds d’Entraide Intercommunal (FEICOM)
(i.e., National Local Government Support Funds) (Nguemegne, 2011, p. 99). Mr. Ondo
Ndong was sacked from office in November (2005), and later arrested in 2006, alongside
32 other officials, charged with embezzlement of a sum of $104 million (52 billion
FCFA) of public money (Nguemegne, 2011, p. 111). While 16 other suspects were
acquitted, Justice Noah Ebella found the sum embezzled to be only $22 million (11
billion FCFA) (Nguemegne, 2011, p. 99). Ondo Ndong was sentenced to 50 years in
prison, his properties seized, and his bank accounts frozen (Nguemegne, 2009, p. 99).
Other culprits were also sanctioned according to their crimes (Nguemegne, 2011).
Agbiboa's study also documented that African Union (AU) report indicated that
corruption drains Africa of US $140 billion per year. This is about 25 percent of the
continent's GDP (Agbiboa, 2010, p. 491). In another study, Haruna (2009) took on the
issue of leadership and political will in Africa, and specifically in the Sub-Saharan
region, questioning the bases that establish public leadership in those countries. The
author claimed that from decolonization, to the second liberation era, Sub-Saharan Africa
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has suffered from leadership poverty (Haruna, 2009). Author documented the following
thoughts concerning the perception of leadership in Africa, a view that has tend to prevail
in the continent until current tendencies in which the need for change is becoming
eminent:
Whether in thought or in practice, leadership in Africa has been narrowly
circumscribed, defined, and operationalized. The nationalistic leadership in the
1960s, authoritarian leadership spanning the decades of the 1970s, and the
managerial leadership proclaiming an "African Renaissance" in the 1990s, all
assumed the leader-follower perspective, which places the responsibilities of
leadership in the hands of the leader. This dominant theme portrays followers as
passive or even subservient and takes the context largely for granted. (Haruna,
2009, p. 941)
Haruna consistently argued that the definition of leadership in African countries,
especially those the author studied, have superficially focused on leadership
characteristics, styles, and behaviors, hardly reflecting leaderships as practiced in African
communities (Haruna, 2009).
In the search for solutions to the above-mentioned leadership deficiency, Haruna
proposed that an alternative, pragmatic view based on unique historical and cultural
community norms should be held for leadership in Africa: one that fosters social change
and institutional transformation (Haruna, 2009). The author referred to such approach as
“community-based leadership,” which he argued that it has a better chance of succeeding
in the sub-Saharan countries because it taps into and builds on the peoples’ cultures
(Haruna, 2009, pp. 946-947). This approach is said to be both consistent with indigenous
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social-cultural value systems of the people and supported by scholarships that makes the
society the focal point of this argument, while considering the fact that in public
administration, there is growing adherence to communitarian and non-bureaucratic
approaches to public service.
Thus, the need for a shifting of emphasis in leadership literature from leadership
traits, skills, behaviors, to processes that are relational and context oriented. While
Haruna’s study suggests a pertinent solution to leadership problem in Africa, this study
also propose that community-based leadership should not negate the input that
globalization tendencies would bring. The truth is that, things have happened to African
history and have affected the leadership of the continent and its life in general. Therefore,
the biggest concern of current leaders, scholars, and practitioners should be how to lay
hands on what will work. A positivistic approach towards solving some of these problems
is going to be rewarding if these countries would consider its adoption.
Furthermore, on the issue of leadership and political will in Africa, Spears (2007)
posited that attempts to solve many Africa’s challenges through benevolent leadership,
democratization, and intervention do not address the fundamental structural issues that
are a consequence of the African experience of state-building (p. 345). In a comparative
study conducted on state formation in the West and in Africa, the author found out that
the state and nation-building process in Europe and North America was a result of
specific circumstances and, in particular, a willingness on some levels to tolerate violence
and coercion as a means of state consolidation (Spears, 2007). This history of violence is
seen as a lamentable, but necessary price to pay for development whose results became
the advent of stable prosperous and democratic states (Spears, 2007).
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In the case of Africa, Spears explained that the continent earned independence
through direct accordance (granted) by the colonial powers, rather than through military
victory as most of the states in the West and in Europe did in order to consolidate
(Spears, 2007). The author concluded that this history left African states in a state
weakness legacy (Spears, 2007, p. 350). This history is also said to have left African
leaders with the heavy responsibility of concerning themselves with the kind of domestic
issues that troubled their colonial predecessors – human rights, democracy, legitimacy,
and territorial control, things that the states and the new leaders did not have enough time
with which to become acquainted or ensure their institutionalization (Spear, 2007). The
dynamics of internal weaknesses and external influences on the history of African
leadership constituted the main argument developed (Spears, 2007).
In the study by Spears (2007), the abovementioned historical events may serve as
pertinent reasons why leadership in most African states became unstable for several
decades after the colonial rule, but it will not serve the same reason why contemporary
leadership should not succeed in the same continent as argued in this study.
Globalization, human development, technology, and accessibility to resources have
placed contemporary governance and state dynamics on a different scale compared to the
situation that was prevalent in the 1960s. With strong political will to change, African
leadership will perform better than current trends irrespective of the historical challenges.
Other transitional states as seen in the preceding examples in this study, demonstrated the
strong will for change across the public sector, private, and the civil society, and the
results where large-scale reduction in corruption and increase in economic development.
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In another leadership study, Wanasika, Howell, Littrell, and Dorfman (2010),
documented how cultural heritage has greatly affected leadership style in Africa, creating
grounds for difficult adherence to change, and the implementation of contemporary
leadership styles that are needed for the market economy and for democratization. The
authors observed in their study, that the servant-leadership model practiced by traditional
African societies made the leader a disputes’ mediator rather than a behavior director
(Wanasika, Howell, Littrell, & Dorfman, 2010, p. 235). The contemporary market place
necessitates new and advanced leadership approaches that are embedded in leadership
styles such as managerial leadership, situational leadership, transactional leadership, and
transformational leadership. With each leadership style being developed to suit the everchanging development in human behavior with respect to time, scholars and practitioners
need to learn how to adapt to change.
With leadership being defined as the capability to formulate a vision and gunner
support for it (Plachy, 2009), current leadership in Africa as well as elsewhere should
understand that followers’ mentality and behavior changes with time. Events and general
human dynamics have changed since the 1960s. More Africans, especially in the case of
Cameroon, have attended and are still attending school in greater numbers than was the
case two decades ago. Moreover, globalization and technological development of today
have diversified the trends of the demand for goods and services. As such, the supply side
must be responsive; otherwise, the result will be outburst of national revolution as seen in
the recent cases of Tunisia and Egypt in North Africa. Civil wars may also prevail if
change is avoided. Nguemegne (2011) pointed out that the absence of a ready political
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will for change in Cameroon would be a major hindrance to a successful anticorruption
mechanism for the country.
Lastly, the study of Neupane, Soar, Vaidya, and Yong (2014) provided grounds to
argue that political will for change must not be exercised solely by the government. The
civil society should also exercise such willingness to accept change as they engage the
government on different platforms of the economy. The study, conducted on how public
e-procurement could help in reducing the risk of corruption in Nepal, revealed that the
innovative tool of ‘e-procurement’ faced several challenges with regard to willingness by
economic operators to accept and adopt the tool. This is a common trend with other
developing countries such as Cameroon, where citizens cry out for lack of political will
for change, but they themselves appear to be allergic to innovations in the way business is
conducted since the culture of corruption seems to be benefiting those that are players
from both sides.
Leadership is paramount in developing, initiating, and encouraging the kind of
political will that considers the eradication of corruption in the public service and in
society in general as a political priority. Encouraging the prevalence of anticorruption
culture against a corruption culture, is another anticorruption strategy worth reviewing.
The next section will reveal some of the pertinent contemporary arguments that have
been put forth on this subject so far by authors across different social science disciplines.
Normative/ Cultural Applications of Societal Behavior
The intrinsic nature of corruption is that it is a behavioral issue, thus, it is argued
in this study that for such behavior to cease or reduce, it should be replaced by another
behavior, which is that of anticorruption. Literature reveals that much has been written on
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corruption and culture compared to anticorruption and culture, due to the predominance
of corruption. Until the practice of anticorruption or until the decision by people to
behave in an uncorrupt manner becomes a norm and social behavior engrafted and deeply
rooted into the culture of people, less will likely be achieved in terms of effectiveness,
permanency, and durability of anticorruption in a given society.
In a study on Mexico, Guerrero and Rodriguez-Oreggia (2008), using a
quantitative analysis, combined with a survey and econometric techniques, examined
socio-demographic and institutional factors affecting the behavior of individuals who
engage in corrupt acts. Using focus groups, the authors collected some information on
how informal institutions and norms promote or block corruption (Guerrero &
Rodriguez-Oreggia, 2008, p. 357). The authors’ findings indicated a trade-off between
perceptions, social dynamics, and individual incentives for corrupt behavior in an
institutional framework, creating a kind of vicious circle that is difficult to break
(Guerrero & Rodriguez-Oreggia, 2008).
The vicious circle mentioned by preceding authors is common in most developing
countries fighting and struggling with corruption, (e.g., Cameroon). In such vicious
circle, individuals see themselves particularly forced to commit corruption because the
implicit system of values of the society in which these individuals dwell, have created a
reward and incentives platform for corruption, thus rendering the latter a normative
activity that can hardly be avoided by all (Guerrero & Rodriguez-Oreggia, 2008, p. 359).
In a situation where the implicit system of values disfavors corruption, an anticorruption
culture could prevail.
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Culturally-speaking, original African societal values do not breed corruption.
Instead, the basic African culture teaches respect for the elderly, love for the family and
community living, speaking the truth, and fear of ancestral curses and ailment if one is
caught in an evil act for which he or she refuses the responsibility by telling lies. In the
pure African traditional setting, it is believed that “gods” would strike someone dead if
he/she lies for an act he or she committed. This kind of norms would not nurture or
promoted the kind of corruption that is currently prevalent in most parts of the continent.
Crittenden, Hanna, and Peterson (2009) argued that it is the advent of modern
government that created the kind of implicit corruption culture currently witnessed in
these societies.
In analyzing the cheating culture as a global societal phenomenon, the researchers
argued that findings suggest that the cheating culture came and spread globally as a
capitalistic phenomenon (Crittenden, Hanna, & Peterson, 2009, p. 337). As such,
societies would not have been corrupted without the notion and practice of business.
However, this position is disputed in this study, as seen in studies above where
communist countries witnessed some of the worst examples of corrupt regimes in recent
decades (Grubiša, 2011; David, 2010; Smilov, 2010). It is factual that business culture
creates fertile grounds for corruption, but corruption is a behavior that is deeply rooted in
human beings just like any other sin. The notion of “everyone is doing it” (Crittenden,
Hanna, and Peterson, 2009, p. 338) is an argument that can help to explain the
pervasiveness of corrupt behavior in the developing world.
The study of the structure of society and the prevalence of the culture of
corruption also indicates that informal relationships have a strong influence in the
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formation of the culture of corruption (Kingston, 2008, p. 90). According to the author,
although many developing countries have inherited or adopted formal legal, political, and
administrative systems similar to those in the developed world, the behavior induced by
these rules has often differed from that which is prescribed (Kingston, 2008, p. 90).
Kingston asked the following questions in social constructs and the prevalence of this
corruption culture.
First, he queried the reason why countries with similar formal rules experienced
different corruption levels, why transplants of formal rules from one country to another
often failed to produce the desired patterns of behavior, and why entrenched corruption is
often difficult to eliminate (Kingston, 2008). Kingston concluded that different sets of
informal rules could interact with various set of formal rules to produce a variety of
behaviors and outcomes. These informal rules are different from society to society, and
thus different outcomes are likely to be produced when they interact with the formal rules
(Kingston, 2008).
Lack of social capital or social trust is said to be at the center of the preceding
tendencies for development of corruption cultures (Kingston, 2008). However, Kingston
suggested that even though informal rules differentials amongst societies can closely
explain the differences that prevail in social construction of behavior in these societies, it
is not the only reason why people in the developing world feel compelled to be corrupt
more than people in the developed world are. These societies have similar notions of
formal institution, but the practice sometimes is different from what it pretends to be.
Most African countries blame formal institutional development and affirmation,
which makes them lag behind the developed world (Balafoutas, 2011). Human beings are
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the same everywhere (with the original weak moral nature), but environment influences
and distinguishes their behaviors based on the kind of behavioral patterns being enforced
in that environment (Balafoutas, 2011). Implicit cultural values do not stand alone to
influence behavior when it comes to corruption, rather, the role of formal institutions is
significant, and it influences the behavior that will slowly turn into a normal practice and
consequently become culture.
In a more recent study, Ocheje (2017) reiterated the challenge faced by African
countries in curbing corruption, due to the normative context of corruption in these
countries. Author argued that if the normative challenges are not removed, the full
potential in the rule of law as an effective anticorruption strategy would not be released
for such purpose. And that social values and norms must yield to new direction if
successful anticorruption practice must be realized in such environments.
Another comprehensive notion that explains cultural and normative tendencies is
the notion of “public beliefs” as seen in a psychological study by Balafoutas (2011).
Cost-benefit analysis and the principal-agent notion are used to explain how the
bureaucrat or government official rationally weighs the chances of gains and losses
before deciding whether to be corrupt or not” (Balafoutas, 2011, p. 51). Looking at the
emotions that surround the corruption act, the author suggested in the study that the
corruption transactions between the lobby and the bureaucrat may depend on the beliefs
of the public in the context of a repeated psychological game (Balafoutas, 2011).
Therefore, a bureaucrat will receive more bribes in a society where corruption is seen as a
normal behavior, than in a society that holds high expectations of the bureaucrat
(Balafoutas, 2011, P. 58).
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Generally, if social behavior standards are low, both the lobby and the
government official feel comfortable to proceed with the corruption transaction. This
model is more comprehensive and significant in explaining the implicit sources of the
corrupt attitude compared to their socio-cultural explanations such as history, informal
styles, and social structure. The model would align strongly with that of implicit systems
of values seen above in Guerrero and Rodriguez-Oreggia (2008).
Rodriguez-Oreggia (2008) argued that not all giving is corruption. The intent to
corrupt and not to ‘bless’ must exist in order to rule for corruption. Circumstances and
societal definitions are also important in determining what is considered a gift and what is
considered as bribe. If not, the tipping culture that is practiced in the West will no longer
be regarded as an act of gratitude and remuneration, but as a corrupt behavior that seeks
to influence service. The same for a public official that receives an act of “thank you”
from the citizens for rendering them a satisfactory service, an act that is not meant to
corrupt the official in any way. Consciences of individuals involved in giving, and the
socio-political stipulations of such behavior tend to be used as a barometer for corruption
across societies. These eventualities should be watched when making an argument on the
nature of gifts and bribes in the perpetration of corruption.
To build a culture of anticorruption, researchers and practitioners must look for
ways to shape public beliefs and implement systems of values to favor anticorruption
behavior just as in the case for corruption as seen in preceding analyses. However, since
wrongdoing is common in the human nature, the achievement of anticorruption culture is
more of a fight compared to the likely and effortless emergence and flourishing of
corruption. Among the few researches that have been considered with the goal to
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discover and develop anticorruption models that can become practical societal norms, is
the study on e-government conducted by Kim, Kim, and Lee (2009). Kim et al. used the
institutional theory of analysis to document and evaluate the development of an
anticorruption system which they called OPEN (Online Procedures Enhancement for
Civil Application) (Kim, Kim, & Lee, 2009, p. 42). Conducted on the second largest
metropolitan government in South Korea, Kim et al. explored three institutionalization
dimensions –regulatory/coercive, cognitive/mimetic, and normative, and four
anticorruption strategies embedded in the system. The results demonstrated how an egovernment anticorruption system in a local government evolved and became a prototype
of a national system to be used for the same purpose (Kim et al., 2009, p. 42).
E-government is a worldwide contemporary phenomenon in public
administration, and a system like OPEN will work well for societies that have widespread
use of the Internet and information technology both for government and the society as a
whole. Expectations differ for developing countries like Cameroon, where
underdevelopment has rendered internet and other associated technologies scarce
resources. The OPEN culture is a future perspective for the country and its advent can be
precipitated by the improvement of other institutions and structures that will ensure its
installation and sustainability (Mungiu-Pippidi & Dusu, 2011). These include education,
governing laws, creation and enhancement of markets, and the installation of modern and
effective equipment.
Civil society organizations can also hold and foster the anticorruption culture. The
fight against corruption is not a responsibility that left in the hands of the government
alone. A study of the Romanian educational system represents a case in which the civil
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society decided to stand up and promote an anticorruption practice, not once, but on a
continuous basis (Mungiu-Pippidi & Dusu, 2011). In their findings, the authors
documented how the Romanian Coalition for Clean Universities (CCU), a grass roots
coalition of civil society organizations and education stakeholders created between 2008
and 2009 analytically supervised and examined 42 Romanian state universities during the
academic years 2007-2009 to assess their governance, integrity, fairness, and their
capability to curb corruption Procedures (Mungiu-Pippidi & Dusu, 2011).
The CCU is a combination of NGOs—professional associations, student, and
teacher unions. The perception of Romania as the most corrupt EU member state
according to corruption perception index was as a result of the country’s educational
systems and evaluated the impact of the CCU on the reduction of such levels of
corruption (Mungiu-Pippidi & Dusu, 2011, p. 532). Such efforts by civil society are
paramount in stamping out the nature of corruption and ministering to an anticorruption
culture, especially in developing countries where societal learning in the democratic era
necessitates multilateral corporation between government, private, and international
actors (Doig & Riley, 1998; Klitgaard, 1998; Everett, Neu, & Rahaman, 2006; Schmidt,
2007). Other anticorruption behaviors can be built and promoted through government
incentives initiated in people’s social norms.
The review of the role of leadership and societal construct in the fight against
corruption has considered different notions and concepts that need to be visited whenever
one might want to understand how corruption comes into being and can be combated in
the context of contemporary developing societies, especially those still struggling with
high levels of public corruption. A strong political will embedded in good governance
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principles, an understanding and adherence to the rule of the social contract, the
transformation of leadership to reflect contingent leadership needs, the influences of
public beliefs, implicit systems of value, e-government practices, and the cultural strength
and political civil society organizations are some of the major notions and concepts
reviewed. The next and final section of this chapter contains a review of an area that
represents the main gaps noticed in the contemporary literature on anticorruption. This
area is that of contextualization, which refers to the effectiveness of anticorruption
campaigns and strategies in the specific societies in which they are being implemented.
Anticorruption Approaches and the Contextualization Perspective
Having reviewed the instruments for anticorruption practice in the preceding
section, this section is concerned with the issue of the contextualization of these
instruments in the given societies, with the goal of explaining the different perceptions
that govern the approaches or instruments and how they demonstrate the dynamics of
applicability and effectiveness of outcomes in the various societies. Anticorruption
approaches or strategies are applicable and can be studied with respect to two contextual
perspectives—the universal contextual perspective (Santiso, 2001) and the particularistic
contextual perspective (Rothstein (2007). These two perspectives have different
implications on the government’s anticorruption policy and mechanism for each country
taking initiative to fight corruption. Sometimes, the actors might not be aware of the
dynamics of the approaches, and as such, cannot assess their relevance in the fight.
Research on anticorruption is growing and areas like contextualization are new
and emerging, and thus appear to lack bulk and depth. Research reviews that discuss the
concepts and the need that they present both in theory and in practice, make applications
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and possibly recommendations to the case held in this study. However, this section
concludes with an introduction of the debate on the application of these concepts, thus
raising the question of the need for mixed approaches and adaptations of strategies for
effective anticorruption practice.
The Universal Anticorruption Perspective
The theory of universalism as held in the practice of anticorruption refers to a
conceptual anticorruption context in which global anticorruption initiatives and
approaches are upheld and implemented worldwide, without necessarily considering the
specific dynamics of the individual countries implementing such approaches. Universalist
theories uphold the transplantation of international measures, especially from the West,
through global cooperation and development programs and institutions such as the World
Bank and IMF, into developing nations based on different economic and socio-political
objectives set for each community (Santiso, 2001). Theoretical perceptions of universally
oriented anticorruption movements saw early emergence in the works of Klitgaard in the
late 1980s, especially as observed in the author’s formula for corruption which is pioneer
in the field and was postulated based on a rational choice (institutionalist) perspective.
Corruption according to Klitgaard is understood in this context as Monopoly plus
Discretion Minus Accountability, which can be represented as C= M+D-A (Klitgaard,
1988, p. 75). The rational choice theory in corruption was also taken up by Alemann
(2005), who explained corruption as a problem of political economy that includes “a
principle-agent model, according to which each player acts in the interest of his or her
own mostly economic utility” (Aleman as cited in Gephart, 2009, p. 8). In other words,
the institutionalist perspective sees corruption because of overarching strategies that lead
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to monopoly, discretion, and a significant absence of transparency and accountability.
This perception for corruption is believed to be the same for all institutions across the
globe (Gephart, 2009), and thus if anticorruption strategies would define corruption in the
same way, the approaches to combating it would believe that what would work for
institutions in the West would also work for institutions in the East and South, especially
in the context of democracy.
One of the most developed studies on corruption, among those conducted on the
subject of “contextualization” of the corruption/anticorruption concepts, is that of
Gephart (2009). The author made a case for the study by highlighting criticisms that
scholars have always imputed on the institutions promoting the international concept and
movement for anticorruption. Those institutions include the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), various international NGOs, and international law in
general seen in the United Nations (UN), EU, AU, and other international organizations,
regional blocks and international conventions (Gephart, 2009). Gephart also posited that
since corruption exists all over the world, in all societies, sectors, and in various forms;
and since corruption is fought in equally manifold ways, anticorruption campaign are
subject to the accusation that they do not constitute a sufficiently differentiated
perspective (Gephart, 2009).
In this study, I sought to put forth this argument with the precaution of not
sounding overarchingly critical and only to realize at the end that those methods are
effective and cannot be much neglected when making a case for anticorruption practice.
As such, conclusions were only made after the collection of data that revealed the
realities on the field. Gephart also took the same guard, stating that the critical voices
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reflected in the article are not aimed at generally rejecting the World Bank’s
anticorruption efforts as well as those of other international organizations. Instead, the
critical observation could be seen as points of departure for identifying the preconditions
of a successful fight against corruption (Gephart, 2009).
According to Gephart, universalist arguments for a global approach toward the
fight against corruption are based on several factors. The first argument is that more
cooperation that is international increases transparency even at the national level (Eigen,
2007; Gephart, 2009). Analyzing transparency initiatives in the oil and gas industries
under the banner of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), an
international advisory group (IAG), Eigen examined the contemporary tendency for the
fight against corruption, and described the coming together of international organizations,
government institutions, the private sector, and civil society organizations to form a
network that is aimed at realizing more successful results in the fight, especially for states
that are rich in resources as victory for a global approach to anticorruption (Eigen, 2007).
Organizations prominent in this fight globally include, TI that has grown beyond
the wildest dream of the international community, with independent TI National Chapters
in about 100 countries. Another key actor is the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) with its outstanding Convention on Combating Bribery of
Foreign Official (1999), signed in Paris in 1997 by 35 exporting countries, enforced after
1999. Other organizations include: The UNCAC of 2003; the Inter-American Convention
against Corruption of 1996; the Convention of the Council of Europe of 1998; the
African Union Convention of 2003; and other focused groups such as the Global Witness,
a United Kingdom based NGO (Eigen, 2007, pp. 331-332).
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Even though EITI focuses on countries that are rich with resources, indicated that
EITI’s ramifications have versions that can affect all countries taking the fight against
corruption as a serious matter. The author listed several countries whose governments
have made endorsement statements for EITI including: Angola, Bolivia, Cameroon,
Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea, Kazakhstan,
Mauritania, Mongolia, Niger, Peru, and Sierra Leon (Eigen, 2007, p. 34). This is an
indication of a growing spectrum of tools and structures for collaboration on the part of
developing nations to address the corruption nightmare.
Other arguments in favor of universalism in combating corruption are those made
for the transplantation of good governance principles into countries lacking such qualities
so as to foster sustainable economic and social development (Santiso, 2001). Laver
(2010) took up this argument in another study designating the combat against the cancer
of corruption as urgency in the international community involving states, multinational
companies, and civil society groups. With less attention paid to this struggle by religious
organizations, and given corruption’s profound moral and social justice dimensions,
Laver posited that these religious organizations should be at the forefront of the struggle
(Laver, 2010). Initiatives made possible by the international environment toward this
fight included seminars that dealt with issues such as effective oversight and constraints
among state institutions, participation and oversight by the civil society, the media and
communities, improvement of public sector’s management, influencing and sustaining a
competitive and responsible private sector and strengthening political accountability
(Laver, 2010, p. 51). Laver however emphasized the role that can be played by religious
values on the enhancement of ethical behavior for many communities (Laver, 2010).
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The Particularistic Anticorruption Perspective
Several arguments have been made due to the weaknesses embedded in an
overarching universalistic anticorruption approach that sometimes does not consider
adaptation exigencies for countries receiving these universal policies. This approach is
criticized, thus leading to the argument for a particularistic approach that encourages an
adaptation of approaches to specific contexts and promotes originality of anticorruption
mechanisms to reflect the socioeconomic, cultural, and political realities of the societies
involved in the fight. The particularistic anticorruption perspective is described in
Rothstein (2007). In a study on corruption and the “Big Bang” theory, Rothstein argued
that the combat against corruption does not need a magic key to an entry point or
institutional device as suggested by the World Bank, that “small changes are likely to
worsen the problem and make corruption and similar practices even more ingrained”
(Rothstein, 2007, p. 5).
Rothstein also put forth several arguments against the nature of the path taken by
the World Bank and other prominent international corruption fighters to address the
problem of corruption in developing countries. Rothstein concluded that the countries
suffering from this ailment must muster forces internally to create a Big Bang change that
can hardly come from international actors who believe mostly in a gradualist perspective
of change as seen in the work of Johnston (as cited in Rothstein, 2007). Gradualists like
Johnson posit that change should be initiated gradually, and that “building a sound
framework of social, political, and state institutions is a work of generations (Johnston as
cited in Rothstein 2007, p. 24). Rothstein disputed this concept especially when it
concerns combating corruption.
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Rothstein founded the particularistic public behavior perspective on the premise that:
At the root of systemic corruption in a particular political culture, which is
defined as a system in which government treatment of citizens depends on their
status or position in society, people do not even expect to be treated fairly by the
state; what they expect is similar treatment to everybody with the same status.
(Rothstein, 2007, p. 13)
In other words, corruption is rooted in deeply held beliefs about the proper order
of exchange in a society – personal-particularistic versus impersonal-universalistic
(Rothstein, 2007). According to Rothstein, this implies that to actually curb corruption,
there must be a move by the entire social order and political culture from the
universalistic equilibrium to the particularistic equilibrium (Rothstein, 2007). Universal
anticorruption campaigns fail because they do not realize that corruption is rooted in a
particularistic political culture in which almost all public goods are distributed on a
nonuniversialist basis (Rothstein, 2007). I took the argument further by evoking the
differences that exist in societal dynamics, thus siding with arguments that support an
adaptation of measures and practices in each context. Thus, anticorruption in the context
of Cameroon is not bound to be the same as in the American or British context in other to
produce desired outcomes, even though examples of the latter can inspire the former.
One of the significant arguments made against the nature of universal approaches
for fighting corruption is found in the question of democratic legitimacy of such
measures posed by Gephart (2009), arguing that many contexts of anticorruption have
been developed and diffused by international organizations known for their lack in
democratic legitimacy. First of all, the United States has a well-known voting authority
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alongside other influential nations of the West for World Bank and IMF programs. This
advantage blocks minority nations’ opinion even in deciding principles for several
programs, including anticorruption endeavors. These programs are subsequently applied
to these countries which have had almost no influence in their conceptualization
(Gephart, 2009, p. 23). Now how would such measures work, when the people who are
supposed to apply and live according to them on daily basis are excluded from the
opportunity of understanding their originality and authenticity towards achieving the
goals for which they were designed?
Delegitimization of the states, governments, and societies of the global South by
international anticorruption approaches (Gephart 2009, p. 24) is another predicament
faced by governments of developing countries. This is exemplified through the World
Bank's predominant zero-tolerance rhetoric on anticorruption that facilitates the legal and
political prosecution of politically disagreeable actors and consequently jeopardizing
opportunities for reformers, members of the opposition, and the entire society to
influence change (Gephart, 2009, pp. 24-25). Therefore, international organizations need
to improve on these approaches (Gephart, 2009).
Social values and norms of every society must be at the center of any discussion
that seeks to address issues that are embedded in such norms and values. This is the
central argument for particularity in the formulation and implementation of anticorruption
measures. Other arguments against universalistic tendencies include claims that
international actors have used Western-oriented and usually ineffective anticorruption
measures to foster neocolonialistic activities in developing countries. Actors like the
World Bank have been criticized as opportunistic merchants who use these platforms to
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foster their business abroad without a real deep goal of solving the issue of
underdevelopment and its associated ills like corruption (Gephart, 2009). In all,
particularistic anticorruption tendencies can be enhanced by the notion of adaptation,
which is the subject matter of the next discussion.
Adaptation of Strategies for Successful Anticorruption Practice
Adaptation of anticorruption approaches is a continuation of the idea of
particularistic anticorruption measures. Adaptation emerges from the critical analysis that
examines the dynamics of contemporary universalistic anticorruption movement that
have portrayed both strengths and weaknesses in the fight against corruption through
considerable initiatives and influences of the world bank, IMF, UNO and other
multilateral and bilateral anticorruption conventions. This has hence given opportunity
for the rise of a particularistic notion that cautions the universal approaches concerning
the different realities every society is experiencing in its daily sociopolitical existence,
and the need for such approaches to connect to these realities to bring about an inside-out
change and not the reverse. This pattern of ideas was held to make the case for
contextualization of anticorruption approaches in Cameroon.
In a study conducted by Quah (2008) on India, the country's policy context was
analyzed considering five major elements: "geographical, historical, economic,
demographic and political aspects that influence the implementation of the country’s
anticorruption strategies" (Quah, 2008, p. 55). To these factors, Quah added a cultural
aspect and a legal aspect to constitute seven contextualization outstanding factors that
were employed in this study to examine the contextualization tendency of the

107
anticorruption approaches practiced and fostered by the current Cameroonian
government.
Quah argued that the gigantic Indian population, complex administration, and
coupled with other economic factors, did not create a favorable policy context for the
prevalence of an anticorruption strategy (Quah, 2008). Quah however suggested that in a
proactive approach to combating corruption, such obstacles should not be examined
independently or expected to vanish on their own or even separated from the
anticorruption effort in any way. Rather, the anticorruption effort should be designed to
not only address such atmosphere but to be sowed into the various contextual aspect of
the society so that they will now auto-combat their corruption issues from inside-out and
emerge with an authentic level of purity that is lasting and sustainable (Quah, 2008).
In a study on Papua New Guinea (PNG), Walton (2016) revealed how
anticorruption measures in the country fell short of producing expected outcomes due to
the absence of a strong focus on how such measures needed to address the policy context
of the country. Author identified four major policy contextual aspects that anticorruption
must pay attention to, which included the opportunities and threats involved in state
politics, structural conditions that support citizens’ corrupt acts, non-state actors’ role in
causing corruption, and legal responses to corruption that end up in prosecution. The core
lesson from Walton’s study is that understanding local, political, cultural, and economic
issues of a society is uncontestably necessary for successful anticorruption practice.
Adaptability of approaches combines the advantages associated with international
anticorruption strategies with those unique to the policy context of the country in which
these strategies are being implemented. Gephart (2009) identified one of the major
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positive potentials of intentional anticorruption efforts to include the capability of
“transporting and diffusing entire conceptions of the "correct functioning of political
systems" (Gephart, 2009, p. 31). In the context of democratization, this assessment is
true, because democratic principles and applications are formulated based on universal
ideologies, one of which is Weber’s legal-rational theory. Adaptation is seen as a means
for contextualization as conceived in this study. In the globalization context, no country
or society exists alone. Means and ideas flow from one end of the world to another more
rapidly today than was the case 30 years ago.
In a more recent study, Ramanujam and Caivano (2016) emphasized the changing
landscape of economic/development studies, stating that this area had recently
experienced a shifting of focus from a universal model of practice to a more pluralistic
approach that calls for countries to shape their policy prescriptions based on their own
sociopolitical contexts. Having the rule of law as a fundamental requirement for
economic development, authors suggested that ultra-pluralism of policymaking
philosophy could lead to the neglect of the core principle of the rule of law even though
authors agreed that the new pluralistic trend that calls for contextualization of policy
making strategies was good for the countries.
The study being conducted on BRIC countries suggested therefore that as these
countries build their new approach and vision as to how the rule of law should be crafted
and implemented to favor economic development in their community, actors should still
consider a set of fundamental rule of law principles that would exist alongside current
transitional institutions, thus building trust in formal institutions as the economic growth
process advances (Ramanujam & Caivano, 2016).
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Having in mind the notion of adaptation of strategies which is a developing trend
in policy studies for developing countries, anticorruption practices in Cameroon by
NACC were examined in the light of the policy context of the country, which
incorporates political, economic, legal, and sociocultural contextual aspects. After such
examination, conclusions were made on the nature of anticorruption practices in the
country, revealing major facts such as how compliant and effective international
strategies have been and can be (Gephart, 2009). The extent of global efforts and the
specific issues in Cameroon that anticorruption approaches need to address in order to be
successful and sustainable were noted together with the policy context of the country.
Summary
Research studies across different social science disciplines were examined in this
chapter, and it was discovered that uncurbed corruption is a major barrier to good
governance, economic development, and the eradication of certain chronic social
problems such as poverty and low standards of living, especially for developing
countries. The chapter demonstrated that corruption is combatable through different
measures and mechanism employed under the banner of anticorruption, engaging the
interplay of efforts of international and domestic actors.
Recent literature on anticorruption identify some of the major strategies used to
fight corruption in mostly developing countries to include economic/market reforms,
administrative/bureaucratic reforms, accountability/transparency enhancing reforms,
democratic accountability enhancing reforms, legislative and judicial reforms, and
general influences from the dynamics of globalization. The literature also indicated that
most countries, especially those of the southern hemisphere have not been very
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successful in their efforts of curbing corruption in their respective societies, due to lack of
robust strategies, mechanisms, strong institutions, and political will. In general, the
literature on anticorruption tend to focus on administrative and system theories and
practices, meanwhile there remains to be void between cultural and behavioral character
of populations in relation to anticorruption practice. This study sought to explore this gap,
while adopting the concept of adaptation as the bridge with which the other concepts of
anticorruption could be connected, and also as an attempt to close the aforementioned
gap. Chapter 3 discussed the methods by which data for the study was collected and
analyzed to provide pertinent basis for the discussions and the conclusions raised and
drawn in the subsequent chapters.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Introduction
In this chapter, I discuss the methods used to conduct the study. The chapter
included the following aspects: research questions; a description and justification for the
research design of the study; the choice of the population sample; data collection methods
and methods of data analysis; ethical issues; and an explanation on how the evidence of
quality in the study was ensured.
Research Questions
This study is guided by one overarching question and four sub questions. The
main question is: “What anticorruption strategies are perceived as effective in helping the
government of Cameroon curb systematic public corruption?” The subquestions are listed
below:
1. What are the anticorruption strategies implemented by Cameroon’s
NACC?
2. What can be learned from NACC’s past experience of working with
anticorruption policies and programs?
3. What tools do NACC agents feel are needed from the government to
implement effective anticorruption policies?
4.

How can the notion of adaptation of policies be used to potentially
improve the development and implementation of anticorruption strategies
at NACC?
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Research Design and Rationale
This study was conducted as a qualitative exploratory case study of the current
anticorruption approaches the government of Cameroon employs to combat corruption.
Creswell (2009) defines qualitative research as “a means for exploring and understanding
the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem” (p. 4). The
qualitative method was selected for this study because of the need to contextualize
anticorruption approaches or mechanisms in the case of Cameroon. Such an approach
would bring the study into contact with a real-world problem that requires extensive
exploration, interaction with participants, collection of potentially sensitive information
and inductive analysis and interpretation of it.
The exploratory approach provided a platform upon which I could seek findings
about the nature of the government of Cameroon’s anticorruption policy, its scope,
strategy, and resources. This allowed a determination to be made as to whether the
anticorruption strategies put in place by the government were properly addressing the
policy context of the country, in the effort of curbing corruption in the society, especially
within the civil service.
The case study method of inquiry was selected as the qualitative tradition of
inquiry that suits best the focus of this study. Case study is defined as “the study of an
issue explored through one or more cases within a bounded system” (Creswell, 2007, p.
73). Yin (2014) defined case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a
contemporary phenomenon (the case) in depth and within its real-world context” (p. 16).
This means the case cannot be studied in abstraction, the researcher must associate the
inquiries with actual happenings or activities in a designated setting. The encompassing
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nature of case study expounded by Yin makes the approach more fitting to study most
complex phenomena, as it tends to provide the researcher with a more simplistic platform
and tools to carry out the inquiries. It is on this definition that this study situated its
inquiries into Cameroon’s anticorruption strategies as implemented by NACC.
Through this study, I sought to explore anticorruption practice in the context of
Cameroon. Trochim (2001) also stated that the case study method is considered as the
most suitable approach for studying a phenomenon in a particular context. Designing this
study in the same light allowed for an in-depth exploration of the anticorruption
phenomenon in the political, legal, economic and sociocultural context of the
Cameroonian society.
Role of the Researcher
My role as the researcher in this study was to provide all the knowledge and
material resources needed for the successful completion of the study and the realization
of its objective. I employed methods and processes to ensure that relevant data was
collected. Participant request forms were used to contact participants for the purpose of
fixing the date, venue, and time for face-to-face interviewing with the participants. The
study also required traveling to the field to meet participants in person for interviewing,
but this process was replaced by virtual interviewing due to security reasons on the field.
This study engaged knowledge accumulated in the field of study of public affairs
in general. An approval was obtained from the Walden University Institutional Review
Board (IRB), which served as the permission to conduct research on human subjects. The
study also noted the dates and venues where data was collected, and the experts that
participated in providing the data. Being in close contact with the data collected and at
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the same time being the person that analyzed the data, could create fertile grounds for the
occurrence of bias for the qualitative researcher (Goulding, 2002, cited in AporiNkansah, 2008). However, I took several measures aimed at dealing with possibilities of
subjectivity. The study was subjected to peer review and the use of multiple sources of
data and data collection methods, with the aim of curbing and preventing any major
biases that could emerge from personal subjectivity.
Methodology
Qualitative case study was employed as the methodology for this study. Yin
(2014) recommended the case study method due to the emphases it places on rigor,
validity, and reliability. Case study design, according to Yin, is an all-encompassing
method that facilitates the study of complex subjects. A research study usually follows
either a qualitative or quantitative approach, or both approaches depending on the nature
of the inquiries the researcher intends carrying out (Creswell, 2009). Establishing an
inquiry continuum enables the researcher to determine an approach that is suitable for the
subject being researched (Creswell, 2009). The researcher’s philosophical worldview
plays a considerable role in determining the suitability of each of the approaches
(Creswell, 2009, p. 5). The nature of the research problem, the researcher’s personal
experiences, and the audiences of the studies are also determining factors in choosing a
specific method (Creswell, 2009). I considered the preceding factors to make a choice for
design in this study.
The qualitative researcher uses activities to locate real world problems that
require extensive and thorough exploration, interaction with participants, developing
assumptions that set the base for inquiry, collecting sensitive information and inductively
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analyzing them, and establishing a conclusive tone that calls for action from targeted
actors (Creswell, 2007). Exploring anticorruption practice in Cameroon fit well into the
preceding description, and thus the suitability of the qualitative method. The qualitative
case study method itself is held as a practical and readable approach (Yin, 2014).
Selection of Sample Population
According to Marshall (1996), choosing a sample to study is an important step in
any research project because it is not practical, efficient, or ethical to study an entire
population. As advised by Marshall, participants and other sample forms, including
documents, are selected based on their relevance. All sampled sources of data should also
possess the potential to contribute accurately and informatively to the understanding of
the phenomenon being studied (Marshall 1996). This is the reason why participants for
the study had to be public servants that work with an anticorruption agency and as such
are familiar with these different strategies of the agency.
I used purposeful sampling to select participants who were considered as key
informants to the study. According to Creswell (2007), purposeful sampling occurs when
researcher selects individuals and study sites because they can purposefully inform an
understanding of the research problem and central phenomenon in the study. The study
made use of key informants –individuals who could provide important in-depth
information about corruption approaches and who were contactable (see Goulding, 2002,
as cited in Apori-Nkansah, 2008). The targeted participant population in this study was
established based on the premise that these individuals were perceived to be
knowledgeable and possessed the necessary experience worthy of inclusion.

116
The participants were accessible for the acquisition of the information. Key
informants included public officials who were knowledgeable about Cameroon’s policy
on anticorruption. They came from NACC which is the government agency responsible
for Cameroon’s anticorruption programs and administration. Information about the
anticorruption strategies and mechanisms put in place by the Cameroon government was
also extracted from government documents, fact books, and archives that held such
information.
There are different strategies for conducting a purposeful sampling, which include
purposeful criterion sampling, maximum variation sampling, snowball or chain sampling,
and others (Patton, 2002). I employed the purposeful criterion, maximum variation, and
snowball purposeful sampling strategies to select participants for the research. Purposeful
criterion sampling allows for a predetermination of criterion of importance, a strategy
common for quality assurance efforts (Patton, 2002). This strategy enabled a preselection
process where I could chose participants who could help me answer the research
question. In this study, the criterion was that the participant must have direct
responsibilities and functions in the government agency in charge of anticorruption
programs and administration in Cameroon (NACC). This was to ensure that the
participants had the capacity to make insightful contributions to the pool of information
concerning government’s anticorruption policy for the country.
In addition to criterion sampling, I used maximum variation sampling, which is
advantageous in that it allows for the selection of few cases or a case, with which
analyses could be made to describe multiple perspectives about the cases or case being
studied (see Creswell, 2007). The implication of this method is that, few cases (in this
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case 20 participants) from different segments of the sampling population were used to
make a representation of the population at large and answer the questions on the subject
matter without necessarily analyzing all existing or possible cases available. This was
aimed at sampling heterogeneity, which helps capture the different areas of the general
population, something that cannot be achieved effectively with random sampling,
especially in this case whereby the subject matter is technically specific (Creswell, 2007).
In other words, instead of seeking representativeness through equal probabilities,
maximum variation sampling seeks it by including a wide range of extremes. The
principle is that if a researcher deliberately tries to interview a very different selection of
people, their aggregate answers can be close to that of the whole population (List, 2004).
Therefore, instead of focusing on government employees who hold higher administrative
offices in NACC, or seeking to obtain representation from all facets of the agency and
any other source of anticorruption policy in Cameroon, participation I focused on the
agency with the most technical aptitude to provide the data needed (NACC), and included
some officers from higher levels of the agency and others from the very bottom level for
variation purposes.
Sample Size
A sample size of 20 participants was selected for this study. Sample size is said to
have no rules in qualitative inquiry, and that it depends on what one wants to know, the
purpose of the inquiry, what is at stake, what is useful, what will have credibility, and
what can be done with available time and resources (Patton, 2002).
This study employed a realizable sample size. According to Marshall (1996),
quantitative researchers have often failed to understand the usefulness of studying small
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samples, with the misapprehension that generalizability is the ultimate goal of all good
research. This is because the primary goal of a qualitative study is to provide in-depth
information about an experience, as opposed to quantitative research in which the focus is
representativeness. Marshall held that an appropriate sample size for a qualitative study is
one that adequately answers the research questions. As such, flexibility in determining
the sample size for a qualitative study is recommended. Thus, the sample size used in this
study cannot be described as large or small; rather it is an adequate size that provided
room for flexibility in gaining in-depth understanding of the studied phenomenon.
Data Collection Methods
Multiple data collection methods were employed in this study to ensure in-depth
and trustworthy analysis. These sources of data included interviews and documents.
Interviews
Interviewing was used as a primary tool for collecting data in this study. This is
because interviewing provides the platform upon which one can stand to go beyond
observing just the physical and superficial facts of a case and be able to enter into
participants’ perspectives and obtain deeper information about the nature of the case
(Patton, 2002). There are three major variations in interviewing: the informal
conversational interview, the general interview guide, and the standardized open-ended
interview (Patton, 2002). I used the general interview guide with open-ended questions to
collect data information from the interviewees.
The nature of the interview ensured that the interviewer was given enough
flexibility to intervene and steer the conversation to any direction that is deemed
desirable and could present the interviewee with more precise and systematic questions. I
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used the encrypted virtual platform WhatsApp to conduct online chats with participants.
This method was chosen because of the current political instability that made it unsafe
traveling to Cameroon. Face-to-face interviews and focus groups interviews are other
techniques that bring the interviewer and interviewee into close physical contact.
The advantage of individual face-to-face interviewing is that it focuses on the
individual, thus making the interview intensive and enabling the interviewer to fetch indepth and detailed information for the subject matter under study (Patton, 2002). It also
allows that informal communication that occurs during face-to-face discussions is
noticed, thus providing the study with more in-depth information. The disadvantages of
this method however include scenarios in which the interviewee hesitates to provide
information, which is a reaction that is not common with a focus group (Krueger, 1994;
Morgan, 1988; Stewart & Shamdasani, 1990, cited in Creswell, 2007). The method is
also costly and time consuming. However, the richness of detail and quality of
information it ensures overshadows any difficulties that may come with it.
I planned to travel from the United States to Cameroon to collect data for this
study. However, Cameroon was undergoing intensive political crisis at that time and the
territory was unsafe. Telephone communication was as such used to replace the face-toface interview option. Effective contemporary technology has made it possible to
communicate in a situation like this just as if one was physically present with the other
party.
Documents
In this study, documents included primary and secondary sources of available data
that revealed facts on significant issues in the study, such as the political, economic,
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legal, and sociocultural realities of the country, and some of the anticorruption strategies
or practices in place. Documents for research might include records, archives, fact books,
and also photographs, compact disks and videotapes, which have sometimes been viewed
as a fourth category of types of data (Creswell, 2007).
Documents played an important role in this study because they enabled access
into certain forms of information such as institutional fact checking which could not be
obtained easily through other techniques. Individuals and organizations sometimes might
be willing to release public documents concerning operations rather than participating in
interviews which could be seen as a time-consuming or sensitive activity like the subject
of this study. Therefore, documents were added to interviews to constituted the methods
used to collect data for this study.

Interviews

1. What are the anticorruption strategies implemented by
Cameroon’s NACC?
2. What can be learned from NACC’s past experience of

Documents

working with anticorruption policies and programs?
3. What tools do NACC agents feel are needed from the
government to implement effective
4. How can the notion of adaptation of policies be used
to potentially improve the development and
implementation of anticorruption strategies at NACC?

Figure 1. Multiple sources of data used to answer research questions.
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Method of Data Analysis
Data Management, Analysis, and Representation
The process of managing, analyzing, and presenting data in this study covered
four essential stages, which included: management (organization) of the data in the first
stage; reading and transcription of the data in the second stage; analyzing the data
through descriptions, clarifications, and interpretations in the third stage; and, finally
packaging and presenting the findings in the fourth stage. The process therefore started
and ended with data management ideas, indicating that the organization of data before
and after analysis was key in this section of the study. The main purpose of data
management is to prepare data for proper analysis and representation. If the tracking and
organization of data is done poorly, the analysis and all other activities that follow also
fail, since they are all intertwined. Miles and Huberman (1994); and Miles, Huberman,
and Saldana (2014) pointed out that data management is one of the four major issues that
are liable to affect the general management of a qualitative study. The three other issues
include: computer usage; staffing and time planning; and, agreements with study
participants.
In this study, I focused decision making on three main issues: ensuring high
quality and accessible data, documentation of the analysis that have been done, and
retention of data and associated analysis after the study was completed. Data
management issues were handled through formatting, cross-referral, and indexing. Other
methods included ‘abstracting’, which means a condensed summary of longer material,
and ’pagination’, which is the use of unique numbers/letters to locate specific material in
field notes.
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I also made use of the following strategies: a) developed and used multiple data
storage instruments such as paper notes, computer disc folders, and USB flash drive, and
also ensured simplification and clarity of data. Since complex data and words could not
be avoided completely, an appendix of definitions and codes was created to facilitate
comprehension, and b) made anticipations ahead of time and figured out solutions for
prospective field issues. Moreover, no participant was neglected throughout the study,
since the participants could be contacted more than once in case of data loss or need for
follow up.
At the first stage, the data was organized into files and folders and a system for
developing codes using letters and numbers was put into place, then the comprehensive
material including interview transcripts, documents, and field notes were read to gain
acquaintance with the material and to develop a deep insight and understanding of the
data and make sense of it Apori-Nkansah, 2008). Memos were derived from short
phrases, key ideas and concepts that were jotted down in the course of reading and
reflecting on the data.
The second stage covered the development of initial codes. According to Saldana
(2015), coding in qualitative research is to use words or short phrases to summarize data.
A preliminary coding framework was developed for the study, and then full codes were
later derived from the data collected as shown in appendix B below. Using the codes, I
was able to focused on reducing the data text into smaller, more manageable themes, so
that one could easily identify specific or different patterns and trends in the data, and how
the data addressed the foundational theories of this study and equally answered the
research questions raised. The codes were abstracted from the data through an iterative
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process that required reading the data several times for new insights until a level of
saturation was reached – when no new insights or meanings were emerging from the data
again. Furthermore, the codes were regrouped into categories of similar ideas. The
categories and codes were compared and contrasted for new insights and the development
of more codes. This activity was done repeatedly until data saturation was attained. Then,
the categories were applied to the research questions to provide an understanding of the
concept of anticorruption. This approach of comparing and contrasting ideas within data
until saturation is reached, for the sake of developing codes and categories, is what
Apori-Nkansah (2008) refers to as the “constant comparative” approach (p. 102).
The third stage is the level whereby proper data analysis was done, including
describing, classifying, and interpreting the data. Even though this stage called for core
analysis of the data, one must mention the fact that data analysis begins right from the
moment the data is being collected. This is especially so, due to the huge size and
complex nature of data usually collected by the qualitative researcher. Different strategies
and techniques are employed from this point onward to assist the analytical procedure.
Codes are useful in this procedure, as they are used to assign units of meaning in a
study, and to reduce the size of data as these codes work intricately as paraphrases to
sizeable words, phrases, sentences, or even paragraphs (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The
coding strategy that this study employed is the pattern coding, which allowed for the
examination of frequencies of particular words to indicate the implications of such
characteristics to the phenomenon being studied. The study adopted other methods and
strategies for in-depth analysis, including an ‘integrated’ approach that proceeded with a
contextual analysis that connects all the salient aspects of the case into one main stream
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of ideas. This entails detailed description, categorical aggregation, direct interpretation,
establishment of patterns, and development of naturalistic generalizations of the
interview transcript (Creswell, 2007).
The main thematic tool that was selected to connect the different pieces of the
data gathered in addressing the main research question raised in this study is the term
“effectiveness”. The operationalization of effectiveness enabled the analysis to explore
the relationship between the different themes drawn in the study to depict existing and
working anticorruption theories and practices, connecting them to the case at hand to
demonstrate what the practice in Cameroon is and how effective it is in an actual combat
against corruption. Therefore, good governance theories and practices, which are also
deemed identical to anticorruption theories and practices, such as respect for the rule of
law, independent judiciary, freedom of speech, accountability, and transparency, were
compared with the strategies actually implemented by the Cameroon’s anticorruption
agency (NACC). The analytical tool of ‘impact’ (achievement) was used as a first step in
this comparison. The results were in turn compared with the actual environmental
dynamics of the country, and that’s where the notions of “policy context” and
“contextualization” came in as second step to enable the study to understand which
strategies could work better for Cameroon’s situation (conclusion – third step).
The fourth and final stage called for the packaging and presentation of the data in
a readable and comprehensible format, and also how to represent the data in tables,
matrices, and narratives (Creswell, 2007). The study therefore had to build a logical chain
of evidence that answered and validated the research questions, reconciling the problem,
purpose, and significance of the study. I used tables, matrices, charts, and narratives to
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represent data in this study. For tables, an iterative “code mapping” figure was used to
show how the codes that were built into categories could now be applied to research
questions in order to form themes. In addition, this study made use of “Constas’
documentational table” for the development of categories (Constas, 1995, p. 262, cited in
Apori-Nkansah, 2008, p. 104). This table was used to show how categories were
developed and how these categories helped in making the analysis an open process
(Apori-Nkansah, 2008). Constas argued that the researcher must make the process of
analysis of qualitative findings a public event in order to ensure trustworthiness of such
findings (Constas, 1995, cited in Apori-Nkansah, 2008, p. 104-105). The table was
accompanied by a matrix that represented the different categories developed. The study
made use of manual coding and all data management and analysis were done without the
employment of any software management tool.
Finally, narratives were provided in a literary format, with the descriptions and
interpretations drawn from the findings of the study. The preceding processes worked in
conjunction with each other to provide a detailed account on how this research arrived at
plausible findings on the dynamics of anticorruption in Cameroon.
Structuring the Narrative Report
Case study research is said to have no standard format for reporting findings
(Merriam, 1988). In this study, I provided a detailed description as well as interpretations
that were influenced both by research and by intellectual insights on the dynamics of
anticorruption practice in Cameroon. The narrative of the case study was opened and
closed with sketches in order to draw the reader into the case. This approach employed
several different successive stages that were followed in structuring the narrative report.
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The first stage consisted of a vignette that introduced the reader to the time and place of
the study. The next step identified the issue, the purpose, and the method of the study, in
order to expose the background of the writer and the issue surrounding the case. An
extensive description of the case and its context, with the aid of uncontested body of data
was then presented.
Besides choosing a design for structuring the narrative report, I also struck a
balance between the weight of the information accorded to description and that which is
allocated for analysis. The study focused on analyzing the case more than describing or
narrating its occurrence, thus providing more substantial and solution-driven information
concerning the phenomenon studied. In addition, the choice of the balance and the entire
structure of the narrative report generally depend on the intent of the study (Creswell,
2007). I maintained the objectivity of the study, which was to guide the structure of the
narrative report, thus providing a deeper understanding of the mechanisms and strategies
that are being utilized by the government of Cameroon to combat corruption in the
country.
Issues of Trustworthiness
The quality of a study is assessed based on its credibility and trustworthiness
(Trochim, 2001). These terms are used in the context of qualitative studies for validity
and reliability purposes. The process of validating a qualitative study is not rigid, fixed,
or strictly measured as might be the case for a quantitative study. Rather, the process
comprises of a ‘crystallization’ of different processes within the sphere of collecting,
analyzing, interpreting, and applying the bulk of data associated with qualitative research
(Trochim, 2001). For the sake of credibility and trustworthiness, I ensured that findings
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matched with the beliefs and perspectives of participants. Credibility and trustworthiness
is also assessed based on other qualities such as transferability, dependability, and
conformability. Transferability allows for external evaluation of the study, to ensure that
the findings can be transferred elsewhere, given similar conditions. Dependability
requires that the changing contexts of the study be identified and demonstrated as to how
such changes impact the findings. Conformability demands that the procedures of the
study be documented, to collaborate and confirm the findings (Trochim, 2001)
I this study, I employed certain techniques that aided the overall quality
verification and evaluation exercise. These included the techniques of reactivity,
reflexivity, and triangulation. Firstly, concerning reactivity, note was taken of the fact
that the data collected for the study was sensitive data due to the nature of the research
topic. Generally, due to political connotations, it was previewed that participants might
be reticent in discussing issues of corruption. Being aware of these dynamics beforehand,
precaution concerning “reactivity” was taken before the start of the data collection
process and throughout. Reactivity is “the influence of the researcher on the setting or
individuals studied” (Maxwell, 2005, p. 108).
On the same note of political sensitivity of the subject being explored, note was
taken that participants could speak, but not in detail. However, to succeed in getting the
information needed to ensure quality for the study, probes were used, also referred to as
“intervention” as discussed in Maxwell (2005, p. 111). These probes are intelligent
interventions made during the interview session, which help in bringing out information
from the interviewee without violating their rights or confidence. These interventions
helped in the retrieval of authentic and quality data, even though quality in qualitative
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studies cannot be 100 percent ensured, due to the fact that participants themselves can
make voluntary and involuntary errors.
Secondly, “reflexivity” as described in Creswell (2007), refers to the questions
such as, “how has the author’s subjectivity been both as a producer and a product of this
text? Is there self-awareness and self-exposure? Does the author hold himself or herself
accountable to the standards of knowing and telling of the people he or she has studied?”
(p. 213). This view is one of the strong points upon which quality assurance in this study
was anchored. I respected every one of these steps throughout the study.
Lastly, triangulation requires that multiple data collection tools and sources be
compared and aligned with each other (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Analyzing a problem
from multiple angles so as to establish validity in such analysis is what is referred to as
triangulation in qualitative research. Triangulation could be in relation to data,
investigator, theory, methodology, or environment. Data triangulation which means usage
of different sources of information; and methodology triangulation which means usage of
different data collection tools are the main forms of the triangulation held in this study to
increase its validity. Also, peer review, including review from my dissertation committee
members served as another form of triangulation for the study. Apart from final reviews
from dissertation committee members, the study was submitted to the review of two
professionals in the field of public policy and administration who have completed
academic studies of this nature, and especially within the most recent decade.
Ethical Considerations
According to Creswell (2007) “a qualitative researcher faces many ethical issues
that surface during data collection in the field and during analysis and dissemination of
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qualitative reports” (p. 141). The main ethical concern that this study presented was the
sensitive nature of its object. Corruption is a topic that is surrounded by strong political
sensitivities and tensions, especially in developing countries. Generally, public officials
in Cameroon were expected to show a great deal of reticence in discussing anything that
has to do with corruption, especially during this time that the subject is a hot spot in the
current political dynamics of the country. Several top government officials, including the
former minister of territorial administration and decentralization, former secretary general
at the presidency of the republic, former minister of finance, former prime minister, and
many other senior civil servants have been apprehended and incarcerated by the
presidential “Operation Sparrow Hawk” for embezzlement of public funds. Others who
have also been apprehended include great business tycoons spanning the civil society and
para-public institutions (Cameroon Polls, 2012). The issue is highly complex, and thus
had to be approached with much caution and astute strategies that would ensure and ease
data collection.
To ensure that the preceding ethical concerns were properly addressed, I put in
place several measures that helped optimize the protection of all categories of
participants. Such measures included designing the case study to present a composite
picture rather than an individual picture, informing the participants of the purpose of the
study, and not engaging in deceptions concerning its nature but making it clear to the
participants (Creswell, 2007). Other measures included: assuring the participants of the
anonymity of their responses during and after the study; explaining the research questions
and data collection methods to the participants before seeking their consent to participate
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in the study; and informing participants that they can withdraw from the study at any
point in time if they wish to do so (Apori-Nkansah, 2008).
In addition, by acknowledging the political sensitivity of the study, data collection
strategies that ensured privacy for the participants were employed. Thus, participants
were not asked any questions that touched nor revealed any facts connected to their
private lives. All questions were based on systematic and procedural facts concerning
how the government of Cameroon approaches the combat against corruption in the
country. The study did not seek to inquire information on who is or who is not corrupt
and/or responsible for the corruption in Cameroon, but rather focused on established
public strategies and institutions designed to tackle the problem within the country. The
technique of note-taking during interviews was employed and no audio- or videorecording was used, since the current nature of events in the country would have probably
scared most public officials from accepting that their contributions to a study of this
nature be recorded through media by which they could be identified.
Summary
In this study, I sought to explore and contextualize the current anticorruption
mechanisms and strategies employed by the government to combat corruption in
Cameroon. Case study research was selected to serve as a theoretical method of inquiry
for the study because it provided a platform for performing an in-depth and contextual
analysis. Interviews and documents were used as tools for data collection. The interviews
were semi-structured, with open-ended questions.
Participants that provided data for the study were 20 in number. They were
purposefully selected through criterion, maximum variation, and snowball sampling
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strategies. The data collected was coded and analyzed through detailed descriptions,
categories and aggregations, objective interpretations, patterns, and naturalistic
generalizations. The findings of the study were validated with multiple data sources and
data collection methods, thick description, supervisory checks, and peer review. The
narrative report was developed through a realist approach.
Participants were protected and assured of the anonymity and confidentiality of
the information they provided for the study. Chapter 4 analyzed the findings that emerged
from the data that was collected as responses to the research questions raised in the study.
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Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
The purpose of this study was to explore the Cameroon government’s
anticorruption policy by assessing the government’s anticorruption approaches and how
they are implemented, so as to provide a deeper understanding of the instruments used by
the government to combat corruption in the country. By so doing, I sought to evaluate the
extent to which these policies satisfy good governance principles and the reasons why
they have not achieved much success since their launch.
The main question addressed by the study was: What anticorruption strategies are
perceived as effective in helping the government of Cameroon curb systematic public
corruption? The following sub-questions were then asked as a follow up to the main
question so as to obtain in-depth information:
1. What have been the anticorruption strategies implemented by Cameroon’s
NACC?
2.

What could be learned from NACC’s past experience of working with
anticorruption policies and programs?

3. What tools did NACC agents feel were needed from the government to
implement effective anticorruption policies?
4. How could the notion of adaptation of policies be used to potentially
improve the development and implementation of anticorruption strategies
at NACC?
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This chapter provides an overview of the findings of the study. It explains the
processes of data gathering, analysis, and interpretation. The chapter concludes with a
presentation of the findings, giving answers to the questions of the research.
Demographics
This study employed 20 participants with different backgrounds and expertise in
anticorruption practice. The pool of participants targeted a specific department within the
overall NACC agency in order to ensure focus and accessibility to in-depth information.
All participants resided in Cameroon. They were all Cameroonians ranging from
36-60 years of age. All of the participants worked with NACC, and five out of the 20
participants were female.
For the purpose of confidentiality, each of the participants was assigned a
particular alpha-numerical identifier. Each participant was assigned the identifier P
(participant) and a numerical ranging from one to 20. For example, the first participant
was P1 and the final was P20.
Lastly, the term public servant was used instead of civil servant to describe the
participants because the former is more generic and covers everyone working with the
public sector either as a direct employee or a contractor. But the latter narrowly identifies
only those who are direct government employees with civil service status. These ones can
be identified with the appellation public servants, but not all public servants have civil
service status, especially in the context of public administration and public law.
Therefore, generally identifying all categories as public servants is a more fitting
appellation.
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Data Collection
For data collection, two methods were employed, which included interviews, and
document review. After receiving approval from Walden’s IRB (approval number: 0500),
I contacted a pool of potential participants at NACC, including a chief senior officer who
was the director that issued a letter of cooperation for data to be collected from that
branch of the NACC agency. All participants had experience with anticorruption policies
and strategies of the agency and they were working at the branch charged with
implementing the agency’s policies in the telecommunication sector of the government.
NACC is organized in such a way that divisional missions are dispatched to each
government sector or department to ensure that the agency’s vision and activities cover
the entire government operations.
I started by making a general appeal to the NACC department to get a potential
participant pool. The management was able to provide me with a pool and then I initiated
separate contacts with the individuals and sought their consent for participation.
Following this initial survey, I was able to sort out those who exhibited interest in
participating in the research. I then sent each person a formal invitation to participate and
an informed consent form. About 40 individuals were initially part of the potential
participant pool, but 20 candidates signed up for participation and this was my purposeful
sampling size determined during the design of the study.
All potential participants were given the opportunity to review the informed
consent form and ask questions related to the study and any other clarifications they
needed to know in order to make informed decisions about their participation in the
study. In order to ensure that I answered the research questions comprehensively and that
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the outcome of the study was representative of the government of Cameroon, a
purposeful sampling technique was employed, and diversity of participants was
considered so that different viewpoints and opinions would be represented.
In the invitation letter, I ensured that potential participants were asked to indicate
their voluntary willingness to participate in the study by reading through, understanding
the terms of, and signing the informed consent form. They also had to consent to
providing me with their WhatsApp registered mobile telephone numbers which were to
serve as the secured communication platform for conducting the interviews. All
interviews were scheduled based on convenient times and dates for the participants. Since
the interviews were conducted virtually, participants also had the choice to determine
locations convenient to them at the time of the interviews. After the establishment of a
mutual time and date for the interviews, I kept periodic reminders with the participants
through secured text-messages as the interviews proceeded.
Interviews
I started interviewing the participants based on availability. Since participants
were working, each person was giving time to rest after working hours and thereafter we
engaged into the interviewing process. Due to the sensitive nature of the research subject,
I always started off by ensuring the participants of the confidentiality of their private
information and the anonymity of any data or disclosure they make throughout the
process.
Based on convenience to the participants, they chose their location during the
interviews, and most indicated that they were at their homes during the virtual interview
conversations. On my end, I was in my home office, and I ensured that the environment
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was quiet and free from any form of distraction. I also informed each participant to make
sure that their environment was conducive to and functional for the interview activity. At
the beginning of each session, I reminded each participant of the voluntary nature of their
participation in the study, the protection of all of their information and disclosures with
confidentiality, and the agreement that they could withdraw from the study at any point
without any particular reason or notice. Before delving into interview proper, I ensured
that a brief conversation was conducted between myself and the participant to prepare the
atmosphere and set a conversational tone and ease that will make the interview process
smooth. I always reminded the participants that they should respond to the question to the
best of their knowledge and not be compelled to say anything they did not feel like
saying. I also told them that they were all identified by coded initials for reasons of
confidentiality.
Within a period of three weeks, I conducted 20 interviews using 20 open-ended
questions that gave the participants the latitude to express themselves based on
knowledge, experience, and available information in and around their agency concerning
the topic addressed. I was not able to physically travel to Cameroon for face-to-face
interviews due to a political crisis that was going on in the country at that time and posed
serious security concerns for my. This challenge was explained to my dissertation chair
and committee with a proposed potentially effective alternative of conducting the
interviews virtually. The proposal was approved, and I put into place a functional
mechanism and equipment that ensured effective and successful interviewing.
During the interviews, I asked different questions, some to redirect the
participants toward the topic, and others to ease conversation when a particular question
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appeared challenging to the participant. Each of the 10 questions listed on the interview
protocol was posed to the participants, and several sub- and diversified questions were
asked to facilitate the main questions and the entire process.
All the interviews were conducted between the participants and me. No one else
intervened in each of the sessions. Due to network difficulties and security reasons, voice
recordings were not obtained; instead, all participants were requested to type their
responses on a WhatsApp platform that was equally encrypted for security reasons. A
separate platform was used for each participant since each of them had a sperate mobile
telephone number. I downloaded and printed the separate interviews for coding and
analysis. I also kept the digital records of the responses on my Apple iPhone 7 which is
also locked with a security code, and then at the end of the interviews, I transferred the
original transcripts to a secured flash drive and equally stored them in my private e-mail
academic folder to ensure that I do not lose all the data if one storage devise
malfunctioned. The data shall be stored at these two locations for at least 5 years
according to IRB prescription, after which it will be destroyed following IRB directives.
The interviews generated 113 transcribed pages of data. The longest interview
lasted for about 3 hours and 13 minutes, the shortest was 1 hour 06 minutes, with an
average of 2 hours. Participants were allowed to take breaks when needed, but none took
a voluntary break during the interviewing process except for a few instances of network
problems and the need to recharge mobile telephones. Overall, the process went
smoothly, and the participants expressed contentment at the end to have been given the
opportunity to participate in the study. A summative interview table presented below
under Appendix E captured the different interview aspects discussed in this section.
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Document Review
In addition to data collected through interviews, I also collected data through
review of relevant documents that were available at that time. The purpose of this
additional source of data was to ensure triangulation of primary data source and to
establish a base for trustworthiness in the data analysis output.
Data used for document review could come from public documents, personal or
private documents, archival sources, non-verbal information, and from mass media
including newspapers, magazines, radio, and television programs (Singleton & Straits,
2005). Bowen (2009) also added that the sources of data for document review vary
substantially and could almost include any relevant verbal or nonverbal information.
Based on this background, I reviewed data obtained from government published
documents, including the presidential decree creating NACC, reports on the state of the
fight against corruption in Cameroon by NACC and I followed online news and talk
shows on issues of corruption and the fight against it in the country. I also reviewed press
briefings of NACC concerning the elaboration of a national strategy to fight against
corruption by the agency, and finally, I reviewed publications made by experts based in
Cameroon concerning the corruption/anticorruption subject in the country.
Description of Data Analysis Process
Coding
To code qualitative data is to assign unique labels to the text passages of the data
that will act as references to specific information derived from the data (Bernard, 1994;
Miles & Huberman, 1994). In this study, I had to create and assign codes that
corresponded to each of the thoughts held by the respondents, about the nature of the
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prevalence of corruption in the Cameroon especially in the civil service, the combat
against it, perception on the effectiveness of the NACC, opinions on the influences of
international policies in the fight, and proposals on strategies to improvement
anticorruption practice by NACC. The codes also encompassed data that was collected in
form of document review.
After assigning codes to all the data, a code list was then created inductively and
manually based on the responses gathered from the field (see Carey, Morgan, & Oxtoby,
2006). A priori codes were envisaged from the research questions and conceptual
framework of the study, but only served as a reference to facilitate actual coding as
represented in Appendix B.
As seen in appendix B, coding was done in three different iterative levels. The
first iterative level shows the initial codes built from the data; the second level depicts
how the initial codes are grouped into categories; and the third iterative level shows how
the categories are applied to research questions to develop an understanding of the
phenomenon of corruption and the combat against it by NACC using the different
mechanisms and strategies of education and sensitization programs, good governance
principles, investigations, institutionalization, and international cooperation. The codes
were then analyzed with the help of other strategies and methods, which are discussed
below. Results were presented in themes and patterns. The categorization of the data to
facilitate analysis was done with the help of Constas’ (1992) documentational table for
the development of categories.
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Content Analysis
According to Lacey and Luff (2009), there are no “quick fix” techniques in
qualitative analysis (p. 6). Thus, there are several different methods that can be employed
for qualitative data analysis. In this study, an integrated approach was employed for the
analysis. This approach proceeds with a contextual analysis that connects all the salient
aspects of the case into one main stream of ideas (Lacey & Luff, 2009). In this respect,
strategies employed to analyze the interview and document transcripts included detailed
description, categorical aggregation, direct interpretation, establishment of patterns, and
development of naturalistic generalization, as they are said to be the most appropriate
strategies for analyzing data in a case study research (Creswell, 2007). The contextual
perspectives of the subject discussed were aided by a case study approach, which
revealed in-depth information concerning the realities surrounding the phenomenon being
studied.
Evidence of Trustworthiness
The trustworthiness of a qualitative study is addressed by examining issues of
credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability (Basit, 2003). These can also
be summed up as validity and reliability, which highly depends on the effectiveness of
the data collection tool in terms of the nature of the tool, and how it is employed (Basit,
2003). For this study, no computer software was employed to assist either the data
collection or analysis process. This was due mostly to technical reasons and other remote
considerations. Although the manual approach of preliminary analysis, which included
coding and categorization of the data, was tedious and time consuming (see Basit, 2003),
it was more acute for a detailed content analysis of the size of data collected for this
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study. Interviewing was the tool judged best for this study, but for validity and reliability
purposes, the data was triangulated with other data collected through document review
(see Miles & Huberman, 1994).
Credibility
Credibility, according to Shenton (2004), measures the congruency of the findings
of the research in relation with reality. Shenton also sees credibility as one of the most
important factors needed to establish trustworthiness in a study. Credibility guides the
qualitative researcher to demonstrate that the research portrays a true picture of the
subject being studied (Shenton, 2004). Credibility therefore measures accuracy and how
factual and believable the findings of the study may be perceived.
To show credibility, Patton (2002) posited that the researcher must demonstrate
rigor in the data collection process, including analyzing the data; must show that the
researcher himself is credible; and that the philosophical believe in the value of the
research is established. In this study, I used an expanded and knowledgeable interview
participant pool. I also triangulated the interview data with document reviews. These
steps, together with observance of rigor in analyzing the data demonstrated the credibility
of the study.
Transferability
Transferability means the possibility for the research findings to be generalized or
transferred to other settings (Shenton, 2004). In this study, I demonstrated transferability
by choosing to study the anticorruption within NACC which is renown in the area of
anticorruption in Cameroon, and as such representative of other organizations making
similar efforts.

142
To ensure generalizability of the study, I designed the interview protocol to fully
capture salient questions surrounding the phenomenon being studied as touching all
NACC activities across the national territory. I also made sure that the participant pool
contained individuals that have had experience working with several divisions of NACC
in different governmental departments according to the organizational and administrative
design of NACC.
Dependability
Dependability refers to the stability of the findings of the study over time (Bitsch,
2005). Therefore, the findings should be supported by data received from the informants
of the study (Anney, 2014). It also means given same or similar context, the study should
be repeatable or replicable (Guba and Lincoln, 1982). Dependability however, could be
challenging to establish due to the changing of the environment of the study (Shenton,
2004).
According to Anney (2014), a major approach to ensuring dependability would be
to keep an audit trail. This entails carefully tracking and storing raw data, notes,
documents, records collected from the field, test scores, and others (Guba and Lincoln,
1982). In this study, I demonstrated dependability by fully describing the research design
and methodology, and I ensured that the procedure of data collection and analysis was
carefully done, and records kept such that a complete trail of the study could be reached
at any time. Also, if such trail is followed (the various steps of the research) and
replicated in the same of similar environment, the results obtained would likely be similar
to the ones reached in this study.
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Confirmability
Confirmability is established by the degree to which the findings of the research
could be said to be an accurate representation of participants’ views (Shenton, 2004).
Confirmability ensures that the interpretations of the findings of the research are not
purely from the imagination of the researcher, but rather that they are derived from the
data collected (Anney, 2014). Also, the extent to which the researcher intentionally
acknowledges his biases determines the level of confirmability of his study (Miles and
Huberman, 1994).
Apart from triangulation, I established confirmability in this study by
documenting the rationale behind every step of the study, I ensured that they data
collected was carefully analyzed and participants true views of the subject matter
represented, I made direct quotes of participants’ own words where appropriate, I also
ensured that the data collection tool and the storing tools were checked and properly
administered and utilized. Finally, I took necessary precaution to ensure that I did not in
any way inadvertently modify the views and comments of the research participants.
Results
The results of this study presented in this chapter contain an encompassing
analysis and interpretation of the data collected from the research participants and
documents. The technique applied to analyze the data collected was content analysis,
which was used to sort out recurrent and major themes and patterns emerging from the
data. These were then interpreted, and meanings attached to all of them.
The guiding argument of the study was that the adaptation of public policies to
fundamental principles of good governance and to specific policy contexts would yield
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better results for public administration and to the government and society at large
compared to situations whereby public policies are being made without any intentional
consideration of these factors. Following this premise, the case of the effectiveness of
anticorruption policies in Cameroon as implemented by NACC was raised through four
research questions:
RQ1: What are the anticorruption strategies implemented by Cameroon’s NACC?
RQ2: What can be learned from NACC’s past experience of working with
anticorruption policies and programs?
RQ3: What tools do NACC agents feel are needed from the government to
implement effective anticorruption policies?
RQ4: How can the notion of adaptation of policies be used to potentially improve
the development and implementation of anticorruption strategies at NACC?
To answer these questions, 20 research participants were asked 10 open ended
questions through individual interviews with the intention for the participants, who were
professionals, to provide responses that could be used to answer the research questions
comprehensively. The questions sought to know the kind of strategies and policies
implemented by NACC to combat corruption in Cameroon, especially within the
government. Secondly, the questions sought to find out how effective these strategies
have been in the agency’s and government’s overall anticorruption effort. Thirdly, the
questions sought to discover whether the anticorruption strategies reflected good
governance principles, and whether they were equally influenced by international
strategies at large. And finally, the questions sought to understand the policy context of
Cameroon and make a case for the adaptation/contextualization of anticorruption
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strategies for effective outcomes. The interview protocol and document review were
therefore designed with great care to elicit the data needed to answer the preceding
questions.
Research Question 1
What are the anticorruption strategies implemented by Cameroon’s NACC?
Introduction
Through this question, I sought to identify the kind of strategies and policies
implemented by NACC to combat corruption in Cameroon, especially within the
government. I also sought to capture the general prevailing issue of corruption in
Cameroon and to know whether government have made serious strides towards its
eradication, and how the research participants, who are anticorruption agents, felt about
the overall government efforts in combating corruption in the country. Questions 1 to 3 of
the interview protocol focused on eliciting information that answered question 1.
Documents reviewed concerning this area, including the presidential decree creating
NACC and agency reports on the state of the fight against corruption in Cameroon by
NACC were also used to answer question 1.
An analysis of the interview questions and documents uncovered seven major
anticorruption strategies implemented by NACC through government’s effort to fight
against corruption in Cameroon. The strategies were sorted in two categories. The first
category constituted strategies that are rooted in good governance principles, and the
second category identified strategies that are regular public policy. The good governancebased strategies were seen as opportunities to gain even more effective anticorruption
results by strengthening their performance through the consideration of contextual
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factors, while the regular public policy strategies were seen as challenges, waste, and
reasons for governmental reform.
Good Governance Opportunities
In reviewing the interviews and documents, three major good governance
principles and opportunities were identified. These are said to be opportunities to develop
effective anticorruption strategies because the data indicated that even though these
principles present in the practice of anticorruption at NACC, they however needed to be
improved upon. These indications could be seen from the emerging themes on figure 1
under appendix B.
The creation and institutionalization of NACC gave the government a sound
vision and direction to fight against corruption in Cameroon. All 20 interview
participants of this study from P1 to P20 affirmed that the creation of the National AntiCorruption Commission (NACC) was one of the major steps the government took to
combat Corruption in Cameroon. Also, information from document review indicated that
NACC is a central government agency charged with the state’s administrative effort to
curb corruption in Cameroon. Accordingly, NACC reports revealed that the vision of the
head of states, Biya, since his rise to power is 1982 had been to build a Cameroon that
was free of all forms of corruption. Created by a presidential decree on March 11, 2006
NACC represented one of the strongest materializations of the president’s vision of a
corruption free Cameroon. Although participants were quick to reveal weaknesses they
believed were associated with NACC’s operations, they were enthusiastic about the
overall creation and institutionalization of the agency an anticorruption organ of the
government. P1 had this to say about NACC:
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Fighting corruption by the government has as first goal the creation of specialized
institutions in which we have NACC. But this institution from its creation has
witnessed a lot of setbacks by reason of the fact that its members are appointed
and are often former agents of public service. Therefore, the fight is slow and
inconsistent. NACC has sub-units in all public institutions and representatives.
There is also a phone number available to those who have been victims to
denounce culprits.
In addition, P3 in his own words said:
The NACC was established to eradicate corruption in the country. Many
strategies have been put in place. Apart from “Operation Sparrow Hawk” that
tracks and punishes those suspected of corruption, a recent hotline has been
instituted and permits victims of corruption to be heard 24/24. This service
permitted many corruption cases to be handled promptly.
P5 added that NACC partnered well with other business coalitions and with the
public contracts regulatory board to tackle the issue of corruption in the country. P13,
P14, and P15 pointed out that NACC as an organization was created with good intentions
and that the agency was fervent in its role which was more focused on investigating and
reporting corruption cases to the powers that be, and that such lack of autonomy was one
of the reasons why they could not achieve much as an institution.
Institutional and legal reforms by the government initiated the rule of law in the
fight against corruption in Cameroon. One of the major tenets of good governance is
respect of the rule of law by the population and the government. The law makers
themselves must respect the laws they make. Having the rule of law and respect for it has
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been a challenge for most developing countries. In the case of Cameroon, at least for
anticorruption purposes, investigations of this study revealed that the government
actually carried out institutional and legal reforms that brought the rule of law to the
center of the anticorruption struggle within its institutions and in the country at large.
The data collected from documents and interviews showed that in an effort to
curb corruption in Cameroon, the government in addition to creating NACC, created a
special criminal court for anticorruption prosecutions, a government department in charge
of superior state control, a public contract regulatory board, a national agency for
financial investigations, all working together in conjunction with NACC and other public
actors in the fight such as the ministry of justice, the audit bench at the supreme court,
and the judicial police. Also, the government brought article 66 of the constitution to the
lamplight, and enacted other laws that reinforced the fight against corruption in the
country. Participants identified and viewed these reforms as opportunities which
government could make significant strides in the corruption battle if they were
sufficiently supported in terms of funding, enforcement, and overall political will. In his
own words, P7 expatiated on this government effort as follows:
First and foremost, the government has created anticorruption units in all public
structures like state universities and other higher institutes of learning. In some
professions like in the military, there are anticorruption units instituted under the
leadership of NACC to denounce some of those uniform men and women who
have been sent on the highways to control the safety nature of roads. There is a
free call number that has been made known to the road users to denounce any
form of corruption by anyone in uniform who instead of being worried about the
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state of the car or the car documents as well as speeding nature of the driver, is
more concerned with collecting money. All drivers know the fine that awaits them
in case of any highway offense but most often they think they will drive without
possessing the required documents with the intention of corrupting the controllers.
Even though these strategies have been put in place by the government to curb
corruption, a lot still needs to be done for this to be a reality.
P8 added that article 66 of the constitution required that all top-level public
officials must publicly declare their assets before and after taking up government offices.
P2 also identified the preceding act as a good anticorruption strategy. P4 said the
government appointed a priest by name Dieudonne Massi Gams, to head NACC as a sign
to show government’s seriousness in the fight and the need to respect the rule of law.
The implementation of whistleblowing and public denunciations brought
legitimacy and voice to NACC’s anticorruption effort. One of the fundamental good
governance principles is that government should be able to guarantee freedom of speech
and allow the voices of the masses to be heard. This study revealed that such opportunity
in the anticorruption struggle in Cameroon existed based on the operational strategies of
NACC. Almost all the participants stated that NACC had a toll-free number that allowed
individuals in all spheres of life to call NACC’s officer round the clock to report cases of
corruption. Government programs for public sensitization such as “operation sparrow
hawk” launched by the president through NACC since its inception in 2006 helped in
cultivating a conducive environment for the voices of the people to be made inclusive and
thereby making corruption not only a public crime but the fight against it equally a public
responsibility.
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Participants pointed out several public sensitization and educational efforts
carried out by government to inculcate values of civil duty in the communities and get
citizen participation active in the corruption fight. P11 pointed that NACC put up notices
in public institutions sensitizing the public government services that are free, she also
mentioned TV and radio programs that are dedicated to educated the people on the
activities of NACC, meanwhile P18 spoke within the same lines recounting government
channels opened for whistleblowers, P1 mentioned open public debates organized by
NACC to sample student’s opinion on the subject matter and equally advise them on the
issues, P10 mentioned a website and email address available for the public to report
corruption issues (website: www.conac.cm) (email: info@conac.cm). All these efforts are
opportunities that government could reap huge policy successes if funded, monitored, and
intentionally enforced.
Other NACC Anticorruption Strategies and Challenges
Apart from strategies that were rooted in good governance principles, NACC also
implemented several other strategies as part of its “National Anticorruption Strategy”
(NAS). But the study revealed that these strategies would probably not offer the same
opportunities for effective anticorruption practice as the others discussed above. Rather
they posed several challenges to the system and could only benefit NACC’s vision if they
are totally reformed to reflect certain good governance practices. The four Strategies
uncovered under this category revealed that:
Effective decentralization should include structural and service decentralization.
Cameroon is a unitary state where government is centralized, making the capital city
(Yaounde) where the seat of government is situated, the lone vibrant place for the
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origination of significant government decisions and activities. Based in Yaounde, NACC
also operates by this centralized trail and would have to control the activities of all other
units spread across the national territory. A decentralized system also means
decentralization of decision making and as well as structures. The study revealed that
even though NACC took significant steps towards decentralization, the efforts were
limited to structural decentralization, and service operations were still centralized for the
most part. Participants pointed out these dynamics and some of them elaborated on what
they thought decentralization meant to NACC as a strategy for anticorruption. P1 stated
decentralization as one of NACC’s anticorruption strategies whereby NACC’s unit are
spread across the territory and in all public services to carry out anticorruption activities.
Criticizing the layout of this strategy, P17 had this to say of NACC:
It is an observatory commission and it receives complaints from government
personnel or citizens and table to the presidency to receive the authorization to go
to the field for investigations before submitting its reports to the presidency, N/B
it does not have powers to enforce any decisions.
P6 pointed out that the structures were decentralized but the operation of services
were still highly centralized as seen in the concentration of decision making in the central
organ in Yaounde. P18 blamed such concentration on the lack of autonomy for NACC.
He passionately expressed this view in the following words:
To be frank, an organization like CONAC (NACC) ought to be independent and
work based on facts discovered and not on political motivations. This greatly
hinders work at the agency. We work mostly on public projects which have not
been completed. But we work with other ministries such as that of public works,
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supreme state control and auditing. We equally work with international
organizations for mutual legal assistance. The organization has as function to help
in the realization of public projects by preventing embezzlement. It equally has as
aim to assist the country towards development
The preceding revelations are the discoveries that we made concerning
decentralization as a NACC anticorruption strategy.
Investigation without prosecution might lead to wastage of public resources. This
study uncovered that investigation of alleged corruption cases was one of the core
functions and approaches of NACC against corruption in the country. However, this
strategy was challenging to the organization based on assessments from the data
collected. P6 spoke passionately about the nature of these investigations in the following
words:
I wonder if NACC members can arrest without the help of the police like in
Kenya where anticorruption commission members can arrest even uniform
officers in flagrant delicto. There is the so-called sparrow hawk operation by the
government working with NACC, which seems to me more like an operation for
political score settling rather than a fight against embezzlement.
Additionally, P8 stated that certain investigations were covered up because the
investigators were bribed by the suspects. The fact that NACC lacked the police power to
make arrests was already a limitation to possible prosecutions. And secondly when these
cases were turned over to the law enforcement agents for arrest and prosecution, some
ended up not being prosecuted or wrong culprits being punished due to administrative
bottlenecks, political score settling, and bribery of the law enforcement/judiciary. NACC
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continued to spend substantial amount of resources on this strategy but yielding less
effective results.
Checks and audits are as effective as the nature of the pollical system in place.
NACC also used checks and audits as a tool to combat corruption in the several
government offices. It worked in cooperation with the inspector general of the supreme
state control department to ensure that regular audits were performed in all government
departments and major administrative units. These checks however could only be
effective if the supervising organ (NACC) was neutral and granted the administrative and
political autonomy to carry out this function. Cameroon’s political system lacked genuine
checks and balances and power weighed significantly in the favor of the executive branch
of the government with little capacity left for the legislative and judiciary branches. The
political system influenced the way NACC carried out its business. In his own words, P7
explained these dynamics as follows:
In some ministries, especially the ministry in charge of finance, various networks
have been mounted to carry out dubious and corrupt practices on the civil servants
who come there to follow their files. The issue of middlemen in this activity has
been a wonderful experience as someone who has nothing to do with a particular
ministry has the power to block the advancement of one’s file if he or she does
not comply. A case I personally witnessed was one widow who was running after
the late husband’s allowance. The man was a gendarme officer. When she
approached one worker at the central treasury in Yaounde, the person requested a
percentage of the money if he should assist her to have the due allowance. The
woman accepted and after the deal was done, she went and reported the matter to
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the minister of finance and the said civil servant had to use his own networks to
survive expulsion from the public service and was only given punitive transfer.
The preceding reports demonstrated the nature of the work culture born out of the
country’s political system that favors a highly centralized government that makes public
administration challenging.
Intergovernmental and International Cooperation without political will yield less
results. Information from the data also revealed that the government through NACC took
several strides to establish intergovernmental and international cooperation as
anticorruption strategy. Data collected from NACC reports on the state of the fight
indicated that Cameroon in the international environment of the fight against corruption
was charged with several activities including the signing of international conventions and
treaties on governance and the combat against corruption. Cameroon was a signatory to
the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) and is also a subscriber to
pan-African sub-regional norms. NACC also engaged in inclusive governance which
brought in private sector entities to partner with the government in the cause. The agency
equally cooperated with other government departments to make the fight an
encompassing government effort. These relationships demonstrated significant
intergovernmental steps taken to ensure public performance and promote transparency
and accountability, but they also seemed to portray only an effort to fulfill regular
government duty, as the policies lacked real action and intention to eradicate corruption
by all cost. P6 expressed his views concerning these findings in the following words:
Generally, I would say that there is a very weak will on the part of the
government to see corruption eradicated in Cameroon. This is evident by the fact
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that even the main institution created by the government to fight it is ill equipped
and ill powered to fight it: the text creating the commission gives it little or no
power to do the job and so at the end of the day it is more or less a paper tiger or a
toothless bulldog that barks but does not bite.
P15 added that the challenges stemmed from the governance system put in place.
To P13, it was an issue of actual will to cooperate and respect of operational
autonomy. He stated that other government policies infringed upon, counteracted, and or
watered down useful and potentially productive programs envisaged by NACC.
Need for Governmental Reforms to Improve Strategies
The themes that emerged from the data on the question of the kind of strategies
implemented by NACC in its anticorruption effort, revealed from the second part that
there was need for system reform so that the strategies could gain traction and thus thrive.
Based on the analysis, decentralization, investigations, checks/audits, and
intergovernmental and international cooperation were potential policy strategies that
could result to great gains in the anticorruption struggle, but NACC and the government
needed to review and make system reforms based on the experiences expressed by the
participants. More expressions on this need were made by participants as they responded
to the other questions. So, the issue of reforms shall come up again as we proceed in the
analysis.
Summary of Findings on Research Question 1
In determining what strategies and how NACC combated corruption in
Cameroon, especially within the government, this study found out from participants and
from document review that NACC implemented strategies that could be categorized in
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two sets: First were good governance principles, which gave the agency significant
opportunities to record good results in the combat against corruption when they are
consistently funded, monitored, and enforced. Second were policy strategies that were
adopted under regular government public policy schemes but created less good
governance opportunities even though they presented potentials for positive impact if
reviewed and shaped through governmental reforms.
Research Question 2
What can be learned from NACC’s past experience of working with
anticorruption policies and programs?
Introduction
After identifying and categorizing the various anticorruption strategies
implemented by NACC in its effort to curb corruption both in government and in the
country at large, the second question sought to find out how its agents felt about their
interaction with the said strategies on daily basis. This was aimed at having a grasp of the
knowledge of participants on the subject matter, understand the dynamics, perceptions,
and realities of the effects of NACC’s strategies on the system, discover the achievements
of the agency, and also uncover criticisms on both its successes and failures. Data from
questions 3 to 5 of the interview protocol and information from document review helped
to answer this second question.
Through the findings, I uncovered seven major pointers. The first indicated that
the participants understood the subject matter and could produce good results as
employees of NACC when given the right tools. Two of the pointers revealed major
achievements (successes) of NACC, and four of them outlined some of the main
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weaknesses of the agency and where it could be said to have failed as an anticorruption
machine.
Availability of Qualified Labor
Good systems need good people working with the systems in order to produce
good results. Qualified people sometimes are not necessarily good people, especially
when the organizational culture does not provide them with opportunities to exhibit good
tendencies. This is the trend that was discovered with the review of interview responses
and documents collected for this study. The participants indicated a deep understanding
of the corruption/anticorruption subject. Writers and reporters from the documents
proved similar qualities. However, the findings portrayed serious distortions in civil
service hiring procedures and culture that surrounded government employment and even
an organ such as NACC that should at least be free of the infection. The issue as such
appeared to be that of organizational culture and not lack of qualified labor thereof.
When asked about their experiences at NACC, participants were able to articulate
the vision of NACC and all its intended strategies, but they did not show that NACC was
producing a lot of results in terms of practical output. P8 said although the agency is
meant to serve as an anticorruption machine, it was not equally free from the corruption
syndrome. P9 said public officials caught in acts of corruption were ready to bribe their
way out and also hide facts from NACC investigators, and because of the high rate of
poverty in the country, NACC agents were bound to accepts such bribes. This
observation revealed an underlying problem of low salaries which further findings shall
address. P10 made an experiential expression that portrayed knowledge and
understanding of concepts and procedures of the agency. In her own words, she said:
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As one who has been working with NACC, it has not been an easy task. It is not
easy because most of those who call to report the issues of corruption do not
reveal their identities for fear of being harmed. However, we have been carrying
out seminars and projects to educate the population about the danger of
corruption, especially on the need to denounce corrupt practices.
Within the same lines of expression, P11 articulated his experience at NACC as
follows:
I have worked with the agency for 5 years. I have worked on the following
projects: “Corruption free Hospitals”, and “Public Funds Safety”. Within the
corruption free hospitals project, I was essentially evaluating the efficiency of
services provided by medical personnel, investigate and identify types of
corruption methods as well as their modus operandi, then design strategies to curb
these. With the public fund safety project, I was on this project more for fraud
investigation related to high profile administrators of the country like
ministers…etc. These projects caused a lot of awareness of the public on how
state services operate, thus the corrupter and the corrupted were rendered
powerless except there was collusion.
When asked about what anticorruption strategies NACC could employ,
participants were rich in their contributions, and this again went to show that quality
labor was available for the agency and likely for the government as a whole, and thus it
was left for the government to create the right environment in which these individuals
could thrive. All 20 participants could articulate at least two fundamental strategies that
were linked to either accountability, transparency, integrity, public responsibility, and
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good governance as a whole. All responses on this particular question were worth
mentioning due to their potencies for a viable anticorruption policy pool.
P1 said culprits should be public shamed, embezzled properties seized, and sever
manual labor inflicted on them. He also mentioned education on civic responsibility and
issues of corruption/anticorruption beginning from elementary levels.
P2 said gift giving before services are rendered should be discouraged, that public
services should be fully decentralized, and that hard work and meritocracy should be
encouraged.
P3 said he strongly thought that the proper implementation of Article 66 of the
Cameroon constitution would be a positive strategy. This article required public officials
to declare their assets before and after assuming public offices. Participant though the
strategy served in a great way to create basis for justification of wealth acquisition.
P4 said households and the younger generation should be the target. That moral
education should be taught in schools in order to create integrity base for these young
ones. That NACC officials should be elected rather than being appointed, and that the
judiciary system should be given full independence.
P5 proposed matching government jobs with appropriate qualifications, and that
salaries should be increased to dissuade public servants from being tempted into corrupt
practices.
P6 mentioned institutional reforms, and reforming the instrument creating NACC
to give it more investigative and judicial police powers to do its job.
P7 proposed legal reforms, including naming and shaming, and incarceration of
culprits, especially public servants with higher posts of responsibility.
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P8 said there should be devolution of administrative and financial resources. That
Cameroon should learn from other countries, and that there should be a change in
leadership.
P9 proposed the implementation of sever criminal and civil sanctions for those
that are guilty of corruption crimes.
P10 said both the corrupted and the corrupter should be punished and inflicted
with heavy fines and long-term prison sentences.
P11 proposed equity in governance, creation of a body that is independent of
politics to prosecute the anticorruption struggle, and involvement of private sector
opinion in public policy making.
P12 said leaders at NACC should not be appointed by presidential decree, and
that anticorruption sensitization programs on radio and television should continue and not
be limited to city areas but be brought to villages in form of debates that could end with
trophies and other prizes.
P13 said civil and public servants should be well remunerated for their labor.
P14 held the same view as P13, stating that the basic minimum wage should be
raised, and that this was possible when compared to the funds the government was losing
to corruption perpetually.
P15 proposed that private investment should be encouraged by the reduction of
taxes for businesses, that the state should put in place a stronger policy for contract
negotiations in the private sector to protect individuals, that the state should also set up
incentives for public servants and encourage general participation in the fight against
corruption, that recruitment into public or civil service should be accompanied by an on
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the job training (OJT) on anticorruption practice, that merit based recruiting should be
encouraged in government and public service, and that public policy should help give
powers more to institutions than to persons.
P16 mentioned public sensitization and annual publication of reports about the
state of corruption in the country.
P17 said a strong system of accountability, effective decentralization process,
improved human resources management be put in place to enhance good governance.
P18 proposed that government should raise public awareness and inform the
public that government alone cannot eradicate the ill of corruption without public
participation, that international cooperation in the fight be promoted, and that government
should improve the overall economy and social aspects of the country.
P19 suggested that NACC should ensure the protection and compensation of
whistle blowers.
Finally, P20 proposed that public servants should be educated on the ills of
corruption to the citizens they are called to serve. That they should be encouraged to
reject corrupt acts even if they are proposed by their clientele. And that public services be
computerized in order to increase accountability. The richness of the preceding responses
demonstrated the availability of a resourceful and available labor for a productive
anticorruption machinery for NACC, but the assessment of the achievements of the
agency indicated that it was challenged by other factors different from personnel issues.
Achievements of NACC
Findings from the study indicated that NACC did not produce the kind of results
participants thought should have come from an anticorruption machinery of its caliber.
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Their expectations were that after more than a decade in existence, the agency should be
able to lay down a groundwork that would significantly curb the amount of corruption
present in government and in other sectors of the country. Amidst the different criticisms,
the study was able to identify three noticeable projects of NACC that could be regarded
as achievements of the agency. These included the following:
Cameroon’s position among corrupt countries of the world shifted. The years
1998 and 1999 were the worst for Cameroon regarding its standing on the Transparency
International Corruption Perception Index list of countries in the world organized
according to the least corrupt to the most corrupt from top to bottom. Cameroon found
itself at the bottom of the list consecutively for these two years as the most corrupt
country of the world. Since then and with the creation of NACC come 2006, the position
has shifted and the data indicated that even though the country was still among some of
the most corrupt countries of the world by year 2017, it was not at least occupying the
bottom position of the list as in previous years.
Changes in Cameroon’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) can be seen on table
1, appendix A under the list of appendixes below. In 2017 CPI reports indicated that the
country was still performing considerably poorly, ranking at 153 out of 180 participating
countries, and scoring 25 out of 100 points in total. Even with such low performance,
some participants regarded the shift from the most corrupt to just one of the most corrupt
countries as a positive move achieved by NACC. In this regard, P2 said he thinks the
agency was somehow effective due to the slight improvement in the country’s CPI.
Public awareness increased. One of the significant items that was noticed
throughout the data was the consistent and overwhelming positive impressions and
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testimonies participants shared about NACC’s community awareness programs and
public sensitization projects and schemes on corruption/anticorruption issues. In his own
words, P5 shared the following testimony on this achievement:
Government via NACC has partnered with some institutions (business coalitions
against corruption, and the public contracts regulatory board) to tackle corruption.
It does investigations to ascertain corrupt practices for the purpose of either
administrative sanctions or prosecution. It has also made available a toll-free
number for public denunciation of corrupt practices. My personal experience has
been enriching, especially by the corruption sensitization programs and training of
personnel within the context of partnership with the above-mentioned partners.
P7, P18, and almost all the participants also mentioned the toll-free number,
which is 1517, as a significant successful tool and strategy implemented by NACC. This
strategy opened up the anticorruption project to the entire public and increased awareness
among the masses that corruption is actually a practice that should be shunned among the
people. Participants equally mentioned the regular broadcast of corruption/anticorruption
issues on national television and radio as another successful move by NACC in raising
public awareness on these issues.
Several high-profile public servants incarcerated, and some funds recovered. The
news on corruption and anticorruption in Cameroon for the past decade as of 2018 was
highly characterized by the incarceration of top-level public servants, especially those
who were in charge of managing the day to day business of the government. The study
found out that “operation sparrow hawk” which was a landmark anticorruption program
launched by the head of state through the NACC machinery led to the conviction and
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imprisonment of ministers, heads of departments, and several directors in charge of
government agencies and parastatals. The program also led to the recovery of several
billions of Francs CFA. Although participants dubbed it a scores-settling tool used by the
head of state to get rid of his political enemies, data from documents revealed that indeed
several government officials have been incarcerated under this program and some funds
embezzled by them were retrieved. From an expert report by a home-based scholar,
Bechem (2018), the following cases and statistics were discovered:
Between 2008 and 2018, the supreme state audit indicted numerous state
dignitaries who were jailed for embezzlement. In its 2008 report, the agency boasted to
have helped save the state a sum of about 35 billion FCFA embezzled by public officials
in corruption schemes. Similar efforts were made by the national agency of financial
investigation (NAFI) and the supreme court audit bench even though these two
institutions regrettably had no powers to press charges on the people indicted by their
investigations. Furthermore, the special criminal court was created to hear embezzlement
cases that were in the amount equal to our superior to 50 million francs CFA. In 2014, the
ministry of justice in its report to the national assembly revealed that the sum of CFA
2.401.235.610 (trillions of francs CFA) was recovered from embezzlers back to the
state’s coffers. The reimbursement was done in exchange for discontinuance of
prosecution proceedings.
The expert report named the following high-profile officials convicted within the
past decade under the “operation sparrow hawk” program: Dayas Mounoume, former
director general of the Douala Port Authority, Arsene Essomba the former deputy
director of the port, and Abel Maguieb, ex administrative and financial director of the
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same agency were all sentenced to15 years in prison each for embezzling 458 million
francs CFA. In 2015, former director general of airports was sentenced to 30 years
imprisonment by the special criminal court for mismanaging the sum of one billion, six
hundred, and forty-two million francs CFA. Other high-profile sentencings included that
of Ephraim Inoni, former prime minister of Cameroon, and Marafa Hamidou Yaya,
former minister of territorial administration and decentralization of Cameroon (minister
of interior) and longtime collaborator of the president of the republic. Reporter indicated
that these successful convictions were minimal compared to the vast number of
corruption cases that were not yet indicted due to the difficulties posed by a judiciary
that’s yet to be independent, as it took orders from the president of the republic who is
also head of the higher judicial council (HJC).
The preceding achievements were strong points that NACC could hold closely to
reflect and be encouraged to improve in its function as the central anticorruption agency
of the government of Cameroon. P17 for one gave some minimal credits to NACC by
affirming that even though the agency was not effective in its anticorruption mission, it
helped in realizing a slight improvement in the fight against corruption in the country.
Weaknesses of NACC
Information from data collected for this study revealed several distress points
within NACC as an organization, with challenges coming mostly from the kind of
government system in which it found itself. The confessions and perceptions of
participants were obvious to the fact that NACC could be termed for the most part, a
failed or ineffective project based on the several weaknesses of the agency pinpointed by
the participants and were identified by the following four factors:
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Lack of ownership and independence. The most frequent and outstanding reason
pointed out by most participants to be responsible for the weakness of the NACC organ
was the lack of actual ownership and independence of the agency in terms of design and
decision making. Participants held that the organization was failing because it was not
allowed to design and draft its own policies, rather it had to wait for everything to come
from the president of the republic. P17 stated that NACC was attached to the presidency
just like any other key institution involved in the corruption fight, as such could not take
any enforcement measures of its own. In her own words, P8 made the following
passionate expressions regarding the lack of ownership and independence for the agency:
It is not very effective because it was developed by others and just imposed on us,
and since it did not come from us, there is lack of ownership. You know when
you don’t own something, managing it too becomes a problem. Even use of the
thing is a problem.
In stronger terms, P7 reverberated similar expressions made by P8 as follows:
The effectiveness of the government in tackling corruption in Cameroon can be
graded with an average mark if one were to become a teacher to grade the
government. What is problematic here is the efficiency of the working nature of
those structures put in place by the government. It is like creating structures
without corresponding powers to effectively accomplish their mission. This can
be equated to sending a military man to a war front without the basic ammunitions
necessary to confront his enemies. There is no doubt that every Cameroonian is
aware of the fact that to enter any higher institute of learning, requires one to pay
bribe for a place, especially for schools like ENAM, IRIC, EMIA, ENS, INJS etc.
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(these are all acronyms in French for prominent public schools in Cameroon
responsible to recruit and train for civil service retention). What blocks the
government from dismantling this network full of corruption is a million-dollar
question that needs a fine mind to reason and come up with the answer. Over 90%
civil servants in Cameroon are corrupt in one way or the other, tying with the
assertion that ‘impossible is not Cameroon’.
Most participants expressed the view that NACC was not as independent as it
should have been, and therefore could not operate flexibly, especially in a highly
corruption driven environment in which the main anticorruption agent should be expected
to hold some considerable amount of discretionary authority for swift action. This
rendered the agency powerless, and often the lack of autonomy caused other government
programs to interfere with the agency’s plans and strategies as explained by p13.
Negative Influences of politics. Participants reported that there was outright bias
in the way NACC strategies were shaped and implemented, due to the influences of party
politics and power politics. P6 said of the actions carried out under the schemes of
“operation sparrow hawk” program to be more of a political score-settling tool rather
than an anticorruption machine. P9 added that the program was a big fiasco, because the
government itself was not sincere, and that sanctions to corruption cases were usually
politically oriented. In his own words, P19 equally amplified the issue as follows:
People do not feel the impact of government strategies. Some feel that the
struggle has been reduced to the arrest and detention of top government officials
who are seen as potential threats to the regime in place. This makes the struggle to
be perceived as a political one. Petty corruption is still alive.
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According to participants, indictments and convictions were based for the most
part on the discretion of the president of the republic, leaving no ample room for
institutional procedure in carrying out anticorruption policies.
Defiance of the merit system. Another prevalent factor noticed from the data was
the absence of a vibrant merit system that could establish a firm foundation and provide
support for the fight against corruption in the country. Participants pointed out that
corrupt practices such as bribery, recruitment of unqualified workers into the civil
service, duplicity of functions, and abuse of authority were still highly practiced in the
government irrespective of the anticorruption effort by NACC. They believed this was
partly due to the absence of a merit-based system in place.
Public servants themselves were said to be in regular defiance of the system. P8
said even some NACC workers took bribe to coverup corruption cases. Pay for play and
backdoor illegal deals within the public service were identified as threats to a productive
anticorruption program by the same government. The system of justice in place did not
make things better either, as it was said to favor mostly particular individuals such as the
political class. Justice was said to be perverted, as such the state of impunity prevailed
and because of this, P10 said most corruption perpetrators either went unpunished or
were not effectively punished.
Conceptual and contextual challenges of the agency. The last major weakness of
NACC discovered in the study was the issue of conceptualization of the agency and
contextualization of its strategies. The study revealed that the agency was not in the first
place conceived as a judicial institution that could be seen as the anticorruption police.
The agency’s key functions as described in the 2011 NACC report on “the state of the
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fight against corruption in Cameroon”, constituted mainly 1) prevention and
communication measures, 2) studies and cooperation measures, and 3) Investigation
measures. The conception of the agency apparently lacked strong law enforcement basis.
The agency’s lack of prosecutorial and police authority was frequently raised by the
participants as some of the key reasons for its weakness. Expressing a feeling of total
consternation due to this situation, P7 exclaimed in the following words:
NACC has failed woefully in the fight against corruption. This is because
Cameroonians are still to see where a head master (principal) of a primary school
will be punished for receiving bribes before admitting students, likewise the
principals of secondary and high schools and rectors (presidents) of state
universities. Enough of the denunciations! What Cameroonians expect to see us a
structure that will have the competence to arrest and punish officials involved in
corruption.
P7 added that NACC has not distinguished itself from other organs of the
government that were equally created to combat corruption but apparently failed to
realize significant victories. These included the national agency for financial
investigation, the public contracts regulatory board, the supreme state audit, the audit
bench of the supreme court, the ministry of public contracts, and the ministry of justice.
P3 also strongly held the view that the conceptualization of NACC was problematic, as
government focused on duplicating structures without giving them practical institutional
ability to function as they should. In his own words, he said:
One thing that the government has been good at doing is the multiplication of
agencies as well as organizing talks on this issue. This is clearly ineffective
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because, more and more mismanagement and misappropriations are recorded in
the country.
P6 said she was yet to see a situation in which a NACC agent would arrest a
corruption suspect without the help of the police as done in Kenya, where anticorruption
agents can arrest even uniform officer in flagrante delicto. On the issue of
contextualization, it appeared that the agency did not pay much attention to the policy
context of Cameroon in terms of the economy, culture, and political environment that
surrounded the agency. It still had to look into the giving culture of the people, the
extremely low salaries paid to citizens in relation to devaluation of the Francs CFA, and
the political system that pushed powers mostly into the hands of individuals and not
institutions. Expert report by Bechem (2018) lamented on the absence of an autonomous
judiciary in the country, and most participants perceived corruption as becoming more of
a cultural issue in Cameroon that needed solutions that addressed the culture.
Summary of Findings on Research Question 2
Through this question, I examined the experiences of the participants in terms of
their interaction with the various anticorruption strategies implemented by NACC and
gathered their perceptions on how successful the said strategies were and the factors that
influenced either their success or failure. The findings revealed that NACC made a few
strides in curbing corruption in the Cameroon public service and in the country as a
whole, but it still needed to do much work because its weaknesses and challenges
appeared to be more noticeable than its achievements and could lead to a failed institution
in the absence of true intervening reforms.
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Research Question 3
What tools do NACC agents feel are needed from the government to implement
effective anticorruption policies?
Introduction
Following the assessment of the effectiveness of the anticorruption strategies
implemented by NACC, the next question that needed to be answered was how possible
shortcomings of the system could be improved upon in order to give it the capacity to
produce better results. Question 3 was as such asked in order to find out what participants
thought government could do differently in order to make NACC more viable as an
anticorruption force. It was also asked to gather tools that participants believed could be
used to solve the failures of NACC identified in question 2. Question 6 and few more
data from questions 7 and 8 from the interview protocol, and data from document review
were used to fully cover the subject matter of question 3.
The study revealed several strategies that could be regarded as solutions to the
problems raised in question 2. Proposals made by participants projected the need for
NACC to overcome barriers and hindrances to good governance by moving into an era
where attention is given to good government behavior through the observance of good
governance principles, and this would enable the establishment of a more productive
national anticorruption strategy. Four major categories of strategies were gathered from
the data.
Policy and Political Reforms
These are reforms that referred to the authority and scope of NACC. Since most
participants believed that the agency was weak due to lack of autonomy and
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independence, these reforms were proposed to have some amount of power shifted to the
agency so that it can do the enormous job it was called to do. Policy reforms in this case
would be refer to changes in government decision making that would target and improve
NACC’s anticorruption strategies, meanwhile political reforms would be government
changes that would increase NACC’s independence, giving it the politico-institutional
leverage it needed to thrive amidst corruption forces coming from other powerful
government institutions and authorities. Participants that made strong expressions
concerning this need were P1, P2, P4, P5, P6, P8, P13, P16, and P18. In his own words,
P1 suggested the following:
The government should make NACC an independent committee and institution.
All the other institutions like the special criminal court, the audit bench at the
supreme court...etc, should be directly supervised by NACC. The members should
hail from an independent electorate of credible moral background.
The propositions made by P1 could only be possible by legislated political
reforms, because NACC could not arrogate such authority to itself. Cooperation between
the major three branches of the government was need for such reform.
P2 on the other hand proposed a policy reform which required that government
should take more rigorous punitive measures against those convicted of corruption.
P4 said government should ensure the election of NACC’s members just as P1
suggested, instead of having them being appointed by the president of the republic.
P5 suggested that NACC should be empowered with the capacity to prosecute
corrupt persons. P6 supported this position, stating that the agency should be given vast
and full powers to investigate corruption offenses, make arrest of offenders irrespective
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of their rank or corps, and prosecute them in court. P8 added her voice to the call for
autonomy for NACC and added that the judiciary system be made independent. Expert
report from Bechem (2018) indicated that the judiciary in Cameroon was still under the
total control of the executive, as the president appointed all judges and magistrates
without confirmation and also sat as the head of the higher judicial council. P13
supported the request for autonomy and the need for NACC officials to be elected rather
than appointed, stating that their appointment made people to see the agency only as a
political tool in the hands of the president for scores settling with his enemies.
In addition to supporting the call for autonomy, P16 suggested a policy reform of
autonomous budgeting. According to him, NACC should be able to draw up its own
budget and table before the national assemble (legislator) for voting. P18 reiterated the
points made by the other preceding participants in the following words:
Make the NACC autonomous financially, legally, with competence to launch
actions even against high ranking state officials without seeking permission from
anyone but the parliament.
Institutional and Operational reforms
These are reforms that would target the reshaping of the internal institution of
NACC and the reinvigoration of its working principles. Some of these reforms could be
initiated and managed by NACC without necessarily having to run to superior
governmental authority for authentication when given proper autonomy. During the
examination of the previous question, most participants pointed fingers at NACC and
concluded that it was not vibrant in most of its anticorruption processes and principles.
They expected NACC to exhibit characteristics of good governance. The proposals made
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in this section were aimed at solving this problem. Expressions from P7, P9, P11, P14,
and P15 captured these reforms. In his own words, P7 expressed the need for the
following operational reforms:
What in my humble opinion Cameroon needs to do is to try to design different
strategies to fight the different forms of corruption in the country, starting from
“grand corruption”, which can be fought by sending those big fishes to jail for
corrupt practices perpetrated by them. As for “petty corruption”, those isolated
individuals involved at a negligible scale can be named and shamed in
newspapers that have national coverage and even televisions at the end of every
year. This should be carried out systematically across the country in all offices.
Distinguishing between types and levels of corruption provided NACC with the
opportunity to organize properly and function effectively.
P9 suggested NACC’s processes be digitalized and that NACC should also
recommend that government services be computerized. He added that NACC could
station undercover agents in different zones across the national territory to track down
corruption cases. This could be seen as a great strategic reform but might face
implementation challenges if NACC lacked the police power to initiate arrests. NACC
was not also going to be able to computerize its activities if it lacked the political will and
finances coming from the government.
P11 proposed another operational reform, which required that NACC should
make it a strategy to request that surveillance cameras be installed in all public offices,
and that these cameras should be reviewed regularly by an independent body and reports
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given to NACC. To cut cost, NACC could have a separate division within NACC do the
camera reviews.
For institutional reforms, P14 proposed the making of NACC a more objective
institution whose findings are interpreted without bias or subjective influences. P15
articulated his own views in the following words:
NACC should be given the possibility to develop anticorruption messages and
programs of its own, should be given the opportunity to administer these
programs by themselves, given the powers to render evidence on cases public, and
be given the opportunity to examine and be present in all public recruitment
processes.
Basically, participants wanted the making of NACC an actual anticorruption force
with legal basis as an institution vested with both police and prosecutorial authority to
find, arrest, and prosecute all defendants of corruption.
Community and Culturally Oriented Measures
This strategy targeted the environment and looked intricately into why the
corrupter and the corrupted got involved in corruption in the first place. The study found
out that the gift-giving culture and patronage practiced in the Cameroonian communities
built up altruistic tendencies for bribery in the people. The laissez-faire civil service
culture of the country also breaded corruption. As solutions, participants proposed the
initiation of reforms such as effective firing of corrupt government employees,
discouragement of gift-giving for the purpose of accessing public services, increasing the
salaries of civil servants, raising the minimum wage, increasing human resources and
financing for areas identified with high levels of corruption, publicly shaming corruption
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convicts, reinforcing public sensitizations and educational programs on
corruption/anticorruption, and the inclusion into school curriculums of moral and civic
education that thought children about the dangers of corruption, anticorruption behaviors,
and patriotism for their country.
Most of the participants expressed the need for these community and culturally
based reforms. The most prevalent of all the measures was the need to include lessons on
corruption into the curriculums of primary and secondary schools. Participants held a
strong perception that corruption in Cameroon had become a cultural issue that needed
more than institutional solutions. P6, P7, P17, and P20 advocated for these reforms in
their suggestions, stating that if government could initiate them, they would stand a better
chance to achieve positive results in the fight against corruption in the country.
International Cooperation
Participants expressed different feelings towards the involvement of international
organizations and other international entities in the fight against corruption in Cameroon.
The perceptions were strictly divided between the question whether international
intervening measures were needed to help the fight against corruption in Cameroon or
not. Some participants like P7, P11, and P15 believed that the international community,
especially international organizations and multinational firms from the West were part of
the corruption problem in Cameroon.
P7 said the international community had little or nothing to offer as solution. And
that most often, they came to the country for the same cause but came out from the
presidency singing the same song being sang by the regime in place. He also emphasized

177
that Cameroon problems needed Cameroon solution, and that they international
community could not change the behavior of Cameroonians overnight.
P11 was more passionate in his expressions against the need of the international
community as part of the solution to the problem, and strongly condemned their
intervention in the issue through the following statement:
International community has helped in grooming what we have today as
corruption vested country spanning back to the time slaves were bought by the
bribery of our chiefs. Because Cameroon is a potential land of opportunities, the
international community comes in for these huge opportunities by lobbying and
bribing, thus rendering the whole system corrupt.
P15 held the same views as P11, stating that he did not think the international
community had a significant role to play in terms of solutions to the problem since they
focused on publishing results of Cameroon as a highly corrupt country but offered little
or nothing to solve the problem. He also believed that some of the corruption practices
benefited international corporate business as they exploited the natural resources of the
system at low prices due to kickbacks and paying of huge bribes to top level government
officials.
Despite the strong rejection of international help expressed by some participants
as seen above, others believed that NACC and the government needed to cooperate with
international actors in the area of anticorruption for a more viable and successful
anticorruption machine for the country. This second view was more popular among the
participant P2, P3, P5, P6, P10, P12, P14, P18, and P19 all advocated for and supported
cooperation with international forces for effective anticorruption practice by NACC. P2
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said international actors could help ensure that embezzlers return stolen money kept in
banks in the diaspora. P3 in his own words said:
The international community has a mighty role to play. They set the pace by
which many countries function globally. How about them prescribing economic
sanctions on these corrupt countries. If they for example reduce or totally end aids
to Cameroon, this would be a hard measure, but could serve a productive role to
ending corruption.
When asked about some of the international anticorruption strategies that NACC
has adopted and is currently implementing, he added:
Yes, I can quickly think of transparency international. They usually require
Cameroon to send annual reports from all parts of the country before harmonizing
a general report.
According to P5, and P6, the international community could be instrumental in
the fight against corruption through bodies like transparency international, and their
corruption perception index (CPI) for the country determined interest in the country by
foreign investors. Therefore, if foreign investment declined for this reason, the state could
be more serious in adjusting its behavior towards corruption in order to attract these
investors. They added that the international community could help by repatriating
embezzled funds stored abroad, prevent transfer of embezzled funds, and provide
assistance in the area of capacity building so that the government and NACC could be
strengthened to wage the war against corruption in the country.
To P10, P12, and P14, the international community was helpful through
anticorruption conventions, bilateral agreements, and cooperation schemes like the ones
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provided by the platforms of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption
(UNCAC), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
Oxfam, and transparency international.
P18 and P19 added that the international community could help in fact finding,
extradition of runaway corrupt officials, and providing expert reports. When asked about
existing international strategies, they mentioned expert reports by Amnesty International,
cooperation with Interpol for investigations, and implementation of the provisions of the
African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption.
Summary of Findings on Research Question 3
Answers to question 3 served as participants’ proposals for solutions to the issues
raised in the second part of question 2. The issues were essentially that NACC was weak
as a government organ charged with the enormous responsibility to eradicate corruption
from the Cameroon civil service and from the country at large. In its quest of fulfilling
this mission, it recorded some successes, but failed greatly and generally to meet the
mark, as corruption was still highly prevalent in the country according to the perceptions
of participants and CPI reports by Transparency International. The answers in this section
proposed the types of tools and approaches the government could engage both on the
domestic and international fronts to improve on NACC’s construction and operation as a
productive anticorruption machinery for the country.
Research Question 4
How can the notion of adaptation of policies be used to potentially improved the
development and implementation of anticorruption strategies at NACC?
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Introduction
The premise of this study proceeded with the claim that effective anticorruption
strategies are those that were designed based on good governance principles. The
question raised from this background was to know whether the anticorruption strategies
implemented by NACC reflected these principles, and if they did, what results did they
bring to the fight, or if they did not, then how could they be improved in order to give the
agency more opportunities to craft strategies that could address the corruption problem
with more positive outcomes in view? These questions were answered through
participants’ responses and data collected from documents as seen in question 1, 2, and 3.
Question 4 was an extension of the investigation on effective anticorruption policy
making, giving the study the latitude find out how proposed policies could be
contextualized for better results, especially policy strategies that came from the
international community.
Question 4 therefore sought to find out whether participants understood
international dynamics of the anticorruption strategies implemented by NACC, and what
their thoughts were concerning how such policies could be engineered to work more
effectively with the local systems in place. The question also sought to know participants
overall perception on the state of the fight as led by NACC. Investigations from
document review, and responses to questions 9 and 10 on the interview protocol were
used to answer question 4. Also, it should be noted that part of question 8 on the
interview protocol identified the international anticorruption contributions to the fight
against corruption in Cameroon, and this was already introduced under question 3. In this
section, the focus was more on the effectiveness of these strategies.
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Participants were once more divided on the effectiveness of international
strategies in the fight, but they all agreed that for these strategies to yield positive results,
they must align with the domestic environment. Overall, three major findings were made
through this question. The study found out that:
International Influence
Some participants in preceding analyses did not view the intervention of
international actors in Cameroon’s anticorruption strategy to be positive. They believed
that multinational firms and other international organizations were instead part of the
problem of corruption in the country, explaining that they paid kickbacks for lower cost
in natural resources markets, and that countries of the developed world served as safe
havens for embezzlers of public funds.
Other participants asserted that the international community played a positive role
in the anticorruption struggle in Cameroon through educational and empowerment
programs, cooperation with investigations, expert reports, scientific policies, and strategic
aid. Findings revealed that these international influences were well in place and could be
felt within the NACC system, but it was left for the agency to properly adapt these
contributions to the policy context of the country and make them viable solutions to the
problem. P1, P2, P3, P6, P7, and P13 made the following expressions about their
experience working with an understanding of the involvement of international strategies
in NACC’s anticorruption policy. In his own words, P1 said:
In my opinion, the primary actor in this fight is the government. The international
community has a limited role to play. In 1998 and 1999, the country was listed by
Transparency International as the most corrupt country in the world. This
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situation exerted some pressure on the government in the eyes of her international
economic partners like IMF and the World Bank. Many top government officials
were arrested in this respect. I therefore think that the international community
has a lot of influence when the country’s economy is at stake.
P2 added that imported policies added value to NACC’s strategies. P3 said, the
simple fact that there was an “international watch eye” over the system, caused policy
makers to remain alerted and aware of the situation either consciously or unconsciously.
P6 expatiated her experience as follows:
There is a success story of the fight against corruption in Cameroon which just
came to my mind. That is, the activities of an Israeli registered Nongovernmental
Organization (NGO) operating in law enforcement in the wildlife sector of
Cameroon. This NGO is called the Last Great Ape Organization (LAGA) and
works in collaboration with the ministry of forestry and fauna (MINFOF) in
wildlife law enforcement. LAGA adopts disguise and undercover strategies to
unveil wildlife crime and even motivates law enforcement officers to work with
them to combat wildlife crime thereby minimizing possibilities of corruption of
law enforcement officers and ministerial officials.
The example by P6 was a clear indication that International intervention was part
of the strategy for the fight against corruption in the country. P7 said the interventions of
organizations such as the World Bank and Transparency International in domestic policy
making often met stiff resistances from officials that were corrupt and were afraid of
exposure. However, the continues pressure from these organizations kept the government
on alert and increased its resolve in cracking down these corruption foes.
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To P13, the world was fast becoming a global village, and therefore states became
obligated to involve themselves in transactions with other states as partners for the
purpose of surviving in this new advent of global village. This equally applied to
anticorruption policy making and implantation. P13 expatiated on his experience of this
connection between NACC and international forces in the following words:
All of these bodies have contributed enormously to the fight against corruption in
Cameroon. But it has always been a very difficult task when it comes to
implementation. This is because these international bodies are most often clear
and transparent in their policies. But if corruption is persisting in our country, it is
because we have all what it takes to fight corruption, with ideas from these
bodies, but we are not willing to depart from the practice. Working with these
international initiatives have been wonderful, but the real problem in Cameroon
always is the issue of implementation, we do not have good laws.
Neglecting the Need to Contextualize Anticorruption Strategies
The eminent presence of international influences on anticorruption policy making
necessitated contextual interpretations in order to adapt these foreign strategies and
contributions to domestic realities for better results. However, the study showed that
NACC did not do much in converting these policies to properly address local realities.
That was participants’ reactions, and their views were expressed as follows:
P8 stated that international actors came in with laws and institutions that did not
fit sometimes with the Cameroon context, because they did not take into consideration
local realities. She gave the example of the creation of NACC and the launching of
“operation sparrow hawk”, that they were born from recommendations of international
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organizations, with transparency international said to be at the origin of the whole NACC
idea. P18 also expressed concerns of contextualization, asserting that policies brought by
international actors worked better with advanced democracies, and could be fruitful at the
domestic level only when applied with keen consideration of the policy context. In his
own words, P19 made the following contributions concerning international anticorruption
policy influences on NACC:
Definitely some strategies have been borrowed. An example is the law creating
NACC, which is heavily believed to be a response to international pressure. The
arrest and detention of corrupt officials is believed to be a necessary evidence to
prove to the international community that the system is indeed fighting against
corruption. The international community is contributing through pressure
mounting.
The believe by some participants that international actors caused minimal or no
intervening impact on NACC’s strategy also revealed the kind of attention the agency
paid to these policies and in extension the rigor with which they treated the need to have
these policies interpreted to better address the country’s own political, economic,
geographical, and sociocultural realities for better results.
Corruption vs Anticorruption Perceptions
The last question of the interview protocol gathered final thoughts of participants,
and analysis in this section was done by putting these thoughts together with the rest of
the data and looking for participants’ perceptions on the major issues of corruption,
anticorruption, and NACC. The first set of perceptions that emerged from this analysis
reflected the state of corruption in Cameroon according to the participants, and the
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second set reflected participants perception on anticorruption and the success of NACC
as the main government agency charged with the task of eradicating corruption in the
country.

Corruption Perception by Participants
Unsure
5%

Moderate
20%

High
75%

High

Moderate

Unsure

Figure 2. Corruption perception by participants
Most participants believed that Cameroon was still highly corrupted. From the
civil service to other public offices and in the private sector, 75 percent (15 out of 20)
participants perceived that corruption in the country was still on the high side. 20 percent
(4 out of 20) of them believed that corruption was prevalent in the country but not as high
as it was during the late 1990s and early 2000s. Only 5 percent (1 out of 20) of the
participants was unsure about the state in terms of high corruption or moderate levels of
corruption.
When compared with Corruption Perception Index (CPI) from Transparency
International (TI) concerning Cameroon for 2017, the study found out that the country
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scored 25 out of 100 points, with scores ranging from 0 = highly corrupt to 100 = low
corruption. These results matched almost perfectly with participants perceptions in this
study, because 100 – 25 is = 75, which could be interpreted to mean that 75% of CPI for
Cameroon in 2017 held that the country was corrupt, with 75 percent indicating very high
levels of corruption. Meanwhile 75 percent of the participants in this study believed the
same. These findings could then establish the basis for the assessment of solutions, which
will be explored in subsequent chapter.
Participants blamed the high levels of corrupt on a plethora of reasons, including
the laissez faire nature of government, poor economy, lack of adequate anticorruption
enforcement mechanisms, lack of the spirit of public service, absence of political will and
bold steps to curb the problem, endemic nature/culture of corruption, state of impunity,
defiance of the meritocracy, poor management, poor legal system, administrative
inefficiencies, ineffective strategies, tribalism, nepotism, and no regime change.

Perceptions of Participants on the
Success of NACC
Unsure
10%

Yes
20%

No
70%

Yes

No

Unsure

Figure 3. Perceptions of participants on the success of NACC
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The study revealed that most participants perceived NACC as well positioned to
bring solutions to the problem of corruption in Cameroon, but that it was limited in scope
and in operation by several factors as seen in preceding analyses. About 20 percent out of
the 20 participants believed that NACC was successful or had significant hopes for
success in its mission as the anticorruption machinery of the country, meanwhile up to 70
percent concluded that NACC considerably fell short of performance and as such needed
serious reforms to ensure that the agency survives with any real hopes of registering
significant victories in the fight. A negligible 10 percent (1 out of 20) of the participants
was not sure about taking a particular stand on the success assessment.
Summary of Findings on Research Question 4
Due to the eminent interaction between domestic and international policies in
contemporary global governance arrangement, it was imperative to assess the role played
by international actors in the anticorruption effort of Cameroon through NACC. Findings
in this section revealed that the international community influenced NACC’s policies, but
the officials at NACC paid less attention to the dynamics of these strategies and as such
did not adapt them properly to serve their purposes. It was also discovered that
participants strongly believed corruption in Cameroon was still on the rise, and that
NACC was not achieving much in positive results despite the efforts of the agency.
Summary
In this chapter, I presented an overview of the purpose of this study, the questions
the research sought to answer, participants’ demographics, detail results from data that
was collected on the study, analysis processes of the data, and the methods used to
demonstrate the trustworthiness of the study.
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Data collected on the research topic sufficiently answered the research questions
and made it possible for NACC’s anticorruption strategies to be identified and its
achievements and challenges revealed.
In chapter 5, the interpretations of the research findings will be presented,
discussions will be made on the limitations of the study, important policy provisions,
implications for social change, and practical and future academic recommendations. And
finally, conclusions will be drawn.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Introduction
The purpose of this study was to explore the Cameroon government’s
anticorruption policy by assessing the various anticorruption strategies it implemented
through the NACC, which served as the central agency for government anticorruption
practice in the country. The aim was to provide a deeper understanding of the instruments
used by the government to fight against corruption in the country. As such, in this study, I
sought to evaluate the extent to which these strategies reflected good governance
principles, as well as the impact of the strategies and their associated challenges in the
anticorruption cause.
Through a review of the literature on the topic of corruption, I discovered that no
scholarly research had been previously carried out to assess the Cameroon government’s
anticorruption strategies through NACC. Specifically, there was no clear understanding
of what the achievements and the shortcomings of the agency were and what it meant to
contextualize these strategies for better anticorruption performance by the agency and the
government at large. In this study, I sought to bridge this gap in the literature.
I chose a qualitative case study design for this study because such a design
provided the platform upon which I was able to explore governmental anticorruption
strategies as practiced by NACC. The research questions for this study identified the
anticorruption strategies practiced by NACC as the implementation scheme of the
Cameroon government’s policy for the fight against corruption and clarified the role of
international actors in the fight and what could be done to improve on these strategies.
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The analysis of my findings in this study led to the discovery that NACC’s
anticorruption strategies were greatly challenged due to poor design, formulation, and
implementation of the policies. The findings concurred with most of the literature
reviewed on anticorruption policy making and implementation, especially regarding the
effectiveness of the Cameroon government’s efforts and strategies against corruption in
the country (Bechem, 2018; Cameroon Today, 2011; Fombad, 2000, 2003; Freedom
House, 2011; Houmfa, 2012; NACC, 2006; Ndoumbe, 2008; Ngomba, 2006;
Nguemegne, 2011; Regional Anti-Corruption Initiative, 2012; Tiky VI, 2010; TI 1998,
1999, 2017).
Seven major anticorruption strategies implemented by NACC emerged from the
collected data and were categorized into two groups: (a) strategies that reflected good
governance principles and that could be enhanced for effective performance, and (b)
strategies that were not properly formulated and, as such, performed poorly and needed
complete reform if they were to be effective. The first category created opportunities
whereas the second created challenges.
According to the findings, the creation and institutionalization of NACC, with its
major strategic objectives to instill respect to the rule of law and to give a legitimate
voice to the people through public denunciations and whistleblowing, was a good first
step taken in the right direction. Elahi (2009) argued that the materialization of
sustainable human development in the developing world, which entails the curbing of
corruption, was a byproduct of good governance principles. In a UNDP policy paper,
Graham, Amos, and Plumptre (1997) identified five major good governance principles:
legitimacy of voice, direction, performance, accountability/transparency, and fairness
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(rule of equity and rule of law). The same argument is made in this study, that NACC
could develop robust anticorruption strategies when its guiding policies are rooted in
good governance principles and practices.
Extending Elahi’s (2009) views to the creation of NACC, it could be said that the
agency was created with a vision in mind, the population was given legitimacy of voice
to participate in the policy of the agency through denunciations and whistle blowing, and
the rule of law was envisaged for the system through the creation of special courts and
specific institutional support systems to aid the overall NACC system. Participants
corroborated Elahi’s views as they concurred that the creation of NACC was a positive
step in the anticorruption struggle, and also ascertained the existence of the preceding
good governance principles around NACC’s vision.
The creation of NACC in 2006 was a positive and laudable initiative taken by the
government of President Biya to address the chronic levels of corruption that had eaten
deep into the roots of both the civil service and the private sector of the country. NACC’s
signature program was significant in the operations and public identity of the agency.
This program became famous among the Cameroonian population because it led to the
incarceration of several top-ranking public officials within a short period time from its
creation (Freedom House, 2011). Several billions of Francs CFA were equally recovered
from the culprits, as seen in the work of Nguemegne (2011). But the momentum with
which the fight against corruption was launched through NACC soon diminished, and the
agency fell short of fulfilling its purpose (Nguemegne, 2011). This was likely due for the
most part to the lack of political will that leadership obviously needed to keep the agency
on viable.
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Haruna (2009) held the view that from decolonization to the second liberation era,
Africa, and specifically Sub-Saharan Africa, suffered from leadership poverty.
Cameroon, being one of the countries in this region, suffered from the same predicament
(Haruna, 2009). According to Haruna, the predominance of dictatorial leadership in these
countries created a leader-follower leadership perspective whereby the responsibilities of
leadership are placed in the hands of the leader and then the followers are seen as passive
people. NACC eventually suffered the consequences of these shortcomings, as leadership
failed to provide a participative environment in which stakeholders and NACC could
successfully put up a strong fight against corruption in the country.
Leadership issues usually lead to managerial issues, and that was the case with the
leadership of the Cameroon government and NACC. The president of the Republic of
Cameroon, having been in power for the past 36 years, depicted the monopolistic
leadership discussed by Haruna (2009). Being in power for such a long time without
alternans could be one of the reasons why fewer opportunities for democratic principles
were created, and consequently fewer good governance tools to combat corruption
existed. Some participants in my study suggested a regime change to this effect, arguing
that current government lacked the political will to initiate real change in the state of
corruption in the country and as such could not furnish NACC with the tools it needed to
perform effectively. They expressed the belief that many government officials benefited
from the systematic corruption in place and were not ready to allow NACC to operate
with success in their midst.
The findings of the study also indicated that NACC fell short of major success in
the fight against corruption in Cameroon because most of its strategies lacked the
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institutional, structural, and interpretative instruments needed in order to assume the kind
of authority, force, and meaning that would have helped enforce its values, principles,
and findings in the system. The lack of independence and autonomy, absence of actual
service decentralization, lack of police authority, negative influences of politics, and
contextual challenges rendered NACC powerless (Fombad, 2000; Nguemegne, 2011;
Tiky VI, 2010). Participants confessed that the agency was controlled from the
presidency and usually could not carry out programs and projects freely without
authorization from the presidency. The agency as such became limited as to the scope
and means of what it could do. According to participants, the agency also investigated
cases but could not initiate arrests on the spot for individuals caught committing
corruption. Regular police officers who should enforce the laws were themselves often
corrupt according to participants. But participants also believed that NACC would have
been able to arrest culprits across all government departments without administrative
impediments if it had been given the necessary autonomy and police authority.
The significance is that because NACC lacked the administrative tools and
political atmosphere needed to operate effectively from a neutral standpoint, it became a
tool in the hands of politicians to settle their political scores. As posited by many
participants, while those who were seen as opponents to the regime in place where being
handcuffed and sent to maximum security prisons for embezzlement, their colleagues
who found favor with the regime were left untouched even though they stole even more
from government coffers and from the people. In the end, citizens of Cameroon were the
ones who suffered from this broken system, as evidenced by the poor economic and
social standards of the country and the overall poverty of the citizenry because a few
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individuals decided to loot the country’s resources for their own private gain to the
detriment of a great share of the population.
This chapter contains my interpretation of data collected through interviews
conducted on participants from NACC and information gathered through document
review. In the conclusion of the chapter, I make recommendations on possible future
studies on topics related to the subject matter of this study, and I strongly believe that
some of the solutions recommended in this study would promote positive social change
when implemented.
Interpretation of the Findings
Adaptation to policy context (Quah, 2008) established the conceptual framework
for this study, whereas Santiso’s (2001), Rothstein’s (2007), and Elahi’s (2009) theories
of universality of policy approaches, particularity of policy contexts, and good
governance provided the underlying theoretical frameworks for the study. The
discussions in this chapter focus on themes and patterns that emerged from data analysis
conducted and described in Chapter 4. Twenty interviews were conducted with the help
of 10 open-ended questions to gather information that was used to answer the research
questions for this study. A detailed discussion and description of key outcomes of the
data analysis is presented below. The findings of the study led to the conclusion that the
creation of NACC as the central government organ to fight against corruption in
Cameroon was well intended and received by the population, but fell short of achieving
major success because some of its strategies were rooted in good governance principles
and could be enhanced for better performance (findings for the first part of Question 1),
but some were poorly formulated and implemented and, as such, needed complete
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reformation for better performance (findings for the second part of Question 1; Questions
2, 3, and 4) as analyzed with the help of the conceptual and theoretical frameworks stated
above.
NACC Strategies Rooted in Good Governance Principles
This section covers discussions on findings for the first part of Question 1.
Through this study, I uncovered three major strategies of NACC rooted in good
governance principles. These strategies were seen as opportunities that the government
could leverage through NACC to enhance the effectiveness of the anticorruption struggle.
These strategies are described hereinbelow.
The creation and institutionalization of NACC
Generally, most countries that have emerged successfully from chronic systemic
and public corruption have designated specific government organs charged with carrying
out the anticorruption policy of the government, ensuring that corrupt officials are
contested with all the tools possible and available. Examples seen in this study include
Croatia, Hong Kong, Bulgaria, and most of the CEE countries that came out of
communism and embraced democratic governance principles, institutions, and structures
from the early 1990s (Beblavý, 2009; David, 2010; Grubiša, 2011; Smilov, 2010;). In
Croatia, the government anticorruption agency was known as the Office of Combating
Corruption and Organized Crime (Grubiša, 2011). In Hong Kong it was known as IACC
(David, 2010). In Bulgaria, the agency was known as the State Agency for National
Security and in Albania, it was known as the Anticorruption Monitoring Group (Smilov,
2010). By creating NACC, the government in Cameroon attempted to address corruption
issues.
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Creating a clear vision and direction for government is one of the principles
identified by Elahi (2009) as a good governance principle. This study held the premise
that if anticorruption strategies were formulated by NACC about good governance
processes, they would stand a better chance to address the corruption issues plaguing the
government. In this line of thought, actual work needed to be done after NACC was
created to conceive a good vision and formulate effective to implement to obtain good
results.
Institutional and legal reforms by the government
Institutional and legal reforms by the government introduced respect for the rule
of law in the system This was another initiative by government through NACC to
formulate anticorruption strategies based on good governance principles. Firstly, the
government recognized the role of the judicial system in the anticorruption process and
promoted cooperation between NACC and the legal system (Nguemegne, 2011). This
policy ensured that anticorruption strategies were built on the rule of law (Elahi, 2009).
Secondly, the observance of the law by public officials, especially Article 66 of the
constitution which required public disclosure of private assets before and after taking up
any government office, was part of NACC’s strategic recommendations to facilitate
personal audits (Nguemegne, 2011).
This was an attempt at good governance as described by some of the literature
reviewed for this study, including Elahi (2009) and Graham, et al. (2003). Even though
NACC intended to abide by the rule of law, it faced the challenge of enforcement as
participants pointed out that corruption perpetrators were not ignorant of the law but were
intentionally inspired to break it by the culture of systemic corruption which had been
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established and practiced in the country for several decades. Good governance
approaches require that NACC does not give up on these attempts but continues to press
on the government to provide more effective legal tools, environment to formulate good
anticorruption laws and sensitization of the people about lawful conduct. Countries of
CEE that have emerged from corruption using good governance approaches, including
the enforcement of the rule of law, could serve as good examples in public education.
The implementation of whistleblowing and public denunciation
This strategy brought legitimacy and voice to NACC’s anticorruption effort.
Another significant good governance principle is giving the people legitimacy and voice,
which entails freedom of speech and expression. Almost all participants identified the
toll-free calling system instituted by NACC to enable whistle blowing and reporting of
corruption cases as a plausible and effective strategy to enforce lawful conduct. It was
thought that integrating a toll free calling system and whistle blowers against illegal
conduct would enable NACC to develop a comprehensive monitoring system which is an
example of good governance as seen in Elahi (2009).
Giving the people a voice in the anticorruption process with protections is
effective, as most participants indicated. This is particularly relevant when the
perpetrators are managers and the whistle blowers are subordinates. Most participants
pointed out that subordinates are normally intimidated in the work environment to remain
silent or share in the proceeds of illegal acts. Participants suggested that NACC could
work on ensuring a security system for individuals who made such denunciations, and
this will encourage more people to testify against misappropriators and deter bad
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conduct. These are some of the groundworks upon which NACC could continue to
improve by adapting procedures learned from other systems.
NACC Strategies with Less Success: Challenges and the Need for Reforms
This section covers discussions on findings for the second part of Question 1,
discussions on findings for Questions 2, 3, and 4. The second category of NACC’s
strategies is considered to have provided less opportunities for a thriving anticorruption
practice, and as such needed thorough reform which could also mean complete
transformation or replacement. According to participants, these strategies were either
poorly formulated or implemented. Four strategies were identified under this category,
including decentralization, investigations, checks and audits, and intergovernmental or
international cooperation. In order to capture the different sections of information derived
from the analysis of data to the answers that emerged from further questions, the
discussion in this section is organized under three major topics that capture these
strategies, their challenges, and their corresponding reforms as proposed by participants.
Political strategies, challenges, and reforms
NACC strategies that had to do with reshaping the institution and giving it the
legal scope and authority to perform could be seen as those directly linked to
governmental politics. These included the politics of decentralization, intergovernmental
or international cooperation, autonomy and independence, and the political will to
change. NACC made few strides in these areas, especially by aligning itself to
international anticorruption conventions and agreements and working in collaboration
with other government departments that took part in the fight against corruption. NACC
also decentralized its units into almost all government departments and agencies and
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carried out probing activities under an “operation sparrow hawk” program that incarnated
the government’s anticorruption mission in Cameroon. These attempts however, did not
realize considerable success due to challenges within the system as pointed out by
participants who also suggested reforms.
The political strategies being discussed in this section, tie with the literature on
the role of leadership as an instrument for anticorruption practice (Maxwell, 1999;
Kpundeh, 1998; Burke, 2008; Elahi, 2009). The data reveals that the efforts made in this
area failed the good governance test as postulated by Elahi (2009). Participants
complained of government refusal to ensure that service decentralization occurred
alongside structural decentralization. While NACC personnel were distributed to various
departments, the services were still highly controlled and concentrated under a
centralized power structure operated by fewer people with connections to the presidency
of Cameroon. This made it easier for justice to be perverted along the chain of command
as corruption cases initiated at the bottom, were usually dropped out by dishonest
intermediaries before reaching the top state managers answerable to the .
Participants confessed that the lack of honesty, autonomy and independence,
absence of governmental will to change, incompetence in top-ranking government
officials, lack of rigor were some of the challenges against NACC’s assignment. They
therefore advocated for new legislation to free NACC from direct control by the
presidency of the republic of Cameroon. The advocacy included a call for NACC to be
independent of the executive and accorded police powers to pursue corruption suspects,
arrest and file charges for prosecution in court.
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According to Maxwell (1999), everything rises and falls on leadership. The
president of the republic of Cameroon in his leadership capacity can initiate these
political changes and give NACC the authority required to investigate and bring to justice
all officials involved in corrupt acts. However, if the all-powerful president fails to
empower this agency then it will continue to face challenges in fulfilling its role freely
and confidently. The legislature could also pick up these signals and bring up appropriate
changes through bills in parliament. Even though the day to day management of
government agencies falls within the jurisdiction of the executive branch, policy changes
for the same agencies could originate from the legislative branch. Kpundeh (1998)
attributed the task to bring about political will for change to not only presidential
leadership, but also to other elected or appointed leaders, civil society watch dogs,
stakeholder groups and others.
Institutional strategies, challenges, and reforms
NACC put into place institutional strategies that also fell short of operational
vigor, and thus could not create the expected impact. These are strategies that had to do
with NACC’s daily operations and functional policies as an anticorruption agency. They
included investigations, checks and audits, anticorruption campaigns and sensitization of
the masses to create greater public awareness, identification of suspects to law
enforcement and ensuring that they are prosecuted according to the law, setting up
transparency, accountability, and integrity systems, and proposing public service reforms.
These strategies tie with the literature on policy and legal instruments of anticorruption
practice (Moroff & Schmidt-Pfister, 2010; Beblavý, 2009; Spector, 2016; Desta, 2006;
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Nguemegne, 2011; McDermott, 2010; Barry and Stephens, 1998; Eliason, 2009;
Kubiciel, 2009; Majila, Taylor, & Raga, 2014).
Findings revealed that NACC carried out extensive sensitization campaigns on
television, radio, and also made use of anticorruption posters posted on government and
public offices, and billboards stationed in different cities and towns across the country.
Participants identified this strategy but complained that the implementation was not done
effectively due to lack of resources by NACC and poor educational methodology.
Participants suggested that the communication of anticorruption ideals would yield better
results if they were developed and added to school curriculum.
The effectiveness of public policy depends on its formulation and
implementation. When Moroff and Schmidt-Pfister (2010) conducted a study on the
effectiveness of anticorruption campaigns, they found out that broad social support for
anticorruption strategies remained essential for the success of any international and
governmental initiative. NACC seems to comply with this strategy but for the fact that it
lacks resources to multiply educative sessions across the country and in different
governmental offices. Slovakia’s case was successful, as public sensitization and
educational programs contributed significantly in transforming behavioral norms and
corruption. The effect deterred people from corrupt practice (Beblavý, 2009).
Findings also revealed that NACC was not sophisticated in its institutional
strategies to build integrity systems and establish strong public performance standards.
However, strides were being made in information technology to computerize services and
processes for open government even though no major accomplishments were recorded.
The legal department was ready to punish culprits through special and newly created
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criminal courts to prosecute perpetrators of corruption, but participants argued that even
with the measures in place, justice itself was corrupt due to the absence of an independent
judiciary system. They therefore suggested that NACC advocates for institutional reforms
if it were to function effectively and achieve meaningful results in its mission. The
foundation of good governance as laid by Elahi (2009) is yet needed at this level to
strengthen administrative procedures and give public managers at NACC the right policy
tools to formulate strategies that will improve the performance of the institution.
Conceptual and contextual strategies, challenges, and reforms
The concept behind the idea of NACC is what gave the organization form and
focus. The concept determined the agency’s founding principles and shaped its projects,
programs and other strategies. Participants stated that NACC was an idea copied from
other countries following the recommendations of TI. Nevertheless, the important
question that should be asked is how the agency was conceptually established to address
Cameroon’s problems in a Cameroonian way. It is by answering this question that
contextual dynamics were visited through studies on the notion of policy context
(Gephart, 2009; Quah, 2008; Rothstein, 2007; Santiso, 2001; Walton, 2016).
Participants stated that NACC was not conceived as a judicial institution endowed
with police authority compared to its counterparts in countries like Egypt and Kenya.
Review of documents pointed out that the agency’s main functions included preventing
corruption, research and as well as communication, cooperation and investigation
measures. Essentially, it was conceived as a research and reporting agency under the
executive branch of the government without any special privileges regarding autonomy
and function. This kind of conceptualization gave the organization a weak base in law
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enforcement and emasculated its prosecutorial abilities. Participants therefore suggested
that the agency be reformed and given a judicial police status so that it could arrest
suspects, especially those caught red-handed.
Findings also revealed that NACC carried out strategies that were influenced by
international actors. Participants expressed different feelings on the influence of the
international community. Some stated that international cooperation and transplantation
of strategies from foreign experiences to Cameroon had a positive impact on NACC’s
efforts, meanwhile others saw the contrary, asserting that foreign actors did not do much
to help apart from monitoring and reporting corruption perceptions just like TI did.
These findings are tied to literature in this study through the works of the authors
mentioned at the beginning of this section, and their works were used to establish the
conceptual and theoretical frameworks that guided this study. For conceptualization of
anticorruption strategies, authors held different perspectives. There were those who
posited for a universal approach, which holds that the same anticorruption strategies
could be implemented in different countries and would yield similar results (Santiso,
2001). But others believe in a particularistic approach, where strategies should be
conceived based on the specific characteristics of the policy context (Rothstein, 2007). It
is this second dimension that gave birth to the concept of adaption to policy context
(contextualization of anticorruption) (Gephart, 2009; Quah, 2008; Walton; 2016).
According to Quah, 2008, when government policies are formulated based on the
country’s policy context, they stand a greater chance to succeed when implemented.
Having conducted a study on India, author identified key features of the policy context of
a country to include geography, history, economic, demography, culture, politics, and
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law, making up seven features of policy context. To the historical element, one could add
religion as subsets. In the case of India, author explained that the country’s large
population was not closely taken into account in implementing a broad base
anticorruption program, reason why the program fell short of expected outcomes. In a
similar case of Papua New Guinea, Walton (2016) found out that the country’s
anticorruption measures also fell short of success due to the lack of a strong focus on how
the measures addressed the country’s policy context. It therefore becomes imperative for
NACC to look into the concept of adaptation of strategies to Cameroon’s policy context,
irrespective of whether the strategies where formulated originally by the agency
according to particularistic theories or were copied from other countries based on
universalist theories.
A typical example of contextualization of strategies would be the case for the
computerization of all government services based on modern information technology to
enhance accountability and transparency in the government. This strategy stands a greater
chance of not succeeding in Cameroon with the same speed as it would in countries with
populations that are advanced in information technology literacy. Therefore, if it were to
be introduced, the process should preferably be gradual and monitored closely alongside
traditional working procedures so that the system should not crash. Also, computer
literacy must be taught in schools beginning at infancy level in preparation for improved
services for future generations. Those already in service could be given special training to
enable advancement and facilitate change.
If the government indeed concerns itself with public performance, which equally
satisfies good governance requirements according to Elahi (2009), these factors of
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contextualizing anticorruption strategies would be considered in the process of
conceiving and enacting policies that will impact and improve NACC’s performance.
Limitations of the Study
In addition to the limitations outlined in chapter 1 of this study, which are
inherent to the study itself and tied to its generalizability, my inability to interview the
main director of NACC and equally recruit participants from the presidency who oversaw
all policies concerning the agency were additional limitations. Serving as critical
stakeholders of the organization, their views could have helped provide clearer insights
about the conceptual mindset of those who created the agency, explaining the original
intent of NACC at creation. This would help understanding the successes and challenges
of the agency from a stakeholder viewpoint.
Recommendations for Further Research
Findings of the study revealed that since its creation in 2006, NACC have not
succeeded in achieving outstanding results in the fight against corruption in Cameroon.
Corruption is still perceived to be on the rise in the country. Feedback from participants
indicated that this was not totally the fault of the agency, rather several factors ranging
from political to institutional and to conceptual challenges undercut the ability of the
agency to curb corruption. Most strategies that the agency implemented as attempts to
curb corruption in the country lacked good governance basis. As a result, strategies
lacked the impetus to thrive. As such, another study that could focus on determining the
importance of an institution like NACC in the fight against corruption in the country
might be needed. This could foster or redirect government’s choice for this method.
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Literature reviewed for this study revealed that in the past two decades, some
Central Eastern European countries were able to curb corruption problems by employing
some of the techniques and policies that NACC also implemented. I would recommend
that a comparative study of systems and anticorruption models be conducted on NACC’s
case vis-à-vis some of these countries that have recorded plausible successes in this area.
Such a study will help NACC and the government of Cameroon identify the deeper
features driving success in these models, and how to better design and implement in
Cameroon for more successful outcomes.
It is also recommended that a quantitative study be carried to calibrate the
understanding of anticorruption appreciation by the population. Chronic corruption
usually births a complacent culture in the population especially through systematic
behavior. Participants pointed out the example of traffic police officers on the road.
These officers collect bribes from motorists instead of issuing tickets for violations of
traffic rules. Most often, the plunder is shared with police supervisors at remote offices. If
anticorruption strategies must cure this corrupt practice, such strategies must be absorbed
by the population transforming the people to act honestly. Feedback from a study that
would focus on finding out how much the people understood and were involved in
anticorruption practices, would help NACC improve on different methods to foster
anticorruption awareness among the population.
The need for contextualization of anticorruption strategies was also identified
within the findings as a strategic approach that NACC could employ to adapt strategies
learned from elsewhere, especially through interaction with the international community.
It would be beneficial for future research and policy making in another study to
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determine how NACC’s strategies interact with the policy context of Cameroon. For
example, determining the relationship between poverty, corruption, and anticorruption.
Such contextual studies might result in the discovery of other factors that need to be
addressed in order to calibrate strategies to impact the anticorruption struggle.
I further suggest that future researchers wishing to add to NACC and the fight
against corruption in Cameroon, take into consideration factors such as access to
potential participants and assurance of their security before embarking on related studies,
so as to increase the chance of successfully carrying out the studies. Corruption is a
highly politicized and security sensitive issue in the country, and public servants at lower
levels hesitate to provide information that could implicate their superiors. This is
pertinent especially if the researcher cannot guarantee the anonymity of personal identity.
Trust building, clarifications, and assurance of the strict academic nature of the research
are some of the tactics that the researcher employs to retain the confidence of
participants.
The findings of this study shall be disseminated through journal publications,
seminars, workshops, presentation at conferences, and at NACC head office. I might
further seek to carry out a phenomenological study on the dynamics of the concepts of
corruption and anticorruption, to discover and define any specificities in the Cameroonian
society. It is also an objective, to have the findings introduced in different curricula on
corruption/anticorruption studies across the country in the form of pointers and simple
definitions that could be understood even by the youths.
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Implications for positive social change
This study has several positive social change implications which I believe will
increase the quest and attention paid to good governance by the government. The result
would improve systems and institutions, democratic processes of governance, and
government services to citizens. An improvement in NACC strategies would lead to
effective anticorruption practice and reduced corruption levels in the public service and
across the country. Another benefit is the improvement in government revenue, better
investment budgets and greater economic activity to alleviate poverty.
To deliver positive social change to the people, NACC would have to work in
concert with the government and its other agencies, NGOs in place, and the international
community. The concept of good governance is the cord that binds society and the
government in a productive synergy. As posited by Elahi (2009) and supported in
Graham, Amos, & Plumptre (2003), the control of corruption remains a significant
indicator of good governance. As such, to curb corruption, good governance principles
must be in play. If a government desires to see levels of corruption reduced in society, but
negates transparency and honesty public services, the rule of law, freedom of speech
(which means people being empowered to freely denounce corruption), public officers
held accountable for bad acts, and building strong institutions in the place of strong
individuals, then such a government would be making a serious mistake. This study like
others, emphasizes the need for good governance in Sub-Saharan Africa (Agbiboa, 2010;
Haruna, 2009; Spears, 2007; Wanasika, Howell, Littrell, & Dorfman, 2010; Plachy,
2009).
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Social change generally means the improvement of lives and the wellbeing of
people in a place, and it is the utmost intention of public policy to fulfill social change.
Improvement in public policy would therefore imply improvement in social change. This
study is aimed at assessing public policy that surrounds anticorruption practice in
Cameroon, with the hope that policy makers and other stakeholders would consult the
findings to better understand how government anticorruption strategies in the country
perform, and the areas in which reforms are needed.
This study will also contribute to positive social change in the area of education
and training, by recommending that further studies be conducted on the phenomena of
corruption and anticorruption in Cameroon, with simple pointers and definitions
developed and integrated in educational curricula across the country. If corruption is a
habit that is learned by society (Guerrero & Rodriguez-Oreggia, 2008; Crittenden, Hanna,
& Peterson, 2009; Kingston, 2008; Balafoutas, 2011; Ocheje, 2017), then anticorruption
would also be a habit that can be learned by society.
Lastly the study potentially contributes to positive social change in infrastructural
development. The recommendations from the findings of the study that government
services be computerized could increase the need for government to build new
infrastructure, to enhance new information technology systems and hardware that will
accommodate the innovation.
Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to explore government anticorruption strategies in
Cameroon as implemented by the government’s central anticorruption agency known as
the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC), and to understand how the said
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strategies reflected fundamental good governance principles. Furthermore, this study
addressed the policy context of the country as a quest for effectiveness in curbing
systematic public corruption in the country.
The study was guided by one overarching question and four sub-questions. The
findings of the study added to the NACC anticorruption body of knowledge in the
specific areas of good governance and contextualization of policies. Existing studies on
anticorruption practice in Cameroon do not explore or focus on NACC as the
anticorruption machinery of the government and the idea of good governance principles
guiding strategy formulation and implementation, and as well as strategies being adapted
to the policy context in place.
Also, most past studies on corruption issues in Cameroon tend to focus on the
causes of the problem, hoping that if all the causes are diagnosed properly, solutions
could easily be attained. But this study took a different route, which was that of exploring
the different solutions that are already out there, to see which ones best addressed the
problem that has already been identified. It is like a doctor spending more time to test the
efficacy of different drugs developed to cure a particular disease, rather than
concentrating only on investigating the different manifestations of the same disease and
failing to dedicate time to develop the medication for that disease.
Systemic and public corruption in Cameroon is not a speculative phenomenon,
rather it is a reality that’s common to the population. It would also take conscious
systemic approaches to develop and administer cures to the problem. But the motivation
to ignite change within the system must come from the people through some sort of a bigbang intervention as seen in Rothstein’s (2007) Big Bang theory of change. I do
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subscribe to the author’s approach of mustering forces from within to address the system.
The people must desire change and engage in the change process. Such desire would then
correspond with any government anticorruption effort to bring about positive results. The
people make up the government. The same people work in public offices. Therefore,
partnership between the government and the civil society becomes a necessity in the
anticorruption struggle.
To ensure credibility of the findings of this study, data collected for the study
through interviews were triangulated with data from documents collected from NACC
online information pool and from other professionals in this discipline who are based
physically in the country. During the interviews, I used open-ended questions and gave
the participants the opportunity to express themselves on the issues raised by the
questions in the interview protocol. All facts and expressions gathered were paraphrased
and reported accurately to ensure that the findings reflect the true perceptions of the
participants. Not surprisingly, some aspects of the analysis of the study concurred with
the findings of other previous studies on the subject. For example, the study revealed that
some of the shortcomings of NACC as an anticorruption machine for the country came
from institutional and operational weaknesses. On the same note, Nguemegne (2011) in a
study on anticorruption in Cameroon, posited that the country’s anticorruption system
failed because of numerous structural and functional weaknesses in the governance
system.
It will be in the best interest of the government and the population at large if
NACC looks into these assessments and take further steps to conduct studies on how to
develop solutions based on recommendations made in this study, in order to improve

212
anticorruption strategies. Senior level administration and the entire government system
(legislative, executive, and judiciary) should collaborate to make the recommended
reforms possible. Anticorruption laws, policies, and processes are connected to all
government branches, and the executive alone cannot possibly initiate and lead an
anticorruption system that will succeed significantly. In chronic and devastating
corruption levels like that of Cameroon, the anticorruption slogan should be “all hands on
deck”.
Finally, I do hope and expect that NACC and other governmental authorities and
institutions will welcome and embrace the good governance and contextualization bases
for formulating and implementing anticorruption policies and strategies as a public policy
and administration tool for approaching new policies moving forward. By so doing,
anticorruption practice in the country will improve, corruption will reduce, money will be
redirected to the right accounts, government will have more to invest thereby creating a
thriving economy for more citizens.
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Appendix A: Corruption Perception for Cameroon
Table A1: Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI): scores and
ranking for Cameroon (1995-2017)
YEAR
RANK
SCORE
LAST RANK OF PARTICIPATING
COUNTRIES (WORLDWIDE)
1995
37
1996
54
1997
52
1998
85
1.4
85
1999
99
1.5
99
2000
84
2.0
90
2001
84
2.0
91
2002
89
2.2
102
2003
124
1.8
133
2004
129
2.1
145
2005
137
2.2
158
2006
138
2.3
163
2007
138
2.1
179
2008
141
2.3
80
2009
146
2.2
180
2010
146
2.2
178
2011
134
2.5
182
2012
144
26
174
2013
144
25
175
2014
136
27
174
2015
130
27
167
2016
145
26
176
2017
153
25
180
Note. Scores range from 0-10 (from 1995 to 2011) and from 0-100 (from 2012 to 2017),
with 10 and 100 being the cleanest from corruption, while 0 is the most corrupt according
to respective eras of scoring methods as seen above. Last rank of participating countries
indicates the position occupied by the most corrupt country for that year globally, even
though more than one participant occupied some of the ranks. (Source – Transparency
International: Corruption Perception Index (1995-2017).
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Appendix B: Codes Represented in Iterations, Category Label, and Meanings
Figure B1
Iteration Level 1; Surface Content Analysis revealing Initial Codes
1a Central
2a Bribery
3a Tribalism, Language barrier,
4a Cultural
1a Centralized
2a Recruiting
Nepotism, Low salaries, Favoritism influences
1a Unique
unqualified
3a Disequilibrium – Victims as
4a Loose
1a Established
workers
Fighters
government
1a
2a Abuse of
4a Weak structures
Institutionalized
authority
3b Openness to the public
1a Controlled
3b Patriotism
4b National
2b Top
3b Financial propriety
dimensions
1b Displeased
ranking public 3b Service loyalty
4b Lack of
1b Problematic
officials
3b Respect of rule of law
knowledge and skill
1b Disease
perpetrate
3b Collaborative governments
4b Weak
1b Sad
bribery
3b Checks and balances
sensitization
1b Adverse
2b Illegal
instrument
consequences
‘cumulation’
3c Lack of cordial relationship
4b Collaborative
of functions
between government and the public corruption
1c Need for cure
2b defiance of 3c Lack of fairness
4b Porous
1c Need for
the merit
3c Lack of meritocracy
recruitment system
change
system
4b Inefficient and
1c System failure
3d Setting good examples at top
ineffective
1c Impunity
2c
levels
government
Imprisonment 3d Severe sanctioning of culprits
4b Recurrent nature
1d Insufficient
2c Layoffs
3d Purposeful investigation
of corruption
efforts
2c
3d Salary checks
1dLaxity
Anticorruption 3d Decentralization
4c Political climate
1d Controversy on campaigns
3d Communication
4c Lack of rigor
the fight
1d Leadership
3e Willingness to change
4d International
3e System reform
dynamics
1e Cultural inertia
3e Incompetence in government
4d Adaptation of
1e System
3e Corruption of bottom level
strategies
centralization
workers by top level workers
4d
Contextualization

Figure B2.
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1a Central
Anticorruption
Organ
1b Problematic
and Displeasing
1c Change
1d Insufficient
efforts
1e Role of
leadership

Iteration Level 2; Pattern Variables
2a Unqualified
3a Barriers
workers
3b Elements of Good
2b Legality and
Governance
meritocracy
3c Hindrances to
2c Instruments for Good Governance
combat
3d Establishing the
National
Anticorruption
Strategy
3e Government
behavior

4a Inertia
4b Impact
4c Conceptual and
managerial
mechanisms
4d External
influences
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Figure B3.
Iteration Level 3; Application to Data Set
1. What are the anticorruption strategies implemented by Cameroon’s NACC?
Themes: 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 1e
2. What can be learned from NACC’s past experience of working with
anticorruption policies and programs?
Themes: 2a, 2b, 2c
3. What tools do NACC agents feel are needed from the government to implement
effective anticorruption policies?
Themes: 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, 3e
4. How can the notion of adaptation of policies be used to potentially improve the
development and implementation of anticorruption strategies at NACC?
Themes: 4a, 4b, 4c, 4d
Table B1: Category Labeling of Codes
Category Label Key
1a Central
Anticorruption
Organ (CAO)
1b Problematic
and Displeasing
(PD)
1c Change (CH)
1d Insufficient
effort (IE)
1e Role of
Leadership (RL)

2a Unqualified
workers (UW)
2b Legality and
meritocracy (LM)
2c Instruments of
combat (IC)

3a Barriers (BR)

4a Inertia (IN)

3b Elements of
Good Governance
(EGG)

4b Impact (IP)

3c Hindrances to
Good Governance
(HGG)
3d Establishing
National
Anticorruption
Strategy (ENAS)
3e Government
behavior (GB)

4c Conceptual and
Managerial
mechanisms (CMM)
4d External
influences (EXTL)
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Table B2: Central Codes and Meanings
Code
Meaning
Central Anticorruption Organ NACC as central anticorruption agency for
government strategy including institutional and policy
strategies
Problematic and Displeasing
Public officials recognize corruption as a severe
problem and are not pleased with the situation
Change
Insufficient Effort
Leadership
Inertia
Unqualified

Legality and Meritocracy
Barriers
Mechanism

Elements

Hindrances
Government Behavior
Structure
Impact

The need for a cure to the problem of corruption
Government is not putting in the amount of effort
needed to combat and curb corruption
Thoughts about what the role of leadership should be
in this fight
Resistance to change; an attitude of government
workers accepting the status-quo of things as the
established rule
Civil servants/public officials accessing and occupying
offices without respecting proper recruitment
measures and the possession of required skills
Measures that ensure respect of the rule of law both
for access into the civil service and stay in it
Hindrances and obstacles to anticorruption efforts
Government organizational and functional machinery
of transparency, accountability, and public
responsibility, believed to be the right setting in which
corruption is curbed
Constitutive elements of Good Governance (respect of
rule of law, financial propriety, openness to public,
public-private collaboration, checks and balances,
patriotism, morality, collaborative governments,…etc.
Difficulties in establishing and observing principles of
good governance for effective anticorruption effort
How government reacts generally to the pervasive
state of corruption in the system
The institutions in place and the organizational form
of government and how they related to the problem of
corruption
The effects (achievements) of NACC in its
anticorruption effort
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Conceptual

How the government and public service has being
conceived administratively and politically, and its
relationship to corruption in terms of inhibition and/or
habitation

Managerial Issues

Loyalty

Probing technical aspects of NACC as the government’s
main organ for the combat against corruption
Steps and strategies taken and can be taken to combat
corruption
Work-consciousness for civil/public servants

Propriety

Proper handling of public finances and other responsibilities

Collaborative Governments

Effective communication and support among different
levels and departments of government
Government collaboration with international partners and
organizations on issues of corruption and the fight against it

Instruments

International Cooperation
Victims as Fighters

The prevailing situation whereby those who supposedly
should be fighting against corruption in the civil service and
government at large, are corrupters themselves

Cultural Influences

The link between the Cameroonian culture and the
prevalence of corruption in the system
System Reform
Proposed solutions to the problem of corruption in the
government of Cameroon and in the country at large
Tribalism, Language Barrier, Causes of corruption easily identified, different from those
Nepotism, Low Salaries,
that are latent
Favoritism
Impunity
Government’s attitude of not punishing culprits of
corruption
Centralization
Explains the concentration of government structures and
activities in one specific location – capital city of the
country
Disequilibrium
Natural dysfunction of the system, in terms of effort toward
the combat of corruption compared to the toll of corruption
Checks and Balances

A governance technique of ensuring transparency,
accountability, and public responsibility.

Anticorruption programs and Government’s anticorruption sensitization techniques
Campaigns
Incompetency
Civil servants/public officials not being able to do their job
properly, due to lack of skills and means
International Influence

Contributions from the international community, either in
the fight against corruption, or in its prevalence
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Appendix C: Interview Protocol
Assessing Governmental Anticorruption Strategies: The Case of the National
Anticorruption Commission in Cameroon
Date: ____________________________
Time of Interview: ____________________________
Location: _________________________
Name of Interviewer:
_______________________________________________________
Name of Interviewee:
_______________________________________________________
Brief Description of Study:
_______________________________________________________
Questions:
1. Please describe what you feel about corruption in Cameroon and the fight against
it, especially by the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC)?
2. What are some of the anticorruption strategies and mechanisms you think
government employs to combat corruption in Cameroon through NACC?
3. What has been your experience working with NACC on different anticorruption
programs and projects for the past years that you have been working with the
agency?
4. As a public servant working with the anticorruption commission, what do you
think are some of the effective strategies to combat corruption in the context of
Cameroon?
5. How effective do you think the government’s strategies in combating corruption
in the country have been?
6. What are some of the things you think government could do to ensure effective
anticorruption practice by NACC?
7. What is your opinion about the role of the international community in the fight
against corruption in Cameroon?
8. What are some of the international anticorruption strategies adopted by your
agency since you started working with them?
9. What is your experience with working with any imported policy strategies, in
terms of effective anticorruption practice and sustainability of positive results?
10. In your opinion, why is Cameroon still ranking poorly on Transparency
International’s list of countries according to corruption perception index (CPI)

246
Appendix D: Summative Interview Table
PA#
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
P6
P7
P8
P9
P10
P11
P12
P13
P14
P15
P16
P17
P18
P19
P20

Category
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None

Status

Source

Conducted via
Virtual Media
Conducted via
Virtual Media
Conducted via
Virtual Media
Conducted via
Virtual Media
Conducted via
Virtual Media
Conducted via
Virtual Media
Conducted via
Virtual Media
Conducted via
Virtual Media
Conducted via
Virtual Media
Conducted via
Virtual Media
Conducted via
Virtual Media
Conducted via
Virtual Media
Conducted via
Virtual Media
Conducted via
Virtual Media
Conducted via
Virtual Media
Conducted via
Virtual Media
Conducted via
Virtual Media
Conducted via
Virtual Media
Conducted via
Virtual Media
Conducted via
Virtual Media

Public Servant
at NACC
Public Servant
at NACC
Public Servant
at NACC
Public Servant
at NACC
Public Servant
at NACC
Public Servant
at NACC
Public Servant
at NACC
Public Servant
at NACC
Public Servant
at NACC
Public Servant
at NACC
Public Servant
at NACC
Public Servant
NACC
Public Servant
at NACC
Public Servant
at NACC
Public Servant
at NACC
Public Servant
at NACC
Public Servant
at NACC
Public Servant
at NACC
Public Servant
at NACC
Public Servant
at NACC

Saturation
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Format

Length

Recording

Transcript

Semi-structured
interview
Semi-structured
interview
Semi-structured
interview
Semi-structured
interview
Semi-structured
interview
Semi-structured
interview
Semi-structured
interview
Semi-structured
interview
Semi-structured
interview
Semi-structured
interview
Semi-structured
interview
Semi-structured
interview
Semi-structured
interview
Semi-structured
interview
Semi-structured
interview
Semi-structured
interview
Semi-structured
interview
Semi-structured
interview
Semi-structured
interview
Semi-structured
interview

3 hrs.
12 mins.
1 hr. 53
min.
1 hr. 44
mins.
1 hr. 47
mins.
2 hrs. 4
mins.
3 hrs. 13
mins.
2 hrs. 58
mins.
1 hr. 39
mins
1 hr. 15
mins.
1 hr. 50
mins.
2 hrs. 3
mins.
2 hrs. 53
mins
1 hr. 57
mins.
1 hr.
6 mins.
2 hrs. 50
mins.
1 hr. 11
mins.
1 hr. 29
mins.
1 hr. 14
mins.
1 hr. 49
mins.
2 hrs. 59
mins.

Word
Messaging
Word
Messaging
Word
Messaging
Word
Messaging
Word
Messaging
Word
Messaging
Word
Messaging
Word
Messaging
Word
Messaging
Word
Messaging
Word
Messaging
Word
Messaging
Word
Messaging
Word
Messaging
Word
Messaging
Word
Messaging
Word
Messaging
Word
Messaging
Word
Messaging
Word
Messaging

Transcribed/
5 pages
Transcribed/
5 pages
Transcribed/
6 pages
Transcribed/
5 pages
Transcribed/
6 pages
Transcribed/
7 pages
Transcribed/
9 pages
Transcribed/
9 pages
Transcribed/
4 pages
Transcribed/
5 pages
Transcribed/
6 pages
Transcribed/
5 pages
Transcribed/
6 pages
Transcribed/
5 pages
Transcribed/
5 pages
Transcribed/
5 pages
Transcribed/
5 pages
Transcribed/
5 pages
Transcribed/
5 pages
Transcribed/
5 pages

